Taiwan’s latest hypersonic missiles allow for precise long-range strikes on China’s vital infrastructure and military installations, a significant advancement in the self-governing island’s defense strategy amid rising tensions with Beijing.
Last month, multiple media sources reported that Taiwan is developing hypersonic missiles capable of striking targets deep into northern China, with ranges extending beyond 2,000 kilometers.
The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) has already mass-produced the Ching Tien supersonic cruise missile, with a 1,200–2,000 kilometer range, and is working to upgrade it into the Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile.
Taiwan reportedly began producing the Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile in late 2024 and delivered small quantities to the Taiwanese Air Force and Missile Command. In the future, Taiwan aims to deploy 10 sets of mobile systems with 20 missiles at Pingtung County, south of the island, according to reports.
The Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile will reportedly transition from bunker-style launch systems to mobile platforms, enhancing survivability and strike capability. The Taiwanese military considers 12×12 chassis trucks from Czech manufacturer Tatra as primary launch vehicles, while US-made Oshkosh M983 trucks are an alternative.
The Ching Tien missile series, first deployed last year, represents Taiwan’s inaugural strategic weapon capable of reaching targets as far as Hohhot, Inner Mongolia. The project, reportedly part of an NT$13.5 billion (US$411 million) budget under the codename “Feiji No 2,” underscores Taiwan’s push to bolster deep-strike capabilities amid escalating regional tensions.
Efforts also involve developing advanced materials and rocket engines to refine the missiles further, with the NCSIST leveraging domestic expertise to achieve hypersonic speeds. This initiative aligns with Taiwan’s strategic pivot toward more mobile and survivable defense systems.
Asia Times has previously reported on Taiwan’s long-range missile projects. Taiwan has unveiled the Hsiung Feng IIE (HF-2E) long-range cruise missile, targeting critical Chinese installations and cities like Beijing and Shanghai.
This missile, with a reported range of up to 1,200 kilometers, demonstrates Taiwan’s intent to counter potential naval blockades and preemptive strikes by China.
Developed by the NCSIST, the HF-2E employs advanced navigation and propulsion systems to achieve high accuracy, comparable to the US Tomahawk missile. Taiwan is also advancing the Yung Feng supersonic cruise missile and reportedly tested the Ba Dan ballistic missile, though US opposition has limited its progress.
Additionally, Taiwan aims to increase annual missile production to nearly 500 units, focusing on indigenously manufactured systems to ensure strategic autonomy.
In a 1945 article this month, Christian Martin mentions that the missile’s range gives Taiwan the ability to strike deep into mainland China, potentially targeting key energy infrastructure such as liquid natural gas terminals, oil ports, petroleum refineries, gas power plants and nuclear power plants.
Martin says that these sites, located primarily on or near China’s west coast, are within the Ching Tien’s reach, making them potential targets in the event of a conflict.
He notes that Ching Tien’s deployment sends a strong message to China, emphasizing Taiwan’s capability to inflict significant damage on critical infrastructure and deter a potential invasion or debilitating blockade.
Further, Ian Easton mentions in a decade-old report for Project 2049 Institute that Taiwan’s military has built a robust counterstrike doctrine targeting vulnerabilities in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) reconnaissance-strike network.
Emphasizing interdiction of critical nodes, Easton notes that Taiwan maintains precision strike capabilities to disrupt PLA command centers, communication hubs and infrastructure.
According to Easton, Taiwan’s doctrine prioritizes intelligence-driven, politically calibrated strikes focusing on PLA assets such as command centers, airbases and naval facilities.
Aside from missiles, he notes Taiwan integrates unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) systems for surveillance, electronic warfare and targeting support while testing advanced unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) for countering PLA radar and missile sites.
Easton mentions that the Taiwanese Navy fields subsonic and supersonic missiles for maritime and coastal targets while ground forces deploy heavy guns and rocket artillery capable of area saturation.
He says these systems collectively enhance Taiwan’s ability to deter and counter PLA operations, highlighting a strategic shift towards resilient, precision-guided and technologically advanced deterrence measures.
The Ching Tien, alongside Taiwan’s other missiles, may form the backbone of a proposed “pit viper” strategy, emphasizing counterstrike capabilities to deter aggression by threatening China’s key cities and infrastructure.
Such strikes may also be a form of psychological warfare. Taiwan may be taking a page from Ukraine’s playbook in the Russo-Ukrainian War by bringing the war to Russia through long-range strikes deep in Russian territory.
Ukraine has hoped such strikes would break the “social contract” between the Russian leadership and people, especially in cities such as Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Such a social contract may imply that as long as the Russian leadership keeps the conflict out of people’s lives, the latter will continue to support the war.
However, Taiwan may note that such Ukrainian strikes have apparently had limited effects on Russian popular opinion and support for the wider war effort. Such strikes may have given the Russian leadership a strong argument for its people to continue supporting the war despite high casualties among Russian soldiers.
Similarly, China’s leadership could use Taiwanese strikes to make its case for the Chinese people to support an invasion and seizure of Taiwan. China may need such support in case a possible decapitation operation against Taipei’s leadership fails, leading to a protracted conflict with the US and its allies supporting Taiwan.
In February 2024, Asia Times reported that the PLA might need a minimum of 300,000 to 400,000 soldiers to seize Taiwan following swift air and missile strikes aimed at eliminating Taiwan’s leadership.
But should these decapitation strikes fail, the PLA may need to send up to 2 million troops to take control of Taiwan, with that massive number required to ensure numerical superiority against defending Taiwanese forces.
The risk of retaliation strikes against mainland China has triggered debates for and against an invasion.
In a December 2019 RAND dissertation, John Meyers says that advocates stress that such strikes are crucial to targeting high-value Chinese assets, including missile sites and command centers, to blunt its military effectiveness and avert heavy US losses in a potential conflict.
On the other hand, Meyers says that critics point out that China’s nuclear arsenal poses a significant escalation threat, as even limited strikes might be misinterpreted as the precursor to a broader campaign, raising the likelihood of nuclear retaliation.
Moreover, he mentions that critics argue that striking the homeland of a nuclear-armed state could severely damage US credibility, violate international norms and alienate allies, complicating global support. He adds that critics warn of the risks of prolonged conflict, as China could double down on a war it perceives as existential.
Meyers says that while proponents argue these strikes are necessary for restoring operational balance, detractors highlight their escalatory nature and strategic hazards. He notes that the debate reflects a critical dilemma for US military planners: balancing tactical gains against the risks of nuclear escalation and geopolitical fallout.
