In a recent broadcast, Russian commentator Vladimir Sovolyov, known for his nationalistic rhetoric, said that Russia’s priority should not lie with conflicts in Venezuela or Syria, but in Armenia and Central Asia which is within Russia’s “sphere of interest.” He also called for a military operation in these parts of the world if necessary:
The loss of Armenia – that’s a gigantic problem. Problems in our Asia, in Middle Asia, in Central Asia… that could be a gigantic problem for us. And we must very clearly articulate our goals and objectives. We must explain: the game is over. International law and international order be damned. If, for our national security, we needed to launch a strategic military operation on Ukrainian territory, why, for the same reasons, can’t we launch a strategic military operation in other parts of our sphere of influence?
This is not just a personal opinion. And Sovolyov is not an outlier. In authoritarian regimes, such as Russia, media discourse often substitutes for formal doctrine. Sovolyov is part of a media ecosystem that unofficially communicates Moscow’s foreign policy signals. Rhetoric as such, often voiced by public figures and media celebrities, serves as a trial balloon – floating positions or policies that may be later formalized in official doctrine, in order to see how certain target audiences (in this case Armenians and Central Asians) react.
Another target of this rhetoric is Russia’s own domestic audience, serving two purposes: to re-affirm the imperial self image of Russia among the “electorate” and to check whether they will support it in public and social discussions. Allowing media figures such as Sovolyov to air out interventionist ideas first, Moscow also preserves plausible deniability in the case of political escalation.
Quite like previous similar cases (such as the imperialistic claims made by historian Mikhail Solomin or by a co-chairman of the Fair Russia – For Truth Party Zakhar Pipelin) Somolyov’s remarks opened up a wave of public and partial-political responses from Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Armenia took an immediate hard line. On January 12, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Sergei Kopyrkin and issued a letter of protest expressing a “deep outrage by the statements made in the program on state television.” According to Ani Badalyan, spokesperson for Armenia’s MFA, “it was emphasized that these are an unacceptable encroachment and hostile manifestation against the sovereignty of the Republic of Armenia and grossly violate the fundamental principles of friendly relations between Armenia and Russia.”
No official condemnation has been issued by any Central Asian states yet. However, public reaction has been loud. Alisher Qodirov, a nationalist Uzbek politician, member of the Legislative Chamber and leader of the Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party, called Sovolyov’s statements propaganda that should be “taken with a cool head.” He emphasized that Central Asia is a “a region where blood-related states are united, capable of responding seriously to any aggression!”
Bobur Bekmurodov, chairman of the “Yuksalis” nationwide movement and a member of the Legislative Chamber, warned that provocations can turn neighbors into enemies: “Our borders are our honor. Any threat to our independence will be met not with ‘obedience,’ but with a decisive blow from the unity of our nation. Such provocations will only turn our neighbors into enemies. We have enough will, resources, and courage to defend our home!” he said in a Telegram post.
Dastan Bekeshev, a Kyrgyz politician , lawyer, and member of the Jogorku Kenesh, called for the Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs to summon the Russian ambassador and issue a letter of protest. He also suggested declaring Sovolyov persona non grata.
“Such a person should not be allowed into Kyrgyzstan,” Bekeshev said on Instagram.
Previously Bishkek banned Vladimir Zhirinovsky, then the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, from entering Kyrgyzstan after he suggested writing off Kyrgyzstan’s external debt to Moscow in exchange for Issyk-Kul lake in 2013. Kazakhstan declared Zhirinovsky persona non grata even earlier, in 2005, over his controversial claims of changing the Russia-Kazakhstan border.
In Kazakhstan, a member of the lower house of parliament and a member of the Majlis Committee on International Affairs, Aidos Sarym, informed Azattyk, RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, that “there is no need for a government-level response to the opinions of ‘propheticians’ like Solovyov” and that the public reaction in Kazakhstan was sufficient enough.
“It would be wrong for official state institutions and structures to protest the position of every political scientist and journalist in Russia. This isn’t a sign of determination and strength, but rather a manifestation of self-doubt and fear,” said Sarym. “If necessary, such individuals could be blacklisted and declared ‘persona non grata.’ Even today, many prominent Russian figures are on such lists.”
Astana has a longer list than Bishkek, and it reportedly includes Russian politicians, TV presenters and other propagandists such as late Tigran Keosaia, Tina Kandelaki, Andrei Grozin, Konstantin Zatulin, Yevgeny Fedorov, Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Pyotr Tolstoy, as well as the head of Rossotrudnichestvo, Yevgeny Primakov.
However, political analysts and researchers from Central Asia do not see Sovolyov’s statement as empty words to be ignored.
Kazakh political scientist Sharip Ishmukhamedov called it part of Moscow’s information war against Central Asia and remarked that a similar campaign was carried out against Ukraine before Moscow’s so-called special operation there in 2022. Ishmukhamedov sees Sovolyov as a journalist paid by the Russian government who knows “a little bit more than us,” including “the situation in the Kremlin” and “what is expected from him.” In this view, Sovolyov’s comments were a message delivered to the public from the Kremlin.
“I hope relevant bodies in Kazakhstan will take this situation into account and will take relevant decisions,” said Ishmukhamedov.
The first deputy director general of the National News Agency of Uzbekistan, lawyer Khushnudbek Khudoyberdiev, also does not think Sovolyov’s comment was just a personal statement from a random journalist. Khudoyberdiev speculated that the rhetoric was “discussed behind closed doors in the Kremlin and then downplayed” to see the public reaction. “The Russian tactic is that the government uses quotes from public activists to say what it wants,” wrote Khudoyberdiev. He, too, noted how Russian propaganda promoted similar claims against Ukraine for years before the war erupted.
As a solution, Khudoyberdiev suggested strengthening education and vocational training as well as diversifying the Uzbek economy. In his perspective, it is important “for us to leave the sphere of Russian influence,” which includes providing jobs for millions of Uzbeks who migrate to Russia for work.
Imperial rhetoric from Russian public figures does not mean that Moscow has an immediate operational plan to conduct a special operation in – or military aggression against – Central Asia. But it is a narrative of aggression, one that at the least is an attempt to remind certain audiences what Russia is – both to domestic audiences to self-soothe and to neighboring states in an attempt to set a hierarchy.
Solovyov’s comments, like those of others in recent years desperately clutching at an imagined imperial status, come as Russia’s material influence has been on the decline.
Central Asia, as ever, follows its multi-vector foreign policies, eschewing dependence on any one great power. China’s economic investments, Turkiye’s growing cultural influence, the West’s selective interests in varying areas – all greatly challenge Russia’s dominance in the region. Moscow feels that Central Asia is slipping away and is not its “backyard” anymore. Solovyov’s claims therefore do not represent Russia’s unquestionable dominance; they merely show Moscow’s anxiety.
