As President Trump’s tariffs begin to bite more widely, hard data on their actual consequences will soon arrive. Of course, the rationale for many of the tariff levels remains opaque, and, despite the August 1 “deadline,” negotiations continue with several important trading partners.
The tariffs’ economic impact is emerging, but the international diplomatic and political effects remain hard to measure. From a geopolitical perspective, it is logical to ask how tariffs fit into America’s grand strategy. But the Trump administration has not done so.
Unfortunately, based on international reactions so far, the U.S. by levying tariffs on friend and foe alike has likely suffered a considerable loss of trust and confidence, built up over decades of effort, in exchange for minimal economic gains — if any — and the risk of formidable losses.
The central, still-unresolved issue is China, in recent years always among America’s top three trading partners (with Canada and Mexico), and especially how China fares compared to India. The White House seems headed toward more-lenient treatment for Beijing on tariff rates and other metrics than it imposed on New Delhi. If so, it will be a potentially enormous mistake. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has suggested that China’s Aug. 12 deadline could be extended if negotiations looked promising.
Trump announced on July 30 that India’s tariff rate would be 26 percent, 1 point lower than originally proposed on Apr. 2, but a major increase from the previous average rate of 2.4 percent. Moreover, Trump harshly criticized India’s acquisition of Russian military equipment, underlining a longstanding U.S.-India disagreement, and Indian purchases of Russian oil and gas in violation of America’s Ukraine-related sanctions. (India is also one of the BRICS countries, which Trump separately singled out for a 10 percent tariff.)
Indians were surprised and angered by the relative harshness of India’s treatment, and the threat of additional, unspecified penalties if Washington and New Delhi could not quickly strike a deal. On Monday, Trump repeated the threat, saying he would increase the 25 percent rate “very substantially over the next 24 hours.”
That anger could grow exponentially if China snags a better agreement, especially if Trump is seen as sacrificing U.S. strategic interests in his “zeal for a deal” with Xi Jinping. China runs a significantly larger trade surplus with the U.S. than does India. Washington has also long complained about Chinese trade practices, which include stealing intellectual property, unfairly subsidizing its international companies and denying access to China’s domestic market, contrary to repeated commitments.
Geopolitically, China (and its emerging Russia alliance) is this century’s principle strategic threat to the U.S. and its allies. Many analysts believe Trump could offer significant concessions on key security issues, such as Taiwan, to get a China deal, citing the recent reversal of the long-standing practice of allowing Taiwan’s president to make transit stops in America and not reaching a trade deal with Taipei before Aug. 1.
Graham Allison of the Harvard Kennedy School writes that “Trump’s view of Taiwan is more compatible with China’s than any U.S. president since World War II.” Further examples of Trump’s softness include allowing Nvidia to resume exports of sensitive information technology to China and ignoring legal requirements to ban TikTok or force it to divest its Chinese ownership.
Critical for Washington is Beijing’s strengthening alliance with Moscow. This “partnership without limits,” as Xi and Vladimir Putin have described it, has already resulted in significantly increased Chinese purchases of hydrocarbons, and negotiations to build new oil and gas pipelines between the two, plus increased financial and military cooperation. This axis raises creates risks all along their peripheries, from Asia through the Middle East to Europe. Beijing’s hegemonic, threatening behavior against Taiwan and the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, and against competing territorial claimants in the South China Sea, endanger key U.S. allies and trading partners.
China and India themselves face off across a long, much-disputed border. Moreover, China aids Pakistan, India’s intense rival, including militarily, as demonstrated in the recent Pahalgam crisis. To make matters worse, Indians have noted that both Pakistan and Bangladesh scored lower tariff rates from Trump.
Having China emerge better than India in their respective trade relations with America would be entirely counterproductive. Instead of advancing cooperation within the Asian Security Quad (India, Japan, Australia and America), Trump could well push India into closer economic and political ties with Russia and China. Beijing would see Trump’s trade concessions as expressions of fundamental American weakness and dependence on trade with China. At least Secretary Bessent did make clear after the last round of U.S.-China talks that China also risked heavy tariffs due to its purchases of Russian (and Iranian) oil and gas.
This reality, and Beijing’s intransigence on trade issues, could blunt Trump’s lust for an agreement with Xi, but the outcome is uncertain. If the tariffs’ negative effects unfold as economic theory indicates, Trump’s domestic political support will weaken correspondingly. Giving China a sweetheart deal on trade will only worsen his problems.
We may be saved, therefore, by Trump’s highest priority: his own well-being.
John Bolton was national security adviser to President Trump from 2018 to 2019 and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006. He held senior State Department posts from 1981 to 1983, from 1989 to 1993 and from 2001 to 2005.
