This week, Senate Republicans joined their House colleagues in proposing to curtail a slew of clean energy incentives. Losing those could upend many a clean energy business, but the cuts would drive a dagger through the heart of the burgeoning green hydrogen sector in particular.
The Senate and House still need to agree on the final text of the bill, but both chambers would take a decade of incentives meant to incubate green hydrogen production and end them after this year. The truth is, though, even before Republican lawmakers sharpened their knives for the tax credit, the much-anticipated green hydrogen boom had quietly collapsed.
Just a few years ago, green hydrogen developers were planning to invest billions of dollars to build gigawatts of wind and solar capacity in prime locations from the Gulf to the desert Southwest, then funnel that electricity into huge banks of electrolyzers. These devices zap water and deliver pure hydrogen gas without the carbon dioxide released by conventional hydrogen production. Ambitious dreamers even proposed billion-dollar pipelines to carry the gas across Texas to ports on the Gulf, where it could be shipped to buyers in Europe and Asia.
I caught a bit of hydrogen fever myself during a reporting trip along the Gulf Coast in December 2023.
In Mississippi, leaders from a company called Hy Stor Energy showed me a vast sandy tract, framed by mastlike pines, where they intended to build a clean industrial park powered by gigawatts of off-grid wind and solar. These power plants would electrolyze hydrogen, which Hy Stor would stash in enormous subterranean storage tanks carved from the region’s salt dome formations. Then steelmakers and chemicals companies would flock there for an uninterrupted supply of undeniably clean hydrogen.
Sure, it sounded bold, but not impossible: Hy Stor’s then-CEO Laura Luce had previously developed salt dome storage for natural gas, and elsewhere in the region, salt dome tanks already store hydrogen molecules for the Gulf petrochemical corridor.
By October 2024, though, Hy Stor had canceled a contract to buy over 1 gigawatt of alkaline electrolyzers from Norwegian cleantech company Nel, and the company’s leadership had moved on, per their LinkedIn pages. (When I texted a former Hy Stor leader to request comment for this story, the phone number’s new owner told me they had nothing to do with the company. A few days later, they texted me again asking if I could give them $20.)
Other firms have canceled projects partway through construction, are holding off on final investments, or have found new customers for their renewables. A few green hydrogen projects are still moving forward, but they’re either in jeopardy, heading overseas, or far more modest than the gigawatt-scale ventures recently under development.
“I think it is overstating it to say [green hydrogen] is dead,” said Sheldon Kimber, whose firm Intersect Power spent years developing ideal wind and solar sites for hydrogen production, before pivoting to supply clean energy to data centers. But, he added, projects that get built in the next few years are likely to rank in the tens of megawatts, not the thousands, and focus on “small-volume, high-margin markets.”
Plug Power stands out as the rare company still building substantial non-fossil-fueled hydrogen production in the U.S. It recently finished a site in St. Gabriel, Louisiana, that can liquefy 15 metric tons of hydrogen daily, bringing its total production capacity to 40 metric tons per day. The company claims it runs the largest liquid-hydrogen production fleet in the nation.
Plug, however, serves as an inauspicious standard bearer for the U.S. green hydrogen industry. The 28-year-old company reported an accumulated deficit of $6.8 billion as of late March, meaning its cumulative losses outweigh any profits by that hefty amount. In February 2021, CEO Andy Marsh raised a warchest of $5 billion to build 500 metric tons per day of green hydrogen production by 2025; the stock traded above $60 a share at that time. Plug burned through that cash and completed just a sliver of the production goal. Currently, its stock trades at just over $1. (A company spokesperson did not respond to requests for comment.)
Plug Power and other hydrogen developers attracted billions of dollars from investors on the promise that success was just around the corner. Now, though, the hydrogen build-out has collapsed under the weight of several interlocking burdens. Self-defeatingly slow federal rulemaking on tax credits, soaring production costs, a dearth of major industrial buyers, and AI’s insatiable demand for power hobbled green hydrogen construction well before the Trump administration decided to go for the jugular.
Tough Break #1: IRS slow-rolled the tax credit
The late 2010s were a euphoric time for clean energy developers. Renewables construction shot forward despite President Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign vows to bring back coal. Low interest rates paired nicely with the low but predictable returns that renewables projects could generate. Entrepreneurs imagined ways to capitalize on the imminent abundance of clean electricity by converting it into hydrogen.
