We are now well beyond the 24 hours that Donald Trump had promised it would take him to secure an end to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. But Trump’s first week since his inauguration on January 20, 2025, has nonetheless been a busy one regarding Ukraine.
In his inauguration address, Trump only made a passing and indirect reference to Ukraine, criticizing his predecessor Joe Biden of running “a government that has given unlimited funding to the defense of foreign borders but refuses to defend American borders.”
Trump’s first more substantive statement on Ukraine was a post on his TruthSocial network, threatening Russia taxes, tariffs and sanctions if his Russian counterpart doesn’t agree to make a deal soon. He reiterated this point on January 23 in comments at the World Economic Forum in Davos, adding that he “really would like to be able to meet with President Putin.”
Trump’s nominee for treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, had already backed Trump’s approach during his Senate confirmation hearing on January 16. Like Trump, Bessent specifically emphasized increasing sanctions on Russian oil companies “to levels that would bring the Russian Federation to the table.”
The following day, Putin responded by saying that he and Trump should indeed meet to discuss Ukraine and oil prices. But this was far from a firm commitment to enter into negotiations, and particularly not with Ukraine.
Putin alluded to an October 2022 decree by Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, banning any negotiations with the Kremlin after Russia formally annexed four regions of Ukraine. Zelensky has since clarified that the decree applies to everyone but him, thus signaling that he would not stand in the way of opening direct talks with Russia.
Yet, Putin is likely to continue playing for time. The most likely first step in a Trump-brokered deal will be a ceasefire freezing the line of contact at the time of agreement. With his forces still advancing on the ground in Ukraine, every day of fighting brings Putin additional territorial gains.
Nor are there any signs of waning support from Russian allies. Few and far between as they may be, China, Iran and North Korea have been critical in sustaining the Kremlin’s war effort. Moscow now has added a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran to the one it had sealed with North Korea in June 2024.
Meanwhile, the Russia-China no-limits partnership of 2022, further deepened in 2023, shows no signs of weakening. And with Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko winning a seventh consecutive term on January 26, Putin is unlikely to be too worried about additional US sanctions.
Zelensky, like Putin, may play for time. Trump’s threat of sanctions against Russia is likely an indication of some level of frustration on the part of the US president that Putin seems less amenable to cutting a deal. Russia may continue to make territorial gains in eastern Ukraine, but it has not achieved any strategic breakthrough.
War of attrition
A significant increase in US military assistance to Ukraine since September 2024, as well as commitments from European allies, including the UK, have likely put Kyiv into a position that it can sustain its current defensive efforts through 2025.
Ukraine may not be in a position to launch a major offensive but could continue to keep costs for Russia high. On the battlefield, these costs are estimated at 102 casualties per square kilometer of Ukrainian territory captured. Beyond the frontlines, Ukraine has also continued its drone campaign against targets inside Russia, especially the country’s oil infrastructure.
This is not to say that Trump is going to fail in his efforts to end the fighting in Ukraine. But there is a big difference between a ceasefire and a sustainable peace agreement. And while a ceasefire, at some point, may be in both Russia’s and Ukraine’s interest, sustainable peace is much more difficult to achieve.
Putin’s vision of total victory is as much an obstacle here as Western reluctance to provide credible security guarantees for Ukraine.
The two options most regularly raised: Nato membership for Ukraine or a western-led peacekeeping force that could act as a credible deterrent, both appear unrealistic at this point.
It is certainly inconceivable that Europe could muster the 200,000 troops that Zelensky envisaged as a deployment in Ukraine to guarantee any deal with Putin. But a smaller force, led by the UK and France, might be possible.
Kyiv and Moscow continue to be locked in a war of attrition and neither Putin nor Zelensky have blinked so far. It is not clear yet whether, and in which direction, Trump will tilt the balance and how this will affect either side’s willingness to submit to his deal-making efforts.
So far, Trump’s moves are not a game-changer. But this is the first serious attempt in nearly three years of war to forge a path towards an end of the fighting. It remains to be seen whether Trump, and everyone else, has the imagination and stamina to ensure that this path will ultimately lead to a just and secure peace for Ukraine.
Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
