Sinwar’s Al-Aqsa Flood washed Iran’s axis away, but new groups could reach Israel

In 2017, Iran saw an opportunity.

Relations with Hamas had been strained for years, after the Gaza-based terror group backed the Sunni opposition to the Bashar al-Assad regime that Tehran was propping up in Syria.

Then, six years into the bloody civil war, Hamas selected two new chiefs seen as friendly toward Iran – Ismail Haniyeh as the movement’s overall leader based in Qatar, and Yahya Sinwar, the powerful new chief in Gaza.

With the new leadership in place, Iran engineered a reconciliation between Assad and Hamas, firming up the ring of armed proxies it had built around Israel.

Tehran, said Sinwar, is Hamas’s “largest backer financially and militarily.”

“All the missiles you might see in Gaza and Lebanon were created with Iran’s support,” boasted IRGC Aerospace Force commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh.

With Iran’s firm backing, Sinwar felt confident as his military force became more lethal, while Israel didn’t hide its desire to avoid any major conflict in Gaza.

Six years later, the support for Sinwar would prove one of the Islamic Republic’s greatest blunders.

Iran’s high water mark

The Hamas commander, confident that his forces could inflict enough casualties on Israel to stop a ground invasion and that Iran and its network would come to its aid, launched the surprise invasion of southern Israel on October 7, 2023.

It was the high water mark of the Iranian axis. Sinwar believed that the attack he termed the “Al-Aqsa Flood” would spring other leaks, forcing the walls Israel had built around itself to burst. Instead, his fanatical assault caused a wave that is washing Iran’s proxies away from Israel’s borders, one that might end up drowning the regime itself.

After Hamas enjoyed several hours of success on October 7, Israel regained control of the situation and moved to the offensive. It ground Hamas’s military down in a matter of months.

When Hezbollah refused to stop its rocket fire, Israel finally unleashed a series of strikes on the Lebanese group’s commanders before moving ground forces across the border. After losing thousands of fighters, most of its rockets, and much of its command, Hezbollah threw in the towel, agreeing to a ceasefire that left what was left of Hamas on its own against Israel.

Israel didn’t have to lift a finger for the next domino to fall. Seeing that Hezbollah and Iran were exhausted and that Russia was stretched to the limit in Ukraine, Syrian rebels poured out of their statelet in the northwest, driving south until they took the capital.

The loss to Iran is tremendous. “The entire Iranian project was built on Syrian soil, to a large extent with Assad’s consent,” explained Carmit Valensi, head of the Northern Arena Program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.

From Syria, Iran was able to supply Hezbollah, move Shi’ite militias across the region, and smuggle arms into the West Bank through Jordan.

The wave moves east

The fragility of the Syrian regime was a surprise, but that was the price Assad paid for his survival. When Sunni rebels threatened to end his rule in 2015,  Assad had to invite Iran and Russia in to save his throne — and likely his head — in 2015. The gamble succeeded in freezing the conflict and leaving Assad in power, but it meant Syria would turn into a hollowed-out husk of a state.

“Russia was never interested in genuine peace and Iran was never interested in Syria,” said Anna Borshchevskaya of The Washington Institute.

“When you have actors who take over, who are not interested in peace, you realize that no conflict is ever truly frozen, and Russia is a master at managing frozen conflicts,” she continued.  “It’s only a matter of time before there’s a spark and things get out of control.”

The question now is how far east the wave that swept Assad aside will reach. With Iran’s help, Shi’ites and their militias now dominate Iraq. Yet a decade ago the Islamic State spilled out of Syria into northern Iraq, a scenario which is once again conceivable, even if a different Sunni armed group leads the way. Or perhaps Sunnis and Kurds within Iraq will sense an opportunity to assert themselves against Shi’ite militias and the government their sect dominates.

“There is definitely reason to expect others to say, wait, why don’t we do this as well?” said Yossi Kuperwasser, former head of the research division in IDF Military Intelligence.

The wave could wash even further, all the way to Iran itself.

