During Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi’s visit to China in December 2024, Chinese media reported on Iwaya’s statement that “on historical issues, the Japanese side continues to uphold the position established in the Murayama Statement, expresses deep introspection, and offers a heartfelt apology.” There were also reports that Iwaya had mentioned upholding both the Murayama Statement and the Kono Statement. However, the Japanese government denied these reports, noting that the government of Ishiba Shigeru was committed to both the Murayama Statement made in 1995 on the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, and the Abe Statement made in 2015 to recognize the 70th anniversary.
With 2025 marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, issues of historical perception are expected to attract renewed attention, and China may have made a strategic move to preempt the surrounding discourse. From China’s perspective, the Murayama Statement is easier to accept, since it takes a critical view of Japan’s modern history in general, clearly acknowledges the facts of Japan’s colonial rule and foreign aggression, and expresses both reflection and remorse. The Abe Statement does not criticize Japan’s modern history generally; rather, it asserts that Japan deviated from a path of international cooperation from around the time of the 1931 Manchurian Incident, and only makes indirect expressions of reflection and remorse concerning Japan’s foreign aggression and colonial rule during that time. The Kono Statement was made in 1993 by Kono Yohei, who was at the time Chief Cabinet Secretary of the government of Miyazawa Kiichi. The Kono Statement acknowledged the involvement of the Japanese military in the issue of comfort women, and made clear expressions of reflection and apology. In the announcement from the Japanese side, Iwaya made no mention of the Kono Statement.
These reports from the Chinese media can be interpreted as China sending the message that it wants the Ishiba administration to adopt a historical perspective that is consistent with the Murayama Statement. Ishiba also mentioned the issue of historical perspectives in January 2025, first in an interview with the Mainichi Shimbun, and later during opening remarks at the Tokyo Global Dialogue of the Japan Institute of International Affairs. While Ishiba avoided clearly evaluating the Murayama Statement and Abe Statement, some explanation was provided. At the Tokyo Global Dialogue, Ishiba noted that “2025 marks the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the war,” adding that use of the term “defeat in the war” was important, as mentioning the “end of the war” would misrepresent the true nature of what transpired. In fact, the Murayama Statement predominantly uses the term “defeat in the war,” while the Abe Statement uses “end of the war.” Taking this into account,Ishiba’s historical perspective aligns more closely with the Murayama Statement, or at the very least raises doubts concerning the Abe Statement. Ishiba’s position may have been received optimistically by the Chinese side, but in Japan, attention later shifted to Ishiba’s visit to the United States and top-level talks between the U.S. and China, and Ishiba has since made no mention of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.
Still, we can view the issue surrounding the Murayama Statement from differing perspectives. On April 12, 2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan and delivered an address to Japan’s National Diet, in which he stated the following: “Since the normalization of diplomatic ties between China and Japan, the Japanese Government and leaders have on many occasions stated their position on the historical issue, admitted that Japan had committed aggression and expressed deep remorse and apology to the victimized countries. The Chinese Government and people appreciate the position they have taken.” Since this statement was made in 2007, the phrasing that “the Japanese Government and leaders have on many occasions stated their position on the historical issue, admitted that Japan had committed aggression and expressed deep remorse and apology to the victimized countries” most likely refers to the Murayama Statement made in 1995, along with the Koizumi Statement made in 2005 observing the 60th anniversary, which upheld the Murayama Statement. China has officially recognized the Murayama Statement (and Koizumi Statement) in positive terms. In contrast, China has yet to make any positive statements concerning the Abe Statement made in 2015. Given this historical context, it is understandable that the Chinese side would want the Ishiba administration to adopt a historical perspective that aligns with the Murayama Statement.
In 2025, China is actively preparing to observe the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. At recent top-level talks with Russia and Belarus, and on other occasions, commitments have been made to spread a “correct view of World War II history” around the world. Regardless of whether any statement to mark the 80th anniversary is issued, the Ishiba administration needs to continue to acknowledge the facts of the past, apologize, and work toward reconciliation. At the same time, Japan must appropriately respond to China’s strategic moves surrounding the 80th anniversary, as well as the broader efforts—pursued in cooperation with Russia and Belarus—to rewrite history, shape perceptions, and influence discourse to the detriment of Japan and the world under the notion of a “correct view of history.”
KAWASHIMA Shin is a professor at the University of Tokyo.
