From the massive-scale retreat of 1949 to the crises over Quemoy, the ROC’s armed forces have long symbolized perseverance amidst adversity. However, amid Xi Jinping’s increasing pressure on Taiwan through China’s recent Joint Sword Exercises, ADIZ incursions and cognitive warfare, military morale has become an existential matter.
Low morale is severely affecting Taiwan’s defense as the country faces a dramatic shortage in troops, with some combat units dropping below 80% staffing due to early retirements and discharges.
This article examines the historical roots of the ROC’s military morale crisis, explores how Taiwan’s quest for identity impacts military morale, and provides suggestions on how to address this critical issue.
The origins of the morale crisis in the ROC military trace back to the early 20th century. After the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, China was divided by local warlords fighting over territories and peoples, who distanced themselves from the ideals of freedom, equality, and natural rights.
This decentralization and infighting between warlord armies proved fatal, with rising provincialism, defection, and bribery shaping the early ROC, and preventing the creation of a unified national military.
As Professor Luyang Zhou highlights in his article “Historical origins of the party-army relations in the Soviet Union and China,” collective treason became rampant in the 1910s and 1920s, to the point that defection and bribery started to substitute real fighting. Dialects, topography and self-sufficiency further fueled the already-rising provincialism in China’s Warlord Era.
In 1925, the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) was formed, comprising of the KMT Party Army and four military forces loyal to regional leaders. The heterogeneity of the NRA with its individual regional leaders exemplified the decentralization of command.
As outlined in the book “The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics,” informal relationships and personal loyalties, rather than ideology, dominated the officer corps dynamics. This fragmentation of the NRA led to widespread defections, further eroding morale.
Additionally, poor military leadership exacerbated the morale crisis. German advisor General George Wetzell criticized Chiang Kai-shek’s rapid promotion of unqualified military officers, resulting in inadequate leadership development. Officers frequently prioritized socializing, planning logistics, and dealing with budgetary issues over training, leaving troops underprepared for conflict scenarios.
By the mid-20th century, military morale had deteriorated significantly. In 1945, an entire section of the Kuomintang army defected to the CCP, and two complete divisions deserted in 1946.
According to a Far Eastern Survey article published in 1947, high desertion and troop loss rates within the KMT army as well as the loss of strategic advantages as American forces suspended supplies, demonstrated clear evidence of declining morale.
Media reports from 1947 predicted that the CCP would most likely win the civil war due to the KMT’s decaying morale and lack of ideological strength. By 1949, the demoralized KMT military lost the Chinese Civil War and retreated to Taiwan.
Following the retreat, the ROC military’s dual allegiance to party and state exacerbated further challenges in democratizing and addressing historical difficulties with morale. Efforts to democratize the military in the 1980s under President Lee Teng-hui faced resistance from the military bureaucracy.
President Lee was the first to endorse civilians for the role of defense minister, appointing Chen-Li-an and Sun Chen in succession, but the military leadership’s refusal to cooperate with them led to the appointment of retired General Chiang Chung-ling to the position instead.
Following President Lee’s attempt to reform the military, President Chen Shui-bian enacted critical reforms to democratize the military. The National Defense Act (國防法) and the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense (國防部組織法) formalized civilian control over the military, establishing the requirement that the Minister of National Defense must be a civilian.
However, this requirement was bypassed during several administrations with retired generals assuming the position. The military’s insular culture and failure to democratize by opening to civilian society has enhanced the identity dissonance between the military and civilians, contributing to the persistence of the military’s morale crisis.
Beyond historical and structural challenges, Taiwan’s evolving identity plays a crucial role in shaping military morale, as shifting perceptions of national identity influence how the military aligns with the civilian society it serves.
In 1992, the National Chengchi University Election Study Center started conducting annual polls on national identity, with results that year showing that 46.4% of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese and Chinese, 25.5% identified as Chinese, and 17.6% as Taiwanese.
By 2024, 64.3% of Taiwanese considered themselves primarily Taiwanese, 30.4% considered themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese, and only 2.2% considered themselves primarily Chinese. The major changes in distribution illustrate a profound shift in the understanding of national identity across Taiwan.
However, this identity evolution clashes with the ROC military’s traditions, many of which are relics from the country’s Nationalist era. Military songs like the “Military Discipline Song” (軍紀歌) and “I Love China” (我愛中華) perpetuate outdated symbols and ideas such as the “National Revolutionary Army” (國民革命軍) and “Revitalizing China” (復興中華), and consequently alienate younger conscripts who identify more closely with being Taiwanese than being Chinese.