The regime, already despised by much of the population, looks feckless. With its own population suffering from economic sanctions, it pumped billions of dollars out of the country and into the hands of its proxies. Tehran has little to show for its investment — the arms it sent to Hezbollah were destroyed or captured by Israel. Syria’s military hardware is now in the hands of Sunni groups.

Not only couldn’t Iran defeat its enemies, but it has made the region suddenly far more dangerous for the Shi’ites it claims to protect.

‘Nothing is finished’

Iran losing all of its allies on Israel’s borders was unimaginable before October 7. Yet it brings with it dangers — some familiar, some new — for the Jewish state.

“Nothing is finished,” said Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

“The Shi’ite axis hasn’t given up its dreams of getting rid of us, nor have they given up on holding onto Lebanon for that purpose,” he continued.

Iran and its battered camp will have to come up with new routes to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah, and new ways to threaten Israel, but they are sure to keep trying.

The rebel groups, even though they include committed jihadists and ostensibly reformed ex-jihadists, aren’t going to pose a threat to Israel in the near term as the clash between Sunni and Shi’a armed groups intensifies in Syria and potentially Iraq.

“They have other enemies,” said Valensi. “They’ll look to finish the fighting in Syria against the remnants of Assad supporters. Israel was on the bottom of their priorities anyway.”

Moreover, since breaking ties with al-Qaeda in 2016, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammed al-Golani has sought to portray himself as a moderate.

In recent days, he started signing his statements under his real name — Ahmed al-Sharaa, and assured minorities they would face no harm.

Rebel commander Anas Salkhadi appeared on state TV with a similar message: “Syria is for everyone, no exceptions. Syria is for Druze, Sunnis, Alawites, and all sects.”

That message might be prudent right now, but it doesn’t mean it will remain that way.

“I don’t buy his conversion, said Yogev Elbaz, fellow at The Moshe Dayan Center, “He’s a pragmatist.”

Turkey’s time

The weakness of the Iranian axis in the face of Israeli attacks was an opportunity for HTS to make its move against Assad. It is also an opportunity for its main backer, Turkey.

“There was a vacuum,” said Borshchevskaya. “And Turkey took advantage of that moment and was able to fill it.”

“Because of its dominant influence and long-standing support for the Syrian rebels, Turkey will have great influence” in post-Assad Syria, explained INSS Turkey expert Gallia Lindenstrauss.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a bitter Israel critic, will look to weaken Kurdish autonomy and get Syrian refugees in Turkey to head back to Syria.

Members of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) deploy outside Ghwayran prison in Syria’s northeastern city of Hasakeh on January 26, 2022 (AFP)

Erdogan also could, for domestic reasons or to pull support from Iran to his axis, decide to double down on his hostility to Israel through Turkey-backed Sunni groups in Syria.

It might sound far-fetched to imagine that Turkey would pursue policies that risk sparking military action by Israel, but recent history shows that Erdogan is willing to get awfully close to that line against regional rivals.

The proxy war between Turkey and Egypt in Libya looked as if it could turn into a direct confrontation in 2020, when Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi threatened direct military force if Turkish-backed forces attacked the city of Sirte

The same year, Ankara heightened tensions with other Mediterranean rivals. A French mission to stop weapons smuggling to Libya was harassed by Turkish warships, whose sailors manned their weapons. Months later, Turkey sent a civilian vessel, accompanied by warships, to survey for oil and gas in waters claimed by Greece. At one point, according to Reuters, Greek and Turkish warships collided.

Though Israel found an aggressive formula for dealing with Iran-backed groups, it will find it much harder to come up with a response to potential threats from Turkish proxies. There is no military option against Turkey, a NATO member and trading partner for Israel.

Moreover, Turkey is a more nuanced actor than Iran, pursuing relationships with proxy groups that leave it with more deniability.

Still, there would be incentives for both Turkey and Israel to move beyond the animosity that marked the relationship after October 7. The stage seems set for Iran and Turkey to face off in Syria through their proxies in the coming years, and Turkey could use Israel’s intelligence and military cooperation.

“The situation in Syria requires communication that will prevent misunderstandings between Israel and Turkey there,” said Lindenstrauss.