Earlier this month, Brazil, as BRICS chairman in 2025, announced that Indonesia had officially joined the bloc, becoming the first Southeast Asian nation to do so. This development resolves long-standing debates in Indonesia’s foreign policy circles regarding its BRICS status: whether it was simply expressing interest or actively pursuing membership. With confirmation of Indonesia’s membership, questions arise about what this signifies for President Prabowo Subianto’s foreign policy, as his first major decision in international affairs, and how it aligns with Indonesia’s traditional “free and active” foreign policy doctrine.
About Status, Not Material Gains
Over the past decade, Indonesia has risen as a middle power, actively involving itself in efforts to solve global crises and participating in high-level forums such as the G-20. This approach aligns with Indonesia’s “free and active” foreign policy tradition, epitomized most recently by former Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi’s global engagements. Former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo added his personal touch by making investment and economic advantage the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. As a result of his pragmatic approach, Jokowi chose to postpone Indonesia’s BRICS membership application in 2023.
In contrast, Prabowo has taken a different approach. Just days after his inauguration, he sent Foreign Minister Sugiono to the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia to formalize Indonesia’s application. Even more so, since he took power, Prabowo has traveled consistently around the world, which has contrasted with Jokowi’s hesitancy to travel abroad unless it brought immediate economic benefits. This stark difference between the two leaders can be explained by understanding Prabowo’s status-seeking behavior.
Status-seeking behavior can be understood as an effort to influence others’ perceptions of a state’s relative standing by acquiring symbols of prestige – whether through enhancing visibility, hosting high-profile events, or joining elite groups. Prabowo, with a stronger understanding of foreign affairs than Jokowi, sees status as a key currency in global relations. Prabowo could seek a foreign policy agenda that focuses on observable qualities and assets to highlight Indonesia’s achievement on the world stage. His visits to Beijing and Washington, the first state visits of his presidency, fit this agenda. Signing a controversial agreement with Xi Jinping and publicizing his call with U.S. President Donald Trump shortly after his election illustrated an important identifier in Indonesia’s status-seeking behavior. As the saying goes, “One cannot envy what one cannot see.”
Middle Power Is Not Enough
In the game of status, the stage is an important element. Prabowo’s upbringing and experience shape his understanding of foreign affairs, and the current international order, in which Indonesia is seen as a middle power, is not enough of a stage for Prabowo. Middle-power countries are not the main actors in global affairs. Instead, they are supporting actors with limited screen time, albeit flexible ones.
An influential Indonesia is central to Prabowo’s worldview. His military background reinforces the belief that hierarchy underpins every interaction. He understands that while countries like Indonesia have limited power and capabilities, status has no such limits. States can pursue as much status as they desire. Though Indonesia cannot rival the U.S. or China in power, it can position itself as their equal. Equality can take many forms, but at its simplest, it means being part of the conversation or forcing entry into it.
In the coming years, the world stage will likely revolve around Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. In this context, the stage is ready if one seeks to attain status. The U.S. and China will likely dominate international interaction through their exercise of power and influence. In a hierarchical view of the world, other countries must seek to understand and navigate this relationship in order for them to be safe in the logic of power or to be relevant in the logic of status.
In Prabowo’s view, Indonesia must seek to elevate its status in order to adapt to the Trump administration. Historically, Indonesia has balanced its partnerships with the U.S. and China, maintaining stable relations with both. However, Trump drastically changed the landscape during his first presidency, disrupting the “normal” U.S.-led liberal international order and creating a new sense of uncertainty. Viewing global relations pragmatically, Trump aligns with those who serve U.S. interests. Prabowo saw this as an opportunity and attempted to engage with Trump during his visit to the U.S. in November. Although no meeting occurred, he managed to secure a phone call. Critics viewed the trip as poor publicity, questioning the value of traveling thousands of kilometers for a phone call.
Nevertheless, this interaction was significant in the context of status, as it allowed Indonesia to position itself as an equal – at least symbolically – to the U.S. However, an important question arises: Does this pursuit of status truly matter? Is it the ultimate goal for Indonesia? While status can offer social legitimacy and recognition, how does it address the needs of the Indonesian people? Should Indonesia prioritize status or aim for more tangible achievements in its foreign policy? Furthermore, higher status brings more responsibility, prompting the question: is Indonesia ready?
Risks of Overreach?
Indonesia’s BRICS membership and Prabowo’s eagerness to participate only in high-profile events reveal a foreign policy driven more by personal ambition and a high need for power than long-term strategic calculation. His impulsive decisions, often bypassing experienced diplomats, may lead to inconsistent policies that risk alienating key partners.
Striving to appease all sides – especially amid intensifying U.S.-China tensions – could put Indonesia in an awkward position. The West may interpret Indonesia’s BRICS membership and its perceived alignment with China’s claims as a shift toward Beijing’s orbit. At the same time, as a BRICS member, Indonesia may find it difficult to criticize Russia’s actions or remain neutral if a new U.S.-China trade war emerges. Balancing these competing pressures will be a significant challenge for Indonesia’s diplomats, who must reassure partners of their nation’s independent stance.
Indonesia’s BRICS episode offers a lesson, that Prabowo seeks recognition and a stage. The more the West criticizes him while China and Russia offer opportunities through BRICS, the closer he may lean toward Beijing and Moscow. For now, China and Russia are winning his favor. Now, the U.S. and Europe must decide how to respond to Prabowo’s BRICS gambit.
