When Moldovans go to the polls in parliamentary elections on September 28, it will be the third time in less than a year – after a referendum on future EU membership and presidential elections last autumn.
In both of the recent elections pro-European forces scraped to victory, thanks to a strong turnout among Moldovan diaspora voters, primarily in Western Europe and North America. And in both elections, Russian interference was a significant factor. This is unlikely to change in the upcoming parliamentary vote. Moldova is too important a battleground in Russia’s campaign to rebuild a Soviet-style sphere of influence in eastern Europe.
Wedged between EU and NATO member Romania to the west and Ukraine to the east, Moldova has its own aspirations for EU accession. But with a breakaway region in Transnistria, which is host to a Russian military base and “peacekeeping force” and whose population is leaning heavily towards Russia, this will not be a straightforward path to membership.
What’s more, a Euro-skeptic and Moscow-friendly government after the next elections might allow the Kremlin to increase its military presence in the region and thereby pose a threat not only to Ukraine but also to Romania. While not quite equivalent to Russia’s unsinkable aircraft carrier of Kaliningrad, a more Russia-friendly Moldovan government would be a major strategic asset for Moscow.
Unsurprisingly, Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu, and her Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky have little doubt that further destabilization is at the top of Russia’s agenda. Fears about a Russian escalation in the months before the elections are neither new nor unfounded.
There were worries that Moldova and Transnistria might be next on the Kremlin’s agenda as far back as the aftermath of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. These worries resurfaced when Moscow, rather prematurely, announced the beginning of stage two of its war against Ukraine in late April, 2022.
Russia’s hopes of capturing all of southern Ukraine may not have materialized yet, but they are not off the Kremlin’s agenda. And a track record of false-flag operations in Transnistria and a coup attempt in Moldova do not bode well in the run-up to the elections.
Knife-edge elections are nothing new in Moldova. Not only is the country physically divided along the river Nistru, but opinions over its future geopolitical orientation remain split even in the territory controlled by the government.
With no pre-1991 history of independent statehood, parts of Moldova were part of Ukraine, Romania and the Soviet Union. Russian is widely spoken and, while declining in number, Moldovan labor migrants to Russia remain important contributors of remittances, which accounted for over 12 percent of the country’s GDP in 2023.
Moldovans in large numbers are, therefore, not keen on severing all ties with Russia. This does not mean they are supporters of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, or are opponents of closer relations with the European Union. But as the referendum and presidential elections in October 2024 showed, if pushed to make a choice between Russia and Europe and manipulated by Russian fear-mongering and vote buying, pro-European majorities remain slim.
This is despite the significant support that the EU has provided to Moldova, including €1.9 billion ($2.2 billion) in financial support to facilitate reforms as part of the country’s efforts to join the EU. And there’s also nearly €200 million in military assistance over the past four years, including a €20 million package for improved air defenses announced in April.
The EU has also provided several emergency aid packages to assist the country’s population during repeated energy crises triggered by Russia. Since then, the Moldovans and Brussels have agreed on a comprehensive energy strategy that should make the country immune to Russian blackmail.
This pattern of competitive influence seeking by Russia and the EU is long-standing and has not produced any decisive, lasting breakthroughs for either side.
When the current president of Moldova, Maia Sandu, won in 2020, she defeated her opponent, Igor Dodon, by a decisive 58% to 42% margin, equivalent to some 250,000 votes that separated the candidates in the second round. Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) obtained almost 53% of votes in the 2021 parliamentary elections and gained 63 seats in the 101-seat parliament.
Not since the 2005 elections, won by the communist party under then-president Vladimir Voronin, had there been a a majority single-party government in Moldova. According to current opinion polls, PAS remains the strongest party with levels of support between 27% and 37%.
In a crowded field of political parties and their leaders in which disappointment and doubt are the prevailing negative emotions among the electorate, Sandu and PAS remain the least unpopular choices. They have weathered the fall-out from the war in Ukraine well so far – managing the influx of refugees, keeping relations with Transnistria stable, and steering Moldova through a near-constant cost-of-living and energy crisis. Anti-government protests in 2022-23 eventually fizzled out.
Russia’s election interference in 2024 was ultimately not successful in cheating pro-European voters out of their victories in the presidential elections and the referendum on future EU membership. But this is unlikely to stop the Kremlin from trying again in the run-up to parliamentary elections in September.
Moscow will try to disrupt and delay Moldova’s already bumpy road to EU membership. A weakened pro-European government after parliamentary elections would be a very useful tool for Russia. Moldova and its European allies are in for an unusually hot summer.
Stefan Wolff is a professor of international security at the University of Birmingham.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
