Peacekeepers have frequently failed to prevent wars, or have even become targets themselves.
Peacekeeping forces tend to have more symbolic power than firepower.
Ukraine’s best chance is European mechanized brigades with a clear mandate.
As Europe mulls dispatching peacekeeping troops to Ukraine, the history of peacekeeping missions suggests the effort is far from a sure-bet. Peacekeepers have frequently failed to prevent wars, or have even become targets themselves.
Peacekeeping is usually associated with the UN, which first sent military observers to the Middle East in 1948 to monitor the armistice after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and today has 72,000 peacekeepers in 11 conflict zones. Russian peacekeepers served alongside NATO troops in Bosnia, and unsuccessfully acted as a buffer between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The African Union has also deployed forces from South Africa and African states in regional conflicts. For poorer nations, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, volunteering their soldiers for relatively well-paid UN peacekeeping has become a source of revenue.
The idea of using European troops to maintain a shaky peace between Ukraine and Russia immediately runs into a definitional problem. Would they be there to keep the peace, or to protect Ukraine? Peacekeepers are typically supposed to be neutral and act primarily as monitors. Indeed, the UN lists four basic principles of peacekeeping: impartiality, consent of the warring parties, and not using force except in self-defense.
Accusations of bias against peacekeepers are not uncommon. Israel, for example, has long accused the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) of ignoring Hezbollah activities along the Israel-Lebanon border, which led to Israeli troops entering Lebanon in October.
But a European peacekeeping mission would be problematic. Even though the proposed peacekeeping force in Ukraine would be under European rather than NATO auspices, the troops would come from NATO or NATO-friendly nations. It is hard to believe that Russia would see it as anything other than a permanent Western expeditionary force to defend Ukraine against another Russia.
Irish troops with the UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon dismounted an armored personnel carrier in March.Niall Carson/PA Images via Getty Images
There are essentially two concepts for a peacekeeping force. One is to act as an armed conflict monitor, which can document which side has violated agreements. Another is to have sufficient force size and a mandate to defend an attacked party, similar to the US-led United Nations Command established to defend South Korea from re-invasion that has been in operation for over seven decades.
Either way, there is a danger: What happens when the peacekeepers themselves are attacked, either accidentally caught in the crossfire or deliberately targeted?
Some 4,423 UN peacekeepers had died as of February 2025, of which 1,134 were killed by “malicious action.” In Lebanon, UN troops have been hit by both Israeli and Hezbollah fire. In January 2025, several UN peacekeepers were killed fighting M23 rebels in eastern Congo.
Peacekeeping forces tend to have more symbolic power than firepower. Those ubiquitous white armored cars used by UN troops may be enough to deter unarmed rioters and looters, or perhaps insurgents with light weapons and IEDs. But in Congo, UN forces are having difficulty confronting rebels armed with anti-tank missiles and drones.
Any peacekeeping force in Ukraine would be caught between two nations armed to the teeth with artillery, tanks, missiles and drones. Fully equipped European mechanized brigades, backed by airpower, might have the firepower to deter attacks. In fact, Ukrainian officials have said that a European peacekeeping mission only makes sense if the peacekeepers are prepared to fight.
On the other hand, Russia invaded to dominate Ukraine and steer it away from the EU and NATO. A strong force of British and French troops on the Russian border could be viewed by the Kremlin as a provocation.
Russia doesn’t even need tanks or cannon to make peacekeeping untenable. There are numerous ways to harass peacekeepers, from IEDs laid by shadowy pro-Russian groups, to artillery barrages that “accidentally” hit a barracks. While this would risk escalation with Europe and perhaps NATO, Moscow could hope that even a few casualties would spur the European public to demand the troops come home.
Ultimately, the success of peacekeeping is measured by whether peace is kept, or at least the violence is toned down. The record here is spotty. Israelis still remember how in 1967 the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) — stationed in Sinai as a buffer between Israel and Egypt — abruptly left in response to Egyptian demands. The result was Israel launching a preemptive strike against Egypt in the Six-Day War. UNIFIL troops have been stationed along the Israel-Lebanon border since 1978, but this hasn’t prevented wars in 1982, 2006 and 2024, as well as numerous border incidents.
However, the UN does claim that peacekeeping works, pointing to successful missions in places such as Cambodia and Namibia. Stationing troops in allied nations has also succeeded in maintaining peace: US troops in South Korea may well have deterred North Korea from invading, while those deployed in Germany during the Cold War helped prevent a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.
Peacekeeping seems most likely to succeed either when the peacekeepers either have overwhelming force, or when the warring parties themselves decide to stop fighting. A European peacekeeping force in Ukraine might enjoy neither.
Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn
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