After 41 years of armed insurgency against the Turkish state, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) has announced that it will disband.
Representatives of the Turkish government and politicians in opposition parties have all greeted the decision and the likely end of a long and bloody conflict, one where an estimated 40,000 people lost their lives.
The PKK’s announcement set off celebrations but also brought up many questions. Political experts say that the dissolution of the group, which is classified as a terrorist organization by Germany and other countries, could fundamentally alter the balance of political power in Turkey.
How would Turkish politics change?
This could well amount to an important turning point in Turkish politics, says Seren Selvin Korkmaz, co-director of the Istanbul Political Research Institute, or IstanPol.
“The political equations we were talking about a year ago are today completely different,” Korkmaz says. “Parties will have to adapt their programs and their discourse.”
In particular, things might change a lot for the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, a pro-Kurdish political party known as DEM for short.
According to Korkmaz, two main factors will impact Turkish politics over the next three years: How peace with the PKK proceeds and the legal situation around jailed Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu.
The democratically elected mayor was detained in March while the peace process with the PKK was already underway. Korkmaz notes that Imamoglu’s own party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) is now classified as the Erdogan government’s “new enemy.” They replace the pro-Kurdish political movement, which was the state’s greatest foe in recent years.
There are a lot of Kurdish politicians in prison alongside Imamoglu, including Selahattin Demirtas, the DEM party’s former co-chairperson who was jailed on what are considered politically motivated charges of terrorism in 2016.
The pro-Kurdish movement now expects some of their politicians will be freed, even as the fate of those prisoners remains unclear.
“Discussing the Kurdish question within the constitutional framework now requires, above all, some sort of detente or democratization,” argues Mesut Yegen, a political scientist at the Reform Institute, an Istanbul-based think tank. “Essentially, the constitution must be redesigned to create a more democratic model for Turkey. But at the same time, there is a government is unwilling to change a presidential system with authoritarian tendencies.”
Many unknowns
It’s also unclear when, how and to whom the PKK might surrender their weapons. Nobody knows whether this could happen via international observers, or whether it will be a complete and thorough disarming, or if it’s just a symbolic gesture. Media reports, citing official sources, suggest these questions may be answered this summer. It appears that the state is working on some kind of plan.
Another issue: there’s some resistance to the group’s dissolution within the PKK itself. Several senior members of the group still need to be convinced. Additionally, there’s also been discussion as to whether a new organization might take the PKK’s place and what happens to the Kurdish umbrella organization, the Kurdistan Democratic Communities Union, or KCK, now.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has made it clear that the PKK’s renunciation of armed conflict won’t be enough. “Putting down weapons alone is not enough,” he said during a televised interview on May 9. “It is necessary to eliminate illegal and intelligence structures. An accountable organization model should be developed by taking advantage of the opportunities provided to political parties and NGOs.” Fidan said he was prepared for a number of different scenarios.
PKK members in limbo?
Also uncertain is the fate of PKK members, including fighters who have sought shelter in the mountains in northern Iraq as well as activists in the cities. The PKK has an estimated 60,000 supporters, including its fighters, sympathizers and civilian helpers.
A general amnesty for PKK members is considered controversial. Potential integration programs are being considered, but a blanket pardon by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems unlikely. The risk of it causing social tensions is too significant.
Leading members of the PKK won’t be able to return to Turkey. Some may be able to travel to third countries, others may stay in northern Iraq. But that too has yet to be decided. Erdogan’s government certainly doesn’t want to see the PKK’s 300-strong leadership, currently living in neighboring Iraq, Syria or Iran, simply be allowed to stay where they are.
The impact on those neighboring nations is also being closely monitored. The north of Syria remains under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF. The core of the SDF is the so-called People’s Defense Units, or YPG. Turkey considers the YPG an offshoot of the PKK. There is speculation that the SDF fighters could be integrated into Syria’s new national army. Any foreigners in the SDF’s ranks should return home.
At the beginning of this process, Turkey’s government had insisted that the YPG should also lay down their weapons. But over time, that demand has become less strident.
The Turkish Ministry of Defense has also changed the terminology it uses and now increasingly refers to the SDF instead of the “YPG/PKK.” Previously, the Turkish government avoided using the acronym SDF, arguing that it was a euphemism for a terrorist organization.
There are also skeptical voices inside Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Former member of parliament, Samily Tayyar, who was close to Erdogan, warned that besides working out a weapons handover and clarifying the legal situation, what to do with former PKK fighters had to be decided.
“This development can’t be assessed in isolation from structures in Syria,” Tayyar said. “More important than dismantling an outdated PKK is eliminating the threat of the YPG on our border.”
This story was originally published in German.
