On June 13, Israel began an air-campaign against facilities associated with Iran’s nuclear program, and carried out targeted assassinations against leading military figures and scientists. Israel’s stated rationale was that Iran was getting perilously close to developing a nuclear weapon. On June 22, the United States joined the conflict by striking three Iranian nuclear facilities.
The implications of the unfolding crisis stretch far beyond the Middle East. On the Korean Peninsula, the Israeli and U.S. targeting of Iran’s latent nuclear capabilities is likely to strengthen North Korea’s sense of justification in pursuing its own nuclear arsenal, which is estimated to amount to around 50 warheads (about half of what Israel possesses). However, the attacks should bestow no such confidence upon those in South Korea who advocate for their own nuclear armament, or the pursuit of nuclear hedging. Israel’s attack on Iran shows exactly why a South Korean nuclear program would be a dangerous pursuit.
Nuclear Hedging in Iran and South Korea
Like Iran, South Korea has been suggested as a nuclear candidate. The two countries certainly differ in many ways: one is a dictatorship and international pariah; the other is a vibrant democracy and a key player in international trade. However, they both face rivals armed with nuclear weapons, which has driven them to pursue nuclear hedging.
Iran’s hedging efforts have progressed far further than South Korea. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the international nuclear watchdog, Iran has accumulated 406 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. Integration of this fissile material into a viable nuclear weapon would likely take around one year.
South Korea pursued a nuclear program in the mid-1970s and engaged in minor enrichment efforts in the early 2000s but is adhering to its non-proliferation commitments today. South Korea does have large supplies of uranium, but a bilateral 123 Agreement with the United States limits enrichment to below 20 percent, which is not weapons grade.
Unlike Iran, South Korea does not have facilities to enrich uranium, nor does it have facilities to reprocess plutonium (another path to the bomb). Recently, many in Seoul have pushed for renegotiation of the 123 Agreement to change this, so that South Korea could “sprint” to the bomb if the security environment deteriorates further. South Korean policy elites have said that a withdrawal of the U.S. security umbrella would be the most likely trigger. Maintaining the ability to sprint to the bomb would constitute a “latent deterrent” to dissuade North Korean aggression.
It is worth noting that President Lee Jae-myung and his administration oppose both nuclear latency and nuclear armament. But the underlying structural drivers of South Korean proliferation have not gone away with the departure of the Yoon administration, which was far keener to pursue it.
Cautionary Tales From the Middle East
Although few in Seoul tend to draw direct comparisons with Iran, Israel’s attack on the Iranian nuclear program should induce caution in South Korean nuclear proponents.
First, a latent deterrent is unreliable. While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Nethanyahu’s beleaguered domestic position and the recent loss of Iranian proxies like Syria and Hezbollah certainly enabled the attack, Israel justified it by pointing to Iran’s approach to the bomb. Similarly, North Korea could justify attacks on South Korean facilities implicated in a latent deterrent.
The biggest difference is that South Korea, unlike Iran, is covered by U.S. extended deterrence. However, the sprint toward the bomb is where things would get truly dangerous. A true push by South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons would most likely be triggered precisely by the withdrawal of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment that constitutes the best insurance against North Korean preventative strikes.
To avoid a North Korean preventative attack during the sprint, some in Seoul have suggested that South Korea should pursue its weapons clandestinely. The likelihood that South Korea can do this is very low. International monitoring regimes under the IAEA Additional Protocol system are extremely strict, and the international community would likely sanction South Korea as well, making the effort even harder.
Even if South Korea was able to construct a weapon, it would not be able to test it: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization maintains more sensors on and around the Korean Peninsula than anywhere else in the world. Without a tested capability, South Korea would not be able to prove the reliability of its deterrent, making the whole effort as futile as it is dangerous.
Some have suggested that South Korea could pursue a “bomb in the basement” approach, following the example of Israel, which has never confirmed nor denied the existence of its nuclear weapons. However, the Iranian missile counterattacks on Israel show that a basement bomb is no fool-proof deterrent either.
Finally, the risk of escalation would be greater. North Korea’s ability to strike South Korea far exceeds Israel’s ability to strike Iran. The two Middle Eastern countries are separated by several other countries; between the two Koreas there is only a narrow demilitarized zone. Adding to this risk, just like Iranian military officials and scientists were targeted by Israeli infiltrators, South Korea must recognize the risk of North Korean “sleeper cells” filling a similar function as well.
A Bad Example
There is another, less obvious implication: Israel’s and now the United States’ targeting of Iran’s nuclear program – and the Syrian and Iraqi programs before that – have cemented such attacks as a core feature of the international counterproliferation system. Article 56 of the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol forbids attacks on nuclear facilities but only covers attacks on nuclear power plants. Major nuclear powers, including the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty – China, France, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S. – have kept the option to attack nuclear facilities open.
What this means is that not only North Korea, but perhaps also Russia, could argue that South Korean nuclear facilities are just as legitimate as targets for preventative attacks as the Iranian facilities are for Israel. The United States’ support for Israel only serves to strengthen this argument. Russia’s attack and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine demonstrates that it has little qualms about the targeting of nuclear facilities. The transfer of Russian military technology certainly constitutes the main risk of the Russia-North Korea alliance, but Russia’s further involvement in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula in some shape or form cannot be excluded.
What South Korea Should Do
The South Korean government expressed “grave concern” over Israel’s action and is outspokenly anti-nuclear. Under Lee, Seoul is highly unlikely to sprint to the bomb or even pursue nuclear hedging.
But the Lee administration should also work actively to curtail the ability of a future Korean government to develop a latent deterrent. One way to do this is to “black box” South Korea’s enrichment with the assistance of a foreign supplier, and commission another country to handle the reprocessing of its spent fuel, if necessary. This would strengthen the South Korean nuclear industry’s competitiveness and provide all the peaceful benefits of this sensitive technology, while still putting it out of reach of any future government with their eyes on nuclear armament.
It would also ensure that Iran’s fate does not befall South Korea.