The Covid-19 pandemic slowed the pace of activity, but then the Biden administration passed the 2021 infrastructure law, which designated $7 billion for a series of “hydrogen hubs” around the country. The administration chased that with the Inflation Reduction Act, which included a lucrative credit for the production of clean hydrogen, up to $3 per kilogram. A new multibillion-dollar industry was in the offing, and visionaries prepared to make their moves, as soon as the Internal Revenue Service published its guidance on how to claim that credit.
Then they waited. And waited.
“At $3 per kilogram, if your plant did not qualify for that and your neighbor’s plant did, then you’re out of business,” said Brenor Brophy, who ran development for Plug Power’s hydrogen production business in the early 2020s (he is no longer with the company). But there was no airtight way of ensuring one’s project would qualify until the final rule came out.
“The Treasury Department sat on that for two and a half years,” which was worse for the industry than if the credit were never created, Brophy added.
Paralysis seized the whole supply chain. Savvy suppliers chose a wait-and-see approach. This saved them money, at the expense of the communities they had promised to invest in.
Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer (D), for instance, famously flew to Oslo to close a deal with Norwegian electrolyzer company Nel. That firm planned to invest $400 million to build a factory near Detroit, and gain $16 million in state funds for creating some 500 jobs. Nel has declined to make a final investment decision on the site. Despite that display of financial discipline, its stock was trading for pennies at the time of writing.
Plug Power, not afraid to be early to the party, went ahead and built a factory in Rochester, New York, in 2021 capable of fabricating 1.5 gigawatts of electrolyzers per year. That’s a big swing compared to today’s demand: Plug noted its Georgia plant, which it called “the largest liquid green hydrogen plant in the U.S. market” in January 2024, contains 40 megawatts of electrolyzers.
Biden’s Treasury Department didn’t release final guidance until days before Donald Trump moved into the White House. The new administration promptly held back funds appropriated by Congress for clean energy efforts and then set about dismantling the clean energy tax credit regime.
“Most of the pipeline will get abandoned if they cannot get a $3/kg subsidy,” said BloombergNEF analyst Xiaoting Wang. Some developers have put on a brave face and said they’ll plow ahead even without the tax credit, but she suspects such assertions are “more advertisement than a real business decision.”
Many of the planned hydrogen projects would have enriched solidly Republican districts, like Texas and Louisiana, the locus of legacy hydrogen production for petrochemical refining. But the prospect of self-inflicted economic pain has proven less of a deterrent for Republican lawmakers than industry insiders had hoped.
Project cancellations have continued amid the uncertainty. Major legacy hydrogen producer Air Products was supposed to build a $500 million green hydrogen production plant in Massena, in upstate New York. The company had cleared the 85-acre site and laid foundations to support 35 metric tons per day of green hydrogen electrolysis, per reporting by local outlet North Country Now.
But new CEO Eduardo Menezes took office in February, after an activist investor attacked the company’s green hydrogen strategy. Menezes promptly canceled Massena and a few other projects, incurring a cost of $3.1 billion for breaking contracts and writing down asset value. Burning that cash seemed preferable to actually finishing and operating those projects.
“Treasury was so effective at destroying the industry that it kind of seems malicious,” Brophy said.
Tough Break #2: Too many expenses, not enough hydrogen buyers
Scaling breakthrough technologies requires faith that costs will fall and customers will want to buy. Elon Musk bet on that happening for electric cars, long before they were widely available to consumers. Solar evangelists dismissed predictions that their technology would never go anywhere; now solar is the fastest-growing new source of electricity production in the U.S. and the world.
Similarly, in that bright period before Biden-era inflation set in, hydrogen boosters saw a clear path to achieving cost declines akin to what solar and batteries had achieved. Legacy dirty hydrogen could be made for about $1 per kilogram; the green stuff cost several dollars more. But a technological learning curve could close that gap, the thinking went, and sway large industrial buyers. In 2021, the Biden Department of Energy set a goal to get green hydrogen costs down to $1 per kilogram within a decade.
Unfortunately, the cost declines that experts expected in the early 2020s never materialized. A late-2024 DOE report on clean hydrogen commercialization noted that costs had gone up, not down, by $2 to $3 per kilogram since its March 2023 analysis. The report cites higher real-world installation costs, rising interest rates, and escalating prices for clean power to meet the IRS requirements for the tax credit.
BloombergNEF analysts looked back at real-world installation costs for electrolysis plants built in 2023, and found they were 55% higher in the U.S. and Europe than the firm had predicted in 2022. Earlier estimates had assumed the core electrolysis equipment would drive most of the cost, but in practice, the seemingly incidental factors — like utility and contractor management, and contingency planning — inflated project costs considerably, Wang noted.
