Five years after the creation of the Space Force, the United States hasn’t quite unlocked the full military potential of space, continuing perennial efforts to normalize space as an operational domain. However, to realize its vision of seamlessly operating across all domains, the U.S. military should urgently rethink its approach to space power, maximizing and diversifying the types of space weapons brought to bear across the joint force. Senior Pentagon and Space Force leaders should reverse policies that seem to automatically rule out developing and using kinetic counterspace weapons and reassess the feasibility and military advantages of space-to-ground weapons.
Little is publicly known about U.S. counterspace capabilities and operations — the military use of weapons in space — but senior defense and military officials have made clear their goal to be a responsible, good neighbor. To them, this seems to mean fielding non-kinetic counterspace weapons that, when used, carry a low risk of creating significant debris fragments. This reflects worries that a less-restrained approach could jeopardize critical U.S. space capabilities such as the Global Positioning System and satellite communications.
The U.S. generally has a tendency to treat space differently. Unlike with other warfighting domains, officials have also routinely felt compelled to explain a distinction between offensive and defensive space operations and, until very recently, shied away from referencing offensive actions. Additionally, the U.S. has vigorously sought to avoid the impression that it uses space for aggression, emphasizing instead the use of space for deterrence.
Concerns about being labeled an aggressor or setting off a new arms race may partly explain why the U.S. has never really shown a long-term interest in developing space-to-ground weapons. Historically high launch costs have also plagued efforts to develop space-to-ground weapons. Cost and contemporary technology limitations affected U.S. plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative, a proposed space-based missile defense system.
Consider how differently China and Russia have been approaching military space power for over a decade. Both have made strides on new ways to destroy satellites. Russia is incorporating nuclear weapons into its anti-satellite arsenal. China’s 2007 debris-generating test of a kinetic anti-satellite weapon was the first of two other tests of similar weapons. In 2021, China tested a hypersonic glide vehicle released from low Earth orbit. Without revealing details, U.S. officials have expressed concerns that China and Russia are working on space-to-ground weapons. China is also looking into orbital kinetic bombardment technologies.
For its own security, not to simply copy China or Russia, it is time for the U.S. to reassess its restrained approach to military space power. Space weapons the U.S. has heretofore ruled out could play important roles in enhancing the nation’s overall military superiority and ability to deter hostile actions in space and other domains.
For example, sometimes the quickest and most reliable way to take out an enemy capability is to blow it up. Relying only on non-kinetic means, like jamming, grappling, cyberattacks or lasers, to conduct space operations is just as risky as it would be in another domain and could leave the U.S. without an effective way to create the required military effects. No one would argue for such limits on Army, Navy, or Air Force weapons — but that is what Guardians are being asked to do.
One fact that needs emphasizing: not all uses of kinetic anti-satellite weapons are created equal. Most debris from the U.S. military’s 2008 shootdown of a defunct U.S. satellite, called Operation Burnt Frost, deorbited within days. Additionally, the Russian ASAT test in 2021 created around 1,800 catalogued debris fragments, yet only around 65 tracked pieces remained in orbit by February 2024. Both events demonstrate that such weapons can be used without catastrophic harm to U.S. interests or generational impacts on space safety.
There is no reason the U.S. should not have kinetic anti-satellite weapons, as such weapons may make sense in certain scenarios. Destroying BeiDou satellites in medium Earth orbit would be unlikely to risk any U.S. or allied space assets, since there are none nearby. Though perhaps a last resort, it would probably be worth taking such an action if it meant winning a war with China, even if it means assuming responsibility for later figuring out how to clear the debris field.
Relatedly, the Space Force is limiting its effects to the space domain by not pursuing space-to-ground capabilities. No other service similarly limits its effects to one domain. The U.S. military is missing an opportunity to diversify its ability to deliver stand-off munitions, something that might become extremely important in a hypothetical South China Sea conflict. As a bonus, space-to-ground weapons can be designed to slip through traditional air defenses and deliver firepower to a target quicker than options from other domains.
Taking a new look at assumptions about space-to-ground weapons — such as constellations designed for orbital kinetic bombardment — would prove worthwhile. Space launch costs have dropped dramatically and are poised to drop exponentially more. And the technology is increasingly feasible: space companies have built assembly lines that manufacture multiple satellites per day, and have demonstrated they can fly large constellations of satellites. Such capabilities also align with U.S. military goals for “global effects across all domains.”
China and Russia may have a head start developing space-to-ground and a diverse portfolio of counterspace weapons, but U.S. advantages — low launch costs, building satellites at scale and flying constellations — will allow it to quickly catch up. The U.S. also has many space companies already working on commercial technologies such as servicing, debris removal, hypersonics and atmospheric reentry that could be transformed into new military space capabilities.
There may be many classified space weapons initiatives already underway. But if no one knows about them, they have no deterrent value. For black projects, the military also cannot tap into innovative space startups, as these companies often do not have the right clearances to even know what the government wants to buy, let alone bid on the work.
By any measure, the U.S. remains the world’s number one space power. But on its current path, the U.S. military risks limiting its options for creating the desired effects in space and missing game-changing ways to deliver firepower in contested environments. It is time for a course correction—it’s time to unshackle space and let it earn its proper place, like any other domain, in military operations.
Clayton Swope is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. He previously served as a congressional staffer and worked at the CIA.
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