India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan following a terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir that killed at least 27 civilians. This is the first time in the treaty’s 65-year history that a signatory has taken such action. While the immediate motivation for the suspension is to pressure Pakistan over cross-border terrorism, for India, the recent terrorist attack may act as a catalyst for realizing its hydro-hegemony in the Indus River system.
The treaty, facilitated by the World Bank during the Cold War to tackle colonialism’s socio-ecological issues in the subcontinent, has endured various crises between the rival South Asian states. However, the IWT struggles to address current climate, economic, and political challenges. Several major water development projects in India, completed in the recent decade or under construction, have already cast serious doubts on the effectiveness of the treaty and the changing geopolitical landscape raises concerns about the World Bank’s ability to sustain it.
For India, the treaty’s suspension offers a chance for renegotiation, while Pakistan faces limited options to uphold its current status.
The Indus River System
Following the end of British colonization in the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the partition of India was both bloody and chaotic. One of the initial points of contention between the newly independent nations of India and Pakistan revolved around water disputes. Just a year after gaining independence, the two countries were on the verge of war over the Indus River system, consisting of the eponymous river and its major tributaries.
The Indus River runs about 2,000 miles through northwestern India and Pakistan, with key western tributaries of the Kabul and Khurram Rivers that originate in Afghanistan, and eastern tributaries including the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej from the Tibetan Plateau. Most of the Indus River system basin lies in Pakistan and India, with only 13 percent in Afghanistan and Tibet.
This river system has served as a vital lifeline for various socio-ecological, economic, and cultural landscapes since the era of ancient civilizations, including the Indus River Civilization. With the partition, the newly independent nations of India and Pakistan faced the dual challenge of rapid state-building and modernization while also inheriting the socio-ecological complexities shaped by over two centuries of British colonial rule in the region, particularly concerning issues of water development and governance.
Colonial Legacy and the Source of Conflict
When the British colonizers departed, they left behind colonial intricacies, including the contentious water landscape surrounding the Indus River system. First, the borders drawn between India and Pakistan traversed the Indus basin, placing nearly all of the waterheads of the eastern tributaries of the Indus within India. This made India the upper riparian state, while Pakistan became the lower riparian state.
Moreover, the colonial hydro-social practices became another source of co-riparian contention. The British developed significant irrigation control infrastructure in eastern Punjab, India, while extensive irrigation canals and agricultural land were developed in western Punjab, Pakistan. This colonial ecological intervention, primarily driven by economic interests and political control, was shaped by Punjab’s diverse ecology.
Central and eastern Punjab enjoy a lush ecosystem with abundant rainfall, while western Punjab is arid and used to be mostly barren. Under British East India Company rule, the fertile land and water resources of central and eastern Punjab were exploited for commercial agriculture, whereas western Punjab remained underdeveloped with a lower population density. Following the First War of Independence in 1857, the British Crown took control of India and established the British Raj. The Raj increased efforts to expand irrigation in western Punjab to serve economic interests and political domination.
Between 1885 and 1940, the British colonial administration set up nine canal colonies in western Punjab and constructed the largest irrigation canal system in the world in the region. Through the centralization of socio-ecological practices such as irrigation and agriculture, western Punjab’s arid land was transformed into a vital area for colonial commercial agriculture, primarily producing wheat, cotton, and sugarcane. Notably, the headwater infrastructure for these canals was located in eastern Punjab.
After the partition of colonial India, India retained the headwater infrastructure, while Pakistan acquired the largest irrigation canal system in the world. This distribution soon led to conflicts between the two post-colonial nations over their shared water resources.
Post-Independence Water Conflict
Within a year of independence, India and Pakistan were on the brink of a water war. In 1948, India blocked the Ferozepur headworks, cutting off the water supply to Pakistan’s Dipalpur and Upper Bari Doab Canals. While India claimed proprietary rights, Pakistan contested this based on prior appropriation rights.
International water law remains ambiguous, with countries relying on various principles, such as prior appropriation, property rights, historical use, equitable use, and the principle of no harm, based on their specific circumstances. Although a bilateral agreement was reached to prevent war, the underlying water conflict persisted and gained international geopolitical significance.
At the time, the Cold War was just beginning, and the United States was engaged in various regions to contain the Soviet Union’s spread and influence. In the early decades of the Cold War, water development became one of the tools the U.S. used to advance its geostrategic goals. In the 1940s, the U.S. collaborated with China’s Nationalist government on these initiatives, but the victory of China’s Communists in 1949 disrupted those efforts. The U.S. grew increasingly concerned about Soviet expansionism in South Asia, especially amid rising tensions between India and Pakistan.
In 1951, with the blessing of the U.S. Department of State, David Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, visited India and Pakistan. Upon returning to the United States, he cautioned Washington about the risk of “another Korea,” highlighting South Asia as a target for Soviet infiltration. Drawing on his extensive experience in water resource development in the U.S., Lilienthal recommended that the World Bank mediate between the countries to resolve their conflict, which the bank agreed to do.
The Indus Waters Treaty
After a decade of complex negotiations facilitated by the World Bank, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan’s military dictator Ayub Khan signed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960 in Karachi. The World Bank serves as the treaty guarantor and assigns a neutral expert and chairperson for arbitration in case of conflicts. A joint Permanent Indus Commission was established between the two riparian countries to address emerging issues and uphold the terms of the agreement.
