Syria after Assad: How Sweida flareup could herald a deeper national crisis

Seven months after the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria’s fragile transition is under severe strain. In addition to political instability, the country faces a deep crisis of identity and representation. 

Tensions have escalated in the south, where a violent confrontation in Sweida has forced the transitional government to confront its limited reach and legitimacy. A series of Israeli air strikes on military sites in Damascus and government positions near Sweida, presented as efforts to protect the Druze minority, have magnified the weakness of central authorities and prompted broader mobilisation among tribal and local forces.

At the heart of this unrest is the Druze community, a small but historically significant religious minority concentrated in southern Syria. 

The Druze have long stood at the edge of Syria’s national politics, asserting local autonomy without seeking a full confrontation with Damascus. But decades of economic neglect, along with a security vacuum and lack of political representation, have deepened frustrations, particularly among younger Druze.

This latent discontent came to the fore during the 2023 protest movement in Sweida, where demonstrators called for the ousting of former President Bashar al-Assad. The movement signalled a turning point: an assertion of civic demands wrapped in communal identity, with some calling for federalism or genuine decentralisation as the only viable path forward.

Meanwhile, in the northeast, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continue to operate outside the transitional government’s authority. Their refusal to integrate into a national military structure is more than institutional resistance; it reflects a competing vision for Syria’s future. 

This deadlock, coupled with rising tensions between the SDF and Turkey, underscores the challenge of reconciling Syria’s patchwork of self-governing zones with any notion of a unified state.

Long-standing grievances

Syria faces three interlinked crises: Sweida’s Druze mobilisation, the northeast’s political standoff, and the transitional government’s inability to manage Syria’s diversity. Israel and Turkey have become the two most influential regional actors in the post-Assad period.

Without a new political formula that recognises local autonomy and shared governance, Syria risks further fragmentation. Sweida may become a precedent, rather than an exception.

Although Sweida remained relatively stable during much of Syria’s civil war, this stability masked long-standing grievances between the Druze and neighbouring Bedouin communities, rooted in disputes over land ownership and tensions between sedentary and nomadic ways of life. Clashes have flared and subsided over the decades.

The presence of government troops is viewed by many communities not as a step towards rebuilding trust, but as the reappearance of a coercive state they had long rejected

The latest round of violence began as a local dispute, but quickly escalated into a broader conflict involving heavy weapons and rising casualties. Government forces were deployed to contain the situation, but their intervention was widely viewed by Druze communities as both partial and provocative. Many saw the deployment as siding with the Bedouin, infringing the Druze’s long-standing commitment to local autonomy.

The Israeli air strikes that followed were publicly justified as measures to protect the Druze. Yet rather than de-escalating the situation, they exposed the fragility of the transitional government and the vacuum of authority in the south. As state forces withdrew from key areas, their absence only deepened the sense of insecurity.

Fearing retaliation, Bedouin leaders appealed to their tribal kin across Syria. As tribal militias mobilised and began moving south, the contours of the conflict shifted; what began as a provincial clash quickly spiralled into a national crisis, reawakening fears of a wider sectarian and tribal conflict. 

The transitional government has thus been forced into an impossible position: either reassert control and risk further inflaming tensions, or stand back and allow local actors to fill the void. Neither option offers a clear path forward.

Divergent visions

At the same time, the northeast remains locked in a political and territorial impasse. The Kurdish-led SDF’s refusal to integrate into the national military structure reflects its fundamentally different vision for Syria.

The SDF leadership is intent on preserving the autonomous governance model it developed during the war, based on decentralisation and multi-ethnic representation. For the SDF, any return to centralised control risks reversing hard-won gains, threatening the fragile regional balance. 

For Damascus, however, formalising regional autonomy is a red line. The administration fears this could fragment the country and weaken its own position.

Negotiations between the SDF and Syria’s transitional authorities have stalled, and the situation is tense. Turkey continues to apply pressure militarily along the border, and politically through its support for armed factions opposed to Kurdish self-rule.

The United States, meanwhile, has maintained a limited presence and continues to back the SDF in the fight against Islamic State remnants. But Washington has made clear that its support is not open-ended, and that it expects a long-term political settlement to emerge from within Syria.

