When Donald Trump launched a trade war on April 2, he produced enormous volatility in stock markets around the world, but since then upheaval in the bond market has forced him to row back on some of his tariffs.
Investors traditionally consider US Treasury bonds to be a safe asset with a guaranteed return and therefore preferable to stocks when the latter are falling in price. However, instead of buying these bonds investors have been selling them, and this produced a rapid fall in their price.
While stock prices have recovered somewhat in Europe and Asia they have continued to fall in the US. But what do US consumers make of all this? Has the shifting of the bond market and economic uncertainty affected voter confidence, and approval, in the US president?
A round up of recent polls suggest US voters expect to see higher prices for goods as a result of the tariffs, with 75% expecting short-term price hikes, and 48% long-term. While 51% like Trump’s trade goals, only 37% approve of his approach. Meanwhile, 91% of Republicans think the president has a clear plan for tariffs and trade, but only 16% of Democrats and 43% of independent voters do. Republican voters are also much more willing to take a longer time to make up their minds about Trump’s trade policy, with 49% saying they will assess it in a year’s time or longer, compared to 36% of independents and 21% of Democrats who are willing to wait that long.
The latest Morning Consult poll on April 14 gives Trump his lowest approval rating yet for his second term, at 45%. A few weeks ago it was clear from the polls that there were massive differences between Democrats and Republicans when it came to approval for Trump’s handling of his job. An Economist/YouGov poll completed on March 18 showed that 6% of Democrats, 90% of Republican and 37% of independents approved of his performance at that time.
A more recent Economist/YouGov poll, completed on April 8 after the trade war began, shows a significant change in the views of independent voters. The Democrat and Republican approval/disapproval ratings are about the same as in the earlier survey by the Economist, but approval among voters who class themselves as independents has fallen by 5% to 32%.
Put simply, the nonaligned voters in America have shifted against Trump over tariffs. This is significant because they are the largest political group in the US, at 37% of electors compared with 34% Democrats and 29% Republicans. Also significant is that, according to Morning Consult, the average voter is more likely to hold positive than negative views about Democrats in Congress, for the first time since the 2024 election, at 47% to 46%.
If this shift continues, and independent voters support Democrat candidates in the 2026 mid-term elections, it means that the Democrats are likely to take control of Congress. This will give them greater opportunity to block presidential initiatives to introduce new bills, which must be passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate to became law
If, at some point, the Democratic party wanted to try and impeach Trump they would need far more Congressional votes than they currently have. The Republicans currently have majorities in both Houses. Impeachment requires a simple majority in the House of Representatives, but a two-thirds majority in the Senate, so it is not an easy thing to do.
That said, the point is often made that Trump is a transactional politician and as a result attracts little personal loyalty from many of the people around him, particularly in Congress. However, if his approval ratings started to rapidly deteriorate, and the midterm elections turn into a disaster for their party, some Republicans may be ready to turn on Trump.
Presidential approval and midterms
We can get an idea of the likelihood of a midterm swing by looking at the relationship between presidential approval and support for the president’s party in all 20 midterm elections since the second world war.
Presidential approval in October and changes in House seats in November midterm elections in the US (1946-2022)
The chart above compares presidential approval ratings in the month prior to elections with seat changes in the president’s party in the House of Representatives. There are 435 members of the House, and they are all up for re-election next year.
It is clear that there is a strong positive relationship between presidential approval and the success of his party in the mid-term elections (correlation = 0.57). In other words when the president is popular his party does well and when he is unpopular it does badly.
Donald Trump did rather badly in the midterm elections in 2018 during his first term of office. On that occasion the Republicans lost 40 House seats, a significantly greater number than the post-war average loss of 23 seats for Republican presidents. The last time the Republicans lost more seats than 2018 was in 1974 after Gerald Ford took over from Richard Nixon following the Watergate scandal.
Currently, the president’s current approval ratings might suggest that the loss of seats by Republicans is likely to be greater in next year’s midterm elections than it was in 2018. In October 2018 Trump’s approval rating was 41%, whereas it currently stands at 45% (with 52% disapproving) in the Economist/YouGov survey.
However, the current approval rating does not take into account the medium to longer term effects of the economic turmoil and market instability triggered by his policies. Tariffs, in particular, are very likely to increase inflation and slow economic growth both in the US and the rest of the world. This is likely to damage his approval ratings.
In the UK Conservative prime minister Liz Truss spooked the bond market in the autumn of 2022 by proposing large unfunded tax cuts. She was rapidly removed by her party from the job of leader and prime minister. This was followed by a crushing defeat for the party in the 2024 election. The same could happen to the Republicans, although the voters will have to wait until next year to make their presence felt.
Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
