When Central African Republic (CAR) goes to the polls in December for its first election since a referendum paved the way for Faustin-Archange Touadéra to run for president an unlimited number of times, the likelihood of him winning another term will not be the only thing on the minds of opposition leaders.
Concerns are also mounting that the Russian and Rwandan interests that have swelled under Touadéra’s presidency will be further entrenched.
Touadéra came to power in the chronically unstable country in 2016 against a backdrop of three years of unrest spearheaded by rebel groups that had left thousands dead.
In 2018, the Russian mercenary outfit Wagner arrived and has since become so embedded that sources in CAR say it and its 36-year-old head of civilian operations, Dimitri Sytyi, operate independently of Africa Corps, Moscow’s newly centralised apparatus for managing its military footprint across Africa.
Since 2014, Rwandan troops have been stationed in CAR as part of the UN peacekeeping force Minusca. An additional 1,000 special forces were deployed following an attack on the capital in 2021. According to the International Crisis Group, their arrival “kept alive a peace process [between CAR’s government and insurgencies] that was deeply weakened”.
Initially, tensions ran high between the Russians and Rwandans owing to unclear mandates and overlapping zones of operation in the economic and security sectors. “It was not clear what was the job of each partner,” said Charles Bouëssel, the central Africa analyst at the International Crisis Group. “And President Touadéra wasn’t really making a decision to say, OK, Rwanda takes this area, and Russia takes that one.”
Things are clearer these days, observers say: Wagner handles the president’s personal security and is in charge of military operations in areas where rebels are active; Rwandan troops train special forces and operate in relatively calmer areas – the capital, Bangui, and along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo – where Rwanda has economic interests. The Rwandan government was approached to clarify its activity in CAR.
“Rwanda has less direct influence over the president because they don’t have the same proximity to him, nor the same methods and the same leverage as Wagner,” said Bouëssel.
Nevertheless, sources say Wagner operatives who focus primarily on gold and diamond mines frequently complain to CAR officials that despite assuming greater combat risks and suffering more casualties, they receive similar economic privileges as the Rwandans.
Rwandan entities are more discreet but present at all levels of the economy. Soft power is also in play: peacekeepers shovel rubbish in several arrondissements in Bangui, while events commemorating the 1994 Rwandan genocide are now held in the city – an initiative that experts say promotes the idea that Rwanda, having rebuilt itself after genocide, is uniquely capable of guiding CAR towards stability.
In different corners of Bangui, dozens of Rwandans, including former UN peacekeepers, have set up construction businesses, restaurants and clothing stores. There are also bigger investors linked to Crystal Ventures, which is owned by the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front party and is involved in key sectors including mining and agro-industries.
Although Touadéra is yet to publicly declare his candidacy for the December elections, many in Bangui consider his re-election a foregone conclusion. “There is not a lot of suspense,” said Bouëssel. “There is 99% chance that Touadéra will be re-elected.”
Kigali and Moscow are expected to support the incumbent, motivated by a desire to protect their strategic interests. Many of the country’s traditional western partners remain hesitant about helping finance the election and some fear a disruption of electoral activity in areas where armed groups are still active. Albert Mokpeme, a CAR government spokesperson, was approached for comment.
On 4 April, the opposition coalition, the Republican Bloc for the Defense of the Constitution, protested in Bangui against the third term, and plan to keep demonstrating in the coming weeks. But they face significant constraints including judicial harassment and travel bans. In January, two brothers of the former prime minister Henri-Marie Dondra, who is running for president, were arrested on allegations of plotting to poison the president.
The opposition is in disarray: some prefer to go ahead with a coalition while others want reforms first.
For years, Rwanda has leveraged peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool in the tiny landlocked nation. The same formula is in play everywhere: deploy troops to keep rebels at bay or train local forces and then secure investment. “There’s an obvious economic quid pro quo,” Danièle Darlan, the president of the Central African constitutional court from 2017 to 2022, told Le Monde last year.
The playbook has allowed the Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, to carve an axis of influence from Kigale upwards to CAR and downwards through the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to Mozambique.
While some in Touadéra’s circle openly admire the strongman model of governance in Russia and Rwanda, others in CAR are increasingly sceptical and some view their president as beholden to the foreign powers he invited in. “This fight is a fight for the republic,” Martin Ziguélé, a prominent opposition politician, said at the April protest. “A fight for respect for the Central African.”