Furthermore, societal perceptions of military service exacerbate morale issues and impact military recruitment. Conscription represents the relationship between civilian and military societies, where both societies intersect. Conscripts often report that their service is menial, with tasks like cleaning overshadowing meaningful training, an issue that traces its roots to the NRA in the Republican Era.
In “The Nationalist Army on the Eve of the War” by Chang Jui-te, the author cites a conversation between Xu Yongchang, director of the ROC Nationalist government’s Military Affairs Commission, and a friend where he stated: “If we implement a conscription system, people will join against their will and will lack ardor. This being so, to defeat Japanese aggression, we must reform the education system to change people’s attitudes or our country will perish.”
With the military facing both internal and external criticism, improvements in the quality of the conscription system should be prioritized to raise the military’s reputation.
The reality of Taiwan’s conscription system depicts deeper issues tied to civil-military relations and public perception. The death of 23-year-old conscript Hung Chung-chiu in 2013, as he served a detention sentence, led to allegations of military abuse.
After his death, over 100,000 people signed petitions and participated in protests against Taiwan’s military justice system, leading to decay in public confidence in the military and the conscription system.
Taiwan was supposed to move to an all-volunteer force by 2015, but the incident exacerbated the military’s recruitment crisis. This dissonance between civilian and military societies underscores a broad civil-military gap, raising questions about the military’s alignment with contemporary Taiwanese values.
Taiwan’s bloody history of civil-military relations also complicates contemporary reform efforts. The memory of the White Terror, a period of authoritarian rule marked by state-led violence and widespread political and intellectual persecution that claimed the lives of 3,000 to 4,000 civilians, continues to shadow Taiwanese society today, severely impacting civil-military ties. Although democratization led to progress, structural and cultural issues still persist.
At present, Defense Minister Wellington Koo has initiated reforms aimed at modernizing and localizing the military, including the scrapping of outdated practices such as bayonet training and goose-stepping.
As the first civilian defense minister in over ten years, Koo has the crucial responsibility of reducing the wide civil-military gap and further “democratizing” the military. His role proves especially important as issues such as poorly maintained and outdated equipment, low morale and a lacking noncommissioned officer program continue to plague the ROC’s military.
Bureaucratic resistance from within the military, however, has hindered significant progress. In 2017, President Tsai Ing-wen attempted to reform military pension system, which was considered extremely generous compared to other public sectors. The reform aimed at reducing the fiscal burden on Taiwan’s economy, ensuring its long-term sustainability.
Fierce opposition from retired military personnel through protests undermined Tsai’s government popularity leading to a massive defeat by Tsai’s DPP during the 2018 local elections. This resistance by the military community demonstrates how sensitive it is to reform and the impact of the military on civilian government.
Another example of resistance to reform is the military’s consistent investment in symmetrical warfare equipment. Throughout the history of the ROC’s past defense ministers, retired or active generals tended to benefit their own branches by investing in large weapons such as fighter jets, submarines, and more.
The lack of civilian oversight in military bureaucracy and the sector’s structure infused with cultural dissonance between military and civilian societies has given rise to the persistent morale crisis that the country faces now.
Moving forward, significant reform is crucial for the highest levels of command to modernize, democratize and better identify with the growing Taiwanese identity. They must shed outdated traditions, ranging from military songs to symbols and embrace Taiwan’s new and democratic symbols and practices to better align with the values of the country they defend.
These reforms must serve to foster transparency, improve training quality, and ensure that the military represents the developing Taiwanese identity.
The roots of Taiwan’s military morale crisis emerges from historical, structural, and societal issues that require critical attention from policymakers. China is closing its siege on Taiwan. Through its Joint Sword exercises, naval fleet expansion, political and cognitive warfare, China’s pressure on Taiwan underscores the need for resilient civilian and military societies.
From the military’s fragmented origins and the scars of martial law to the evolving Taiwanese identity, these fundamental vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s defense demands urgent attention. The morale crisis is not only a matter of identity but also an existential threat which resonates with Taiwan’s future, security, and sovereignty.
As Taiwanese identity has evolved, the military must adapt accordingly and undergo reforms that align with the democratic values of modern Taiwan.
Patrick Ko is a policy analyst at Safe Spaces, a policy consulting firm based in Taiwan and Washington DC. His work focuses on East Asian and Latin American international affairs.
