On May 1, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released two videos in Mandarin on its social media accounts, each targeting a different audience: low-ranking government employees and high-ranking Chinese officials. The videos appealed to viewers’ assumed dissatisfaction with the political system and personal survival instincts – offering an “exit plan” by cooperating with the CIA.
Despite receiving mixed reviews from Chinese netizens, the message was crystal clear: the U.S. intelligence agency is looking for informants, and insiders are welcome.
Predictably, the videos drew stinging criticisms from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which labeled the CIA’s effort as “a naked political provocation.”
The clandestine struggle between U.S. and Chinese intelligence agencies is an enduring part of the bilateral relationship, yet such an open and undisguised attempt at recruiting Chinese officials is rare. The overarching question for observers is, of course: will it work?
Before answering that, we must first ask another question: why is the CIA taking this unusual step and directly appealing to members of China’s government?
It is no secret that the United States and China view each other as leading strategic competitors, if not outright adversaries. As a result, this rivalry places mutual sabotage at the core of their intelligence operations. Despite U.S. commitments to wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, its intelligence community have maintained a consistent focus on China, seeking to push back Beijing’s expanding global reach.
Between 2010 and 2012, China’s security services ran a successful counterespionage campaign that eliminated CIA assets within the country. Ever since then, the United States has struggled to rebuild its human intelligence network in China, reportedly with limited success. Although U.S. intelligence can observe China’s growing capabilities from the outside, human intelligence from within the country is essential for understanding Beijing’s intent and plans. The CIA’s outreach via social media is an effort to restore such important channels of information that might help Washington outsmart Beijing.
However, several factors work against the CIA’s goal.
While dissatisfaction exists within the Chinese bureaucracy, the price of betrayal is extremely high. China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has been waging a counterespionage campaign for years now. Utilizing its extensive surveillance capabilities, the MSS closely monitors party-state personnel and society at large. Besides catching spies, the campaign’s other goal is to instill fear and deter would-be collaborators. The MSS frequently publicizes its success on its WeChat account – most recently, the arrest of a government worker who allegedly stole some 300,000 classified documents.
Chinese courts have meted out harsh punishments. In April, a former employee of a military research institute was sentenced to life imprisonment for selling secret documents to foreign intelligence agencies. This came after a former engineer was sentenced to death in March for similar offenses.
Given the grim operating environment, the risks of working with U.S. intelligence agencies are extraordinarily high. The consequences are so severe that they act as a powerful deterrent against disoriented individuals within the Chinese government.
In addition to China’s domestic environment, the deteriorating political conditions in the United States also matter.
Since January, the Trump administration has caused major disruptions within the U.S. government, negatively impacting the United States’ reputation and credibility worldwide. Previously, governments around the world viewed the U.S. as a reliable long-term partner. However, the administration’s adherence to the “America First” ideology and President Donald Trump’s transactional approach to global affairs have rendered U.S. policies unpredictable, short-sighted, and prone to reversals. This volatility is a clear deterrent for anyone considering risking their life to establish working relations with U.S. intelligence agencies. Moreover, the United States’ ideological attraction as the champion of liberal values has also declined, alienating idealists who might otherwise be motivated to cooperate.
Beyond the harm to U.S. soft power, the Trump administration has imposed significant cuts across the federal government. In early May, it announced plans to cut 1,200 personnel from the CIA and 2,000 from the National Security Agency. Similar reductions are reportedly underway in other intelligence agencies. Although the specific impact on the CIA remains unclear, such cuts are expected to disrupt operations and may discourage potential assets from seeking to build sustained relationships with the agency.
However, perhaps the most serious problem deterring Chinese officials from working with U.S. intelligence agencies is the Trump administration’s mishandling of secured communications. The MSS counterespionage campaign from 2010 to 2012 succeeded because of vulnerabilities in the CIA’s communication systems. Alarmingly, Trump administration officials have exhibited persistent incompetence in handling classified information. In February, to comply with a Trump executive order, the CIA sent a list of all personnel hired over the past two years to the White House through an unclassified email.
The following month, the “Signalgate” scandal broke, revealing that senior national security leaders had shared classified information in an unsecured Signal group chat. Subsequent reports alleged that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has shared classified information in other Signal chats. The full extent of such practices within the Trump administration remains unclear, and there are frequent new revelations on administration officials’ security mishaps. These avoidable blunders present a serious threat to operational security and increase the risks for U.S. intelligence assets worldwide.
In the end, the United States and China are locked in a constant shadow war that will continue as long as their geopolitical rivalry endures, and tactics to undermine each other will evolve with time. Due to the security climate within China and volatilities within the U.S. government, the recent CIA attempt to recruit Chinese officials may yield very limited gains, far from enough to restore its dismantled human intelligence network in China.
That said, this incident is unlikely to meaningfully alter the already strained China-U.S. relationship, as espionage is a common feature of great power competition. Besides excoriating the CIA’s actions, China will likely intensify its counterespionage campaign – further deepening the atmosphere of fear within the government – which some analysts see as beneficial to U.S. interests since it creates more discontent among Chinese bureaucrats. Furthermore, China’s MSS is likely going to exploit the opportunity and deploy its agents as dangles, with the aim of feeding U.S. intelligence false information to misguide and confuse U.S. policymakers.