The IWT addresses the conflict between India and Pakistan by implementing the principle of equal apportionment, which allocates rivers rather than equal water distribution. Pakistan is allocated control of the western rivers – the Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus – while India controls the eastern Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas tributaries. In other terms, the treaty did not established any kind of water-sharing mechanism, nor did it allocate any rights to or consideration for biophysical processes and ecosystems.
The treaty embodies a stark division similar to the partition of colonial India, leading to violence and loss of life. It divided the Indus River system between the two countries, treating the waters of the river and its tributaries as a thing rather than an essential resource with inherent value. This view undermines the ecological significance of the river and promotes a mindset of ultimate control of the state over the given part.
India gets 30 percent of the total Indus River system water, while Pakistan receives 70 percent. The Cold War geopolitics and the post-World War II liberal framework contributed to how the transboundary river conflict was resolved. Indeed, the World Bank recognizes the treaty as one of the most successful agreements in water dispute resolution.
Many in India have long viewed the allocation of 30 percent of the river’s water to India, as the upper riparian country, as unfair. Nevertheless, the Indian government upheld the treaty to foster cooperation and peace. However, around 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi began linking the treaty to national security, which led to growing opposition and calls for renegotiation.
This raises the question: What led India to consider suspending the treaty?
Factors Shaping Indian Revisionism of the IWT
India’s decision to suspend the treaty should not be interpreted as a complete abrogation; rather, it emerges as a calculated strategic maneuver designed to compel Pakistan into renegotiations. Article 12 of the treaty permits such discussions, provided the other signatory responds affirmatively. Indian urgency for amendment of the treaty is underscored by myriad pressing factors, including shifts in the hydrological, demographic, economic, security, and political dynamics of the country. This scenario highlights the imperative for India to enhance its freshwater endowments to meet its increasing needs.
India is facing a severe water crisis, with over 600 million people experiencing significant shortages. By 2030, water demand is expected to double, driven by population growth, economic development, and climate change, while the potential for increasing supply remains limited. Furthermore, infrastructure projects in upstream countries like China and Nepal could worsen the situation. For instance, China’s $137 billion Medog Dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River (known as the Brahmaputra in India), and Nepal’s hydropower projects on the Koshi and Ganga rivers could significantly reduce water flow to India. Climate change, marked by monsoon variability and prolonged droughts, further worsens water insecurity in India, leading to groundwater depletion.
At the subnational level, these situations have transformed water resource distribution and sparked political conflicts among Indian states over water access and control. In addition to the ineffective mechanisms for resolving subnational water conflicts, the federal government, which has limited authority to mediate these disputes, is under growing pressure. Consequently, the quest for new freshwater sources has become critical, leading the government to allocate resources toward enhancing infrastructure that will enable a water grab, particularly within the Indus River system.
With the increasing water demand, India has taken significant steps toward establishing upper riparian hydro-hegemony over the Indus River system. The 313 Megawatt Kishenganga Project on the Jhelum River was completed in 2018, and the Ratle Project, which has a capacity of 850 megawatts, is currently under construction on the Chenab River.
Pakistan views these projects as violations of the IWT and has referred the matter to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. In 2023, the court ruled against India; however, India has rejected the ruling. In 2024, India officially informed Pakistan that it was seeking a renegotiation of the treaty.
Overall, India’s approach toward the mechanisms established for resolving disputes between the two countries, as outlined in the treaty, has been indifferent, highlighting the practical dysfunctionality of the IWT. This indifference has persisted for several years, suggesting that India is unlikely to reverse its suspension of the treaty.
In this context, what options does Pakistan have moving forward?
Pakistan’s Options
Under the IWT, the signatory countries have the ability to request amendments. In principle, Pakistan can reject any requests it considers unfounded. However, India, as the upper riparian state, could unilaterally abrogate the treaty to assert its hydro-hegemony. This approach would contradict India’s historical support for a rule-based international order, suggesting a shift in its stance toward international law.
In addition to the increasing water insecurity in India, another factor reflecting the country’s willingness to take unilateral action is the populist approach of Modi’s government. This may fuel a determination to abrogate the treaty if Pakistan refuses to renegotiate it. There has been an increasing call in public discourse for the abrogation of the IWT, a sentiment that gained momentum following the 2016 Uri terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir. In response to this public outrage, Modi threatened to withdraw from the treaty, leading to a systematic weakening of India’s commitment to it. As a result, India’s disregard for the terms of the treaty leaves Pakistan, a lower riparian country, with limited options, if any.
The Indus Waters Treaty was established to foster peace between two post-colonial riparian states in the contested international context of the Cold War. The conflict largely arose from the political and socio-ecological legacies of colonialism in the subcontinent. The treaty prevented water wars between the two countries, but it could not establish peace or address the harm to nature and people inflicted by colonialism. Its bureaucratic focus justified the continued centralization of water control and worsened ecological practices. As a result, water insecurity for both states did not improve and continued to worsen over time.
The collapse of the treaty should not come as a surprise, and it doesn’t necessarily have to be discouraging either. Instead, this moment presents an opportunity to challenge the ongoing colonial socio-ecological legacies and to advocate for the rights of marginalized and disadvantaged communities, the rights of nature, and the rights of rivers of the Indus.
