Donald Trump says he wants to end the war in Ukraine. It’s worth asking what kind of “peace” he has in mind – and whom it would actually serve. For anyone looking for insights into how Trump’s latest diplomatic gamble over Ukraine might unfold, there is already a precedent: his high-stakes engagement with North Korea during his first term.
If history is any guide, the Trump-Putin talks will be flashy, vague and ultimately meaningless – just like his North Korea diplomacy.
Trump’s dealings with Kim Jong Un were a masterclass in showmanship. His North Korea talks delivered no lasting diplomatic achievements, but they did produce some unforgettable images and memorable firsts: a sitting US president meeting a North Korean leader for the first time, a handshake and an unprecedented crossing of the DMZ into North Korea and a dramatic departure at the Hanoi Summit.
Each of these moments was presented as historic, but ultimately yielded no denuclearization, no durable peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula and no reduction in threats to Northeast Asia or the world.
Now, as Trump pledges to bring peace to Ukraine and eyes direct negotiations with Putin, the critical questions must be asked: Will his approach to Moscow follow the same pattern as with Pyongyang? Will high-profile negotiations over Ukraine become a spectacle rather than a substantive diplomatic effort? And, most importantly, if peace is achieved who will benefit?
From 2017 to 2019, Trump led highly personalized negotiations with Kim Jong Un. The process moved from escalating rhetoric and chaos to an abrupt pivot, culminating in a series of summits with great photo-ops, a promising but hollow agreement and, ultimately, the collapse of negotiations.
In 2017, Trump heightened tensions by threatening “fire and fury” against North Korea’s “Little Rocket Man” and warning that he had “a bigger nuclear button” on his desk. The world braced for war, only for Trump to reverse course as inter-Korean relations improved and announce his intention to negotiate.
At the Singapore Summit in 2018, North Korea agreed to “work toward denuclearization,” but the agreement lacked specifics, verification mechanisms and any commitment from the United States to lift sanctions. Trump paused joint military exercises with South Korea and declared victory, claiming that the nuclear threat had disappeared.
It hadn’t.
A year later, the Hanoi Summit ended in disaster. Trump rejected Kim’s proposal to dismantle part of his nuclear arsenal around Yongbyon in exchange for sanctions relief. Determined to appear dominant, Trump walked away from the table, demanding not just nuclear dismantlement but also the elimination of other weapons facilities.
The next move was pure theatrics: in June 2019, Donald Trump stepped into North Korea at the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas in what was widely seen as an attempt to revive interest in a process that had failed already. His staged, highly publicized stunt made headlines, but within months, North Korea resumed its missile tests, proving that Trump’s summitry had changed little on the ground.
The lesson should be clear: Trump thrives on gestures and a series of grand performances but lacks the patience for sustained, institutional negotiations. Now, Trump is poised to apply the same formula to Ukraine.
His negotiations with Moscow may well mirror his North Korea diplomacy – optics-heavy, substance-light and, ultimately, ineffective. Perhaps in Riyadh or Geneva Trump may hold a summit with Vladimir Putin – shaking hands, and announcing a ceasefire. The truce itself may contain only vague security guarantees for Ukraine, lacking any real enforcement mechanisms.
In exchange, Trump could push for lifting sanctions on Russia or freezing military aid to Kyiv, effectively cementing Moscow’s territorial gains. Just as North Korea continued its nuclear program after Singapore, Russia could consolidate its control over eastern Ukraine while pretending to engage in one-on-one diplomacy.
The real question is not whether Trump can broker a peace deal, but whether it would hold – or merely become another Singapore, where the adversary benefits while the other side secures no assurances.
The fundamental difference is that Putin is not Kim Jong Un. While Kim needed Trump for legitimacy, Putin does not. North Korea was an isolated regime with limited leverage. Russia, by contrast, has a global network of allies, a wartime economy and a strategic interest in prolonging its aggression.
Unlike Kim, Putin is not looking for recognition – he is looking for concessions. Whereas Kim sought an agreement with Trump to boost his economy and political image, Putin does not need Trump to justify his war –he needs territorial control, sanctions relief and fractures within the Western alliance. If Trump delivers the latter, Putin will gain far more than Kim ever did.
The European dynamics present a different context from the Korean Peninsula. When Trump negotiated with North Korea, South Korean President Moon Jae-in attempted to influence US policy, emphasizing inter-Korean relations and urging Washington to take a more structured approach.
But South Korea learned the hard way that Trump could not be trusted to deliver a breakthrough with Pyongyang. Once Trump shifted his focus to reality TV over sustainability, Seoul was left powerless, facing a weakened security environment and an emboldened North.
Europe should take heed of South Korea’s experience and not repeat Seoul’s mistake. If Europe fails to assert itself now, it risks finding itself in South Korea’s former position – marginalized and unable to shape negotiations that define its own security for years to come.
Trump’s – and Vance’s – statements thus far suggest that Washington would sideline European allies just as it sidelined Seoul. Korea’s passing may foreshadow how Europe will be ignored in a Trump-Putin deal.
The earlier visits by French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer to Washington signal that European leaders understand the urgency of the moment. If they expect to shape the future of Ukraine, they must act now. Beyond seizing Russian assets, Europe must accelerate Ukraine’s EU accession, increase its defense spending, and ramp up military production and aid. The time for passive diplomacy is over.
As European Union chief diplomat Kaja Kallas commented in the context of the fallout between President Zelensky and Trump in the White House in late February, “the free world needs a new leader. It’s up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.” Europe has a choice: lead, or be led. The message is clear: It’s time to “man up” (not “Moon up” as South Korea did) – or be written out of history.
Tereza Novotna PhD is a political scientist and foreign policy analyst specializing in European external relations, EU-Asia affairs and global security. She is a senior affiliate researcher and lecturer at the Free University of Berlin, a senior associate research fellow at EUROPEUM, a Korea associate at 9DashLine and a non-resident Kelly fellow at the Pacific Forum. Her commentary has appeared in 38 North, The Diplomat, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, NK Pro and the Bulletin of the East-West Center Washington among others.
