Yisrael Beytenu head Avigdor Liberman’s leak on Wednesday that Israel was arming a gang in Gaza opposed to Hamas was meant to shock.
And, at first, it did. The immediate reaction was disbelief that Israel would hand over weapons – reportedly captured from Hamas – to a criminal gang in Rafah with past ties to ISIS in Sinai.
Have we not learned, went the initial chorus. Arming or building up enemies of our enemies never ends well.
Consider the experience of the Phalangists in Lebanon, ran this argument. Or, more recently, look at Israel’s moves in the early 1980s to let Hamas grow as a charitable organization in the hope it would act as a counterweight to Fatah. And then, eventually, Israel even gave arms to Yasser Arafat and Fatah. How well did all that work out?
But after the initial “OMG, how could we be doing this again?” moment came some more sobering considerations.
Is it bad to back a group opposed to Hamas? Is it bad to take steps to undermine Hamas’s control of Gaza? Is it wrong to arm a small militia to do work to keep Hamas from the food distribution points so that IDF soldiers don’t have to risk their lives doing the same? Can it be all that bad if the plan was backed – even initiated – by the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and the IDF?
Exchanging terrorists for criminals
Yasser Abu Shabab, the head of the militia reportedly receiving the weapons, is a very bad actor, and his group is a gang of criminals. But who is Hamas – a local chapter of the Girl Scouts?
The decision to arm the Rafah-centered militia may have been procedurally flawed – it did not go through the security cabinet – but it reflects a long-standing, if controversial, Israeli doctrine: the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
Does it sometimes backfire? Yes. Does it always backfire? No.
During the Syrian civil war, Israel secretly armed and funded several rebel groups in southern Syria that helped keep ISIS and Iran-backed terrorists from the border.
As a short-term tactical move to weaken and undermine Hamas, the decision has logic. What would be a mistake is turning an alliance with Abu Shabab into a long-term strategy or making it a cornerstone of Israel’s still-undefined “day after” plan for Gaza.
Then there is the matter of the leak.
Liberman’s political motive was clear: to damage Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by painting him as reckless.
First, Netanyahu allowed Qatar to fund Hamas with suitcases of cash. Now, he’s arming what the party leader characterized as “a group of criminals and felons, identified with Islamic State.”
In revealing the program, Liberman essentially shut it down – an operation initiated and supported by the defense and intelligence establishments. Abu Shabab quickly distanced himself from any Israeli link, posting on Facebook:
“We categorically reject these accusations… Our weapons are simple, outdated, and came through the support of our own people… We have never been, and will never be, a tool of the occupation, and we refuse to have our name dragged into any dubious agendas.”
Netanyahu slammed Liberman for the leak, asking, “What did he leak? – that, on the advice of defense officials, we worked with clans that oppose Hamas? What’s wrong with that? That’s good; it saves the lives of soldiers.”
He then added, “This publication only helps Hamas, but Liberman doesn’t care.”
Liberman surely does not want to help Hamas. But he also doesn’t mind hurting Netanyahu – especially with elections in the air.
His criticism – that Abu Shabab’s group is filled with felons with past ISIS ties – echoes intelligence concerns that weapons could be turned against Israel down the line.
That concern is valid. But so is the argument that sometimes unsavory actors may still serve useful purposes – if only temporarily. Defense officials have argued that even criminal elements can help stabilize a zone if they perceive it as being in their interest to do so.
In this light, Liberman’s leak appears to be motivated more by the political opportunity to embarrass Netanyahu than by concerns about national security. The real damage may not be to the prime minister’s reputation but to ongoing operational efforts to find effective ways to further weaken Hamas and undermine its control of Gaza from within.
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