The Vietnamese Communist Party’s announcement of Resolution 68 has been hailed by many Vietnamese businesspeople as a major step toward protecting private property rights, ensuring fair competition and codifying legal precepts.
Crucially, those legal changes include preference for civil remedies over criminal penalties, a ban on retroactive application of the law, and the presumption of innocence – all crucial to the functioning of a modern economy underpinned by the rule of law.
But beneath that business optimism lies a vital question: Is this real liberation for all private enterprise or a head fake that ultimately serves the rich, powerful and Communist Party-connected?
Announced earlier this month, Resolution 68 did not spring from a vacuum. In July 2023, the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council issued the “Opinions on Promoting Development and Growth of the Private Economy.”
That document was issued at a delicate moment as China’s economic engines were losing steam. Business confidence had crumbled after heavy-handed crackdowns on big private tech companies like Alibaba.
Recognizing that a suffocating regulatory burden and political uncertainty were choking off private-sector dynamism, the Chinese government shifted its message, emphasizing the significance of the private sector to the country’s drive for modernization.
China’s 2023 document sought to rebuild trust and stability, and still sent the signal that the Communist Party sought to maintain a firm hold on the economy.
By 2025, the economic tide had shifted in Vietnam as well. The 2024 death of leader Nguyen Phu Trong and the ascension of To Lam to Party chief marked a significant change in Vietnam’s leadership hierarchy and outlook.
Meanwhile, Vietnam’s private sector had grown quickly but encountered longstanding obstacles, including access to resources, legal uncertainty and fragile business confidence, partly due to the crackdown on allegedly corrupt businesses and politicians.
Chinese playbook
Resolution 68 borrows heavily from China’s playbook, praising the private sector’s importance while promising a more business-friendly environment. But Vietnam’s version goes even further, promising a stronger legal shield than China’s.
Article 11 of China’s 2023 document cautions against internal corruption and requires strict compliance regimens, criminalizing acts like embezzlement and bribery. It also highlights moves to beef up Party work in private companies, conveying the underlying assumption that businesses should police themselves in line with Party values.
Vietnam’s Resolution 68 also calls on private companies to promote business ethics, integrity and social responsibility. But Vietnam frames corruption as a two-way street, stressing that public officials must also stop extorting and exploiting private businesses.
This dual messaging presents the state as both enforcer and partner, aiming to project itself not just as a regulator but also as an enabler of private-led growth. However, the key worrying difference between the two policies lies in how they handle legal risks.
China’s document promises to reduce unnecessary interference in business activities during legal investigations. It stresses “protecting the property rights and interests of private enterprises and entrepreneurs in accordance with the law” and pledges to curb overreach like sweeping asset freezes or arbitrary enforcement.
But it stops short of removing criminal prosecution from the table. Due process and proportionality are central, but when justified, criminal liability remains.
Vietnam’s Resolution 68 takes a bigger leap. Section 2.3 stipulates:
- Economic and civil violations should first be addressed through civil, economic, and administrative measures,
- And where the law permits both criminal and non-criminal handling, criminal measures should be strictly avoided,
- Even when prosecution is necessary, remediation should be prioritized and weighed heavily in legal decisions,
- Retroactive actions that harm businesses are prohibited,
- And the presumption of innocence is strongly emphasized.
This is not a subtle repositioning. Vietnam’s document not only endeavors to minimize legal disruption, but it in fact makes criminal penalties a last resort even in cases where legal outcomes are ambiguous.
Reform for whom?
On paper, these principles align with international standards of predictability and proportionality. Prioritizing civil remedies and respecting the presumption of innocence are hallmarks of a fair legal system.
But Vietnam’s political-business terrain muddies the waters. Even if these reforms lead to a more level playing field for small and medium enterprises, in an environment still driven by elite capture and cronyism, these legal protections may still give priority and better protection to powerful state or state-linked conglomerates.
For many businesses, the new legal shield may ultimately remain out of reach unless you are one of the major players with political connections.
Additionally, overprotecting large companies creates systemic risks. Shielding such firms from full legal scrutiny fosters moral hazard – or worse. If these giants fail, the state may be forced into expensive bailouts, destabilizing the broader financial system in a “too big to fail” scenario.
Vietnam, one of the key “China+1” destinations for global manufacturers, is already coming under investor scrutiny for its commitment to stability and predictability.
Resolution 68’s pro-business promises may ease concerns for domestic businesses, but foreign investors, particularly those who are aware of China’s decades-long trajectory, will be closely monitoring how it’s carried out. Any overt defense of elite interests could dent confidence in Vietnam’s long-term legal credibility, even if short-term sentiment improves.
By any measure, Resolution 68 is a bold move. It promises to slash red tape, protect property rights and update the legal regime in ways more appropriate for today’s Vietnam.
But Vietnam’s strong tilt toward shielding private businesses from criminal penalties raises an unavoidable question: Is this the dawn of genuine legal reform or just a clever maneuver to protect the connected while appearing modern and pro-business to the outside world?
Vietnam’s entrepreneurs and foreign observers alike should temper optimism with caution, watching closely to see whether this latest wave of reform truly levels the playing field or merely fortifies existing powers and hierarchies.
Leo Tran writes about international affairs, trade, and global strategy. His work has appeared in The Diplomat, Kyiv Post, and Modern Diplomacy. He also publishes at Vietnam Decoded.
