When someone threatens to put a 200% tariff on your wines, it is evident that you no longer have a convivial relationship with that country, let alone an alliance.
Donald Trump’s attitude to Europe at least has the merit of clarity, distasteful though it is. He considers America to be better off operating alone, and thinks it is so powerful that, to borrow his own words, “it has all the cards.”
In response, Europe has two big advantages: it has other allies beyond America; and (counted as the European Union plus the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey) its economy matches the United States in size*.
This gives Europe a lot of cards to use for its own long-term benefit and in bargaining with the Americans. The value of the continent’s market is, in fact, rising thanks to the effect of Trump’s own destructive tariff policies on the US dollar.
The US currency’s strength against the euro in recent years exaggerated the wealth of the United States, a trend which is now going into reverse.
When thinking about how to respond to the new situation, it is important to recognize what has not changed as well as what is new. The external environment, to the west across the Atlantic and to the east from Russia, has changed radically. But the domestic environment has not, except perhaps in one important respect.
We can celebrate the revival of Franco-German collaboration and Britain’s return to its geographical destiny as a European power, both in response to the external threat. But we must also recognize that the domestic politics of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and others remain deeply affected by feelings of anger over immigration and economic disappointment.
This is true of Britain, too, even though Sir Keir Starmer’s Labour government is defended from it by a huge parliamentary majority.
A weakened leader such as France’s Emmanuel Macron shares with the strong, newly elected leaders such as Germany’s Friedrich Merz and Britain’s Starmer the need to ensure that whatever solutions they find to rebuild Europe’s defense and to protect Ukraine do not worsen the domestic grievances that have fueled the rise of extremist parties, but instead help to create a sense of common purpose and solidarity.
This will not be easy. Starmer has already caused one of his cabinet ministers to resign by cutting overseas aid to fund increased defense spending, and now faces a new cabinet rebellion over cuts to welfare spending.
Germany’s Merz will face similar problems as he seeks to boost spending on defense and public infrastructure without adding to the popularity of his opponents in the far-right Alternative for Germany or the far-left Linke parties.
Macron, Merz, Starmer and their neighbors have one important advantage, however: this is that Trump’s brutal treatment of Ukraine and his trade war on Europe, combined with the ever-more-evident threat from Russia, in the information war as well as the kinetic sort, is changing the meaning of patriotism and nationalism, all across the continent.
Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) exposes the issue perfectly: until now, the party has been pro-Putin while supposedly nationalist. Chancellor-elect Merz can now easily attack the AfD as being anti-German.
In France, Marine le Pen faces a similar difficulty: her past ties to Russia count as anti-patriotic. Within Giorgia Meloni’s coalition, Matteo Salvini and the Lega also now need to be careful, but then so does Meloni herself.
It is early days, but a new shape and direction for Europe is emerging from these changing external and domestic forces. Four basic themes can be identified.
The first is that, being urgent, cooperation on military operations and on defense investment are taking the lead, so they are doing so chiefly at the level of national governments outside formal EU institutions.
The grand moves are being done by presidents, chancellors and prime ministers, while the European Commission handles the boring stuff about new borrowing facilities, joint defense procurement and the like.
This allows non-member countries like Britain and Norway to take part, while preventing hostile members such as Hungary from holding things up.
The second theme concerns Ukraine’s central role in Europe’s present and future. As well as the war itself, Ukraine’s military strength and experience, and its growing, battle-hardened defense industry, represent a vital part of the whole continent’s future military strength and security.
If a peace settlement of some sort can be achieved, the reconstruction of Ukraine’s devastated cities and the integration of its economy both can serve to boost growth in the whole of Europe. This makes it even more important that Ukraine’s democracy is protected against Russian and American manipulation.
The third theme has a strong Italian accent. National government defense and public investment programs need to be directed so as to maximize sustainable, widely shared long-term growth.
At the European Commission, the agenda for Ursula von der Leyen’s second term as president has drawn heavily on the reports last year on EU competitiveness and the single market drawn up under the leadership of Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta.
Their recommendations pushed strongly towards reducing national barriers and increasing cross-border integration, the need for which has been exemplified by Unicredit’s difficulties in persuading Germany to accept its takeover bid for Commerzbank.
If Europe faces a barrier to its revival and to countering the threats from Trump and Putin, it lies in the way that national resistance obstructs European integration. The biggest challenge now will be how to overcome that resistance.
Thanks to the American and Russian bullies, there is a chance that obstacles such as Hungary can be dealt with more robustly and that internal resistance to integration can be lessened.
For external negotiations, the fourth theme, the issues are clear. There is only one way to deal with bullies, and that is by responding in a tough, resolute manner, whether over tariffs or military sabotage.
Fortunately, this can also be done in coordination with allies, of which Europe now has more than either America or Russia. It is time to work together with Japan, Canada, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand, as well as nearby partners such as Britain, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. Europe is not alone.
Currently an independent writer, lecturer and consultant on international affairs, Bill Emmott from 1993 to 2o06 was editor-in-chief of The Economist.
This article was originally published in Italian by La Stampa and in English by his Substack publication, Bill Emmott’s Global View. (Subscribe here for free to receive his posts.) It is republished by Asia Times with kind permission. Follow the author on Twitter @bill_emmott
