As the war in Ukraine grinds on and tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait, comparisons between the two flashpoints have become common. But for all the talk of parallels, one glaring lesson remains unheeded in Taipei: civil society must be battle-ready before any conflict begins.
The slogan “Defending Ukraine is defending Taiwan” has gained traction among international policy elites. With the return of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, the parallel between Taiwan and Ukraine has become even more pronounced, as concerns over Ukraine’s potential abandonment by the U.S. have reignited and intensified the conversation. For many in Taipei and Washington alike, Ukraine’s endurance in the face of Russian aggression is seen as a metaphor for Taiwan’s future resilience. However, this comparison, while compelling, overlooks the most pressing disparity: Ukraine’s civil society was well-prepared. Taiwan’s is not.
Taiwan recently conducted its largest-ever Han Kuang exercises, which stretched twice as long as usual and mobilized over 20,000 reservists in live-fire scenarios staged in everyday settings, from train stations to schoolyards. Children watched as smoke clouds and blank rounds filled the air. This year’s drills included unprecedented civilian-facing components, such as emergency response simulations and cyberattack countermeasures. The message to Beijing and Washington was clear: “We are defending ourselves.” But is that enough?
Despite these expanded exercises, Taiwanese civil defense remains, to some extent, performative rather than structural – or the structural component stays outside of the media cameras. Programs like Kuma Academy have begun to raise awareness and offer civil defense training, but their reach remains limited. Han Kuang exercises only began systematically integrating civilians in 2025, three decades after they were first launched. And while reservist training has expanded, ordinary citizens remain largely spectators rather than participants.
This reflects a deeper issue. Many Taiwanese still treat war as unthinkable. Years of peace and prosperity have dulled the sense of urgency. Unlike Ukrainians, who by late 2021 had begun to accept invasion as an inevitable risk, many in Taiwan maintain psychological distance. A 2025 poll by National Chengchi University showed that while more than 60 percent of respondents identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, most prefer to maintain the status quo over seeking formal independence. In Taiwan, identity is shaped more by culture and lifestyle than existential political commitment.
Ukraine was different. After the 2014 Revolution of Dignity and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian society mobilized from the bottom up. Grandmothers knitted socks for strangers at the front. Villages sent food. Volunteers formed territorial defense units and supply chains. By the time of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, that resilience had matured into a hardened national defense network. Civilian readiness was an integral part of daily life. Ukrainian identity came to mean democracy, sovereignty, and resistance to imperial domination.
In Taiwan, by contrast, civil-military integration remains weak. Public interest in geopolitical threats is very often comparatively low. Many young people are disengaged from debates on national security. Defense policy is frequently left to the state and military establishment.
Taiwanese authorities have begun addressing this gap. But the scale is still insufficient. Taiwan’s “baby steps” toward resilience remain tentative and lack clear direction. Even recent conscription reforms – extending mandatory service from four months to one year – appear to be reactive rather than transformative. Civilian participation in the Han Kuang drills is only now being introduced, and the delay speaks volumes.
Meanwhile, China has been preparing its society for decades. Through patriotic education, ideological discipline, and social control mechanisms, Beijing has cultivated a population conditioned to support the state in conflict. Taiwan’s strategy has been the opposite: depoliticize, demilitarize, and hope for deterrence through foreign alignment. The discrepancy could be catastrophic.
Security guarantees are not security strategies. Ukraine learned this with the failure of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. When the invasion came, international support was crucial – but insufficient without internal resilience. Taiwan risks a similar fate. Its defense posture relies heavily on U.S. backing under the Taiwan Relations Act, yet in a crisis, external help could be delayed or constrained by legal ambiguity, political division, or fear of escalation with China. Moreover, to receive American aid, Taiwan must demonstrate its readiness to resist, as the U.S. will not come to save those who don’t want to fight for themselves. Even in the event of a robust U.S. response, it would take time – something Taipei might not have.
China’s likely strategy for taking Taiwan would be a swift and overwhelming assault, aimed at preventing foreign intervention and minimizing civilian resistance. It may not be framed as a war, but rather as a “quarantine,” “peacekeeping operation,” or a “domestic stabilization campaign.” Taipei may have only hours to respond. Without a mobilized population, no volume of imported hardware will be enough.
Even Taiwan’s recent drills, despite their expanded scope, underscore the problem. Civilian-facing exercises may look impressive, but they remain isolated and symbolic. Watching blank rounds fired in a train station doesn’t prepare civilians to act. Unless these gestures evolve into a national civic mobilization strategy, the island remains vulnerable.
Despite dramatic headlines and regular military provocations, Taiwan must fully absorb the lessons of Ukraine. The comparison may be imperfect, but the warning is unmistakable: war may not come tomorrow – or ever – but in Xi Jinping’s era, national rejuvenation and “reunification” remain core objectives of the Chinese Communist Party.
