After Ukraine’s attack on Russian air bases, some pundits are writing that Ukraine is winning the war. At least one American newspaper headlined the surprise attack as Russia’s “Pearl Harbor,” evidently forgetting the ultimate result.
In any case, the actual ground war in Ukraine is increasingly favoring the Russians, who are slowly tightening the noose on Kyiv’s forces.
The latest drone attack is Ukraine’s emerging strategy to raise the cost of the war to the Russians, hoping either that they will get a better deal from Moscow, or more likely, persuade their American and European sponsors to actually join the fighting.
The new strategy first took shape in the invasion of Kursk in August 2024, a venture that cost Ukraine approximately 75,000 troops killed or wounded. At the same time, Ukraine began launching heavy drone strikes inside Russian territory as well as on the battlefield.
These attacks, at least those on the battlefield, forced the Russians to change tactics and revert to smaller unit operations that were more survivable, and it certainly slowed down the pace of operations for Russia’s army.
Conversely, the Russian strategy is to grind down Ukraine’s army and, wherever possible, trap them in cauldrons, cutting off their resupply and rotation lines of support. The Russian strategy appears to be unaffected, at least so far, by Ukrainian strikes inside Russia, or by wasteful operations in places such as Kursk, which actually support Russia’s military objective.
As matters now stand, on the backside of the now-failed Kursk operation, Russia has expanded its operations in Sumy, a Ukrainian province adjacent to Kursk. Sumy offers long-range potential for a land assault on Kyiv, should Russia be able to consolidate its operations in Kursk and further weaken Ukraine’s army defenses.
Some Russian mil-bloggers are expressing the view that even if Russia and Ukraine sign some form of “peace agreement,” guerrilla attacks on Russian territory and on their forces in Ukraine likely will continue for the foreseeable future.
One can see in these ruminations the belief that NATO will continue to cause Russia trouble for many years to come, assuming Russia does not take more radical steps to quash them.
Examples of how Ukraine is executing its strategy are clear. The attack on Russian air bases is just a part of the process: railroads have been hit, railroad bridges destroyed, and the Kerch Strait bridge was hit by a large explosion on June 3.
The Ukrainians also destroyed power stations supporting Kherson and Zaphorize, showing that Russian control is not all that effective.
Ukraine is also carrying out a record number of assassinations. including Zaur Gurtsiev, 34, a decorated former major, who was blown up in Stavropol in southern Russia.
The Ukrainians are exploiting a major Russian weakness, a lack of adequate preparation to protect important assets, including key people, and poor intelligence.
Can Ukraine’s strategy actually work?
Ukraine’s advantage is that it is supported by US and European intelligence and technical capabilities, which act as a facilitator and force multiplier for Ukrainian non-conventional operations.
In addition, Ukraine has its own drone manufacturing and electronics and software development experts. Before the Russian invasion, Ukrainian software engineers were working for leading companies outside the country. Israeli companies contracted or hired Ukrainian software developers to augment Israel’s own formidable capability in this sector.
There also are limitations to the Ukrainian strategy. First, while the strategy, especially the use of drones coupled to some battlefield tactics, has given fits to the Russian army, the best that can be said is that it has slowed them down but not stopped them.
Meanwhile, the Russians are able to keep heavy pressure on the Ukrainians, making use of long-range missiles, drones, and increasingly FAB bombs (conventional bombs with guidance kits, called UMPK kits, extending their range).
Ukraine also has gotten some glide bombs from the US (such as the GBU-39), but the payload is much smaller than those used by the Russians, and the Ukrainians are running out of aircraft that can launch them. GBU-39 is a glide bomb in the 250-pound category, while Russia’s glide bomb can carry between 555 pounds. and 3 tons of explosives over 37 miles.
Certainly, the Ukrainians are aware of the vulnerability of their armed forces, especially as they are stretched out over a long line of contact, now expanded with Russian operations in Sumy.
Reports say the Russian cauldron battlefield strategy is squeezing off logistical support for Ukrainian units, and their ability to rotate soldiers, meaning that morale is suffering and even well-organized defenses can’t be held for very long.
An additional problem for Ukraine is securing adequate supplies from Europe and the United States, as well as trained operators for the imported weapons. Europe has slowed down the transfer of weapons, as European planners worry that they have little left for national self-defense.
It is unclear whether the US will keep up the pace, since there is growing concern in Washington that the US will not remain competitive in the Pacific – facing China’s rising military capabilities – if it continues to strip its stockpiles of critical weapons and munitions. Should the US reduce deliveries of weapons, a distinct possibility for operational reasons, Ukraine’s army cannot remain in the field for very long.
Ukraine’s main problem is internal and political.
The current leadership can’t acknowledge the surrender of any territory to Russia. It could agree to a ceasefire in place, but the Russians are not ready to grant that. It would leave the Russians with control of some of the territories they have annexed, but not all that they claim, and the possibility that the war might resume again in future.
More to the point, the Ukrainians don’t want to give up on a relationship with NATO and Europe. Thus, even though uninvited, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says he will attend an upcoming major NATO meeting in the Hague.
While the US says that Ukrainian membership in NATO is off the table, Kiev is not accepting the US position. Zelensky is currently in Vilnius where he will be attending the Bucharest Nine and Nordic summit, aimed at unifying regional support for Ukraine.
(The Bucharest Nine, established in 2015, includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.)
We know less about Russia’s internal situation. The Russians, so far, have failed to come to grips with Ukraine’s unconventional war strategy, nor have they reacted so far either in improving their own security measures or in answering the Ukrainian attacks.
How this impacts the current leadership, the Kremlin first of all, Russia’s security services, and the Russian army, is simply unknown. Having said that, it is unlikely the Russians will dramatically change their approach to the conduct of the war, or at least so far, there is no evidence of any change.
It looks like Ukraine’s new strategy will not have more than a marginal effect on the war itself.
Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