In the northeast, as in the south, the core issue is not just who controls territory, but what kind of Syria will emerge from the ruins of the old regime. The standoff reflects a deeper failure of the transitional government to offer a political framework broad enough to accommodate competing demands. Instead of drawing diverse factions into a shared national project, the new state risks becoming just another centre to resist.

As President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s transitional government struggles to assert meaningful authority over a deeply fractured landscape, the real power in many areas lies not with national institutions, but with local militias and tribal councils. Public services are inconsistent, state institutions are under-resourced, and accountability mechanisms remain largely absent.

Efforts to centralise power have not restored confidence. The presence of government troops is viewed by many communities not as a step towards rebuilding trust, but as the reappearance of a coercive state they had long rejected.

Broader disengagement 

Sweida has thus exposed the limits of the transitional government’s model. Without a credible vision for political inclusion and power-sharing, the risk is not merely that Sweida remains restive. It is that its experience becomes a template for other regions – each turning inward, asserting its own structures of authority, and disengaging from a centre that offers little beyond rhetoric.

Syria’s political future remains deeply uncertain. The transitional government has inherited not just a broken state, but a fragmented society without a shared vision for what comes next.

The most constructive outcome would be a negotiated form of decentralisation – one that acknowledges the realities on the ground and grants regions like Sweida and the northeast meaningful self-governance within a broader national framework. Such a model would not resolve all tensions, but it could offer a foundation for coexistence, recognising diversity as a structural feature of the new Syria, rather than a threat to its unity.

A more likely path, however, is continued fragmentation. In this scenario, the country would remain formally intact, but functionally divided into competing zones of influence – each with its own political logic, security apparatus and external patrons. This model would risk institutionalising inequality and fuelling resentment between regions.

The most dangerous trajectory is a renewed descent into civil war. If the transitional government continues to assert central control without legitimacy, and if local actors see no space for genuine political participation, identity-based mobilisations could spark a new cycle of violence. But this time, the battle lines would not be drawn between the regime and opposition; they would emerge instead from rival communities, self-declared authorities and contested visions for the state.

Regional influences

While domestic dynamics are driving much of Syria’s fragmentation, regional actors continue to shape the boundaries of what is possible – and what is not. In the current phase, two powers stand out in their influence: Israel and Turkey.

Israel has made clear that it will not tolerate any security vacuum along its borders, especially where it perceives threats linked to Hezbollah or other Iranian proxies. Its recent air strikes served as a stark reminder of Israel’s red lines – and its readiness to act unilaterally in defence of its strategic interests.

Turkey, meanwhile, has expanded its influence in northern Syria through affiliated armed groups and administrative control over key areas. Its overriding concern remains the containment of Kurdish autonomy, complicating any attempts at national reconciliation or unified governance in Syria.

The fall of the Assad regime removed a central pillar of authoritarian control, but it did not resolve the deeper questions of identity, representation and governance

By contrast, Iran and Russia, once central actors in Syria’s war, have receded into the background. Preoccupied with internal crises and overstretched internationally, both have limited capacity or will to shape Syria’s post-Assad order. Their reduced presence has left a vacuum that is being filled not by diplomacy or reconstruction, but by local actors and foreign powers with narrow agendas.

For the transitional government, in the absence of a clear regional consensus or sustained international commitment, the new Syrian state faces the challenge of rebuilding under the shadow of fragmentation – often with external actors working at cross purposes.

Syria is no longer at war, but neither is it at peace. The fall of the Assad regime removed a central pillar of authoritarian control, but it did not resolve the deeper questions of identity, representation and governance that continue to divide the country.

In Sweida, a long-marginalised community has moved from quiet discontent to open mobilisation. In the northeast, the SDF refuses to integrate into a national framework it does not trust. Across the country, the transitional government has failed to offer a political model capable of bridging these divides; instead, its actions have often deepened mistrust.

The crisis in Sweida is not an isolated episode. It is a warning that without structural changes, other regions may follow a similar path, turning inwards to defend their own interests. What we are witnessing may not be the exception – it may be the future.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.