The European Union scrambled to diversify its energy supply and reduce its reliance on Russian gas after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Pipeline gas imports from Russia dropped sharply — from more than 150 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2021 to less than 52 bcm in 2024.
However, despite sweeping sanctions designed to curb Moscow’s energy revenue, Russia still accounted for roughly 19% of the EU’s gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply in 2024.
According to a recent report by DUH (Deutsche Umwelthilfe, or Environmental Action Germany), the EU’s imports of Russian LNG have increased. The environmental NGO’s analysis found that the bloc bought about 20% more Russian LNG in 2024 than it did the previous year.
Prioritizing Europe’s energy security
In the search for alternative energy suppliers, Brussels has struck or renewed deals with countries that are politically unstable or considered misaligned with European values.
Algeria, long plagued by domestic unrest and diplomatic tensions with neighbors like Morocco and Spain, remains a key supplier. Libya’s gas output is regularly disrupted by militia blockades and factional infighting.
Meanwhile, Gulf monarchies like Qatar — often criticized for their human rights records — continue to play a significant role in Europe’s energy strategy.
In each case, the EU appears to have chosen pragmatism over idealism, prioritizing energy security even in the face of political risk and conflicting interests and values.
But one major energy player remains absent from the EU’s calculus: Iran.
Despite possessing the world’s second-largest proven gas reserves, Iran has virtually no energy trade with the EU.
The reasons cited by officials are complex — rooted in geopolitics, nuclear diplomacy and human rights record — but the question remains: If Europe can do business with Russia, Libya and Qatar, why can’t it be pragmatic about Iran?
Sanctions, blacklists and the cost of doing business with Iran
The most significant barrier preventing Iranian energy from reaching the EU is sanctions.
The European bloc is bound not only by its own sanctions but also by a wider web of US-led restrictions targeting Iran’s energy sector. These measures penalize non-US companies that engage with Tehran’s oil and gas industries.
Sanctions do more than halt trade. “They deter investment in Iran’s energy infrastructure, making it prohibitively expensive to extract and transport oil and gas to Europe,” Adnan Mazarei, an economist and former senior official at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), told DW.
Despite Iran’s vast reserves, much of its potential remains untapped.
Still, sanctions have not entirely shut Iran out of the global energy trade. Tehran continues to export oil through what experts describe as a “shadow fleet” — tankers that operate off radar, often transferring cargo mid-sea to disguise its origin.
Iranian oil and LNG have found buyers in countries like China and Malaysia, outside the reach of US enforcement.
“Some Iranian oil even ends up being re-imported into Europe through intermediaries such as India,” Mehdi Ghodsi, an economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, told DW.
“European companies simply cannot take that kind of risk and trade directly with Iran,” Ghodsi added, noting that such a move would result in “severe penalties.”
How did we get here?
Iran is one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world, largely due to its financial support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah — organizations that are classified as terrorist groups by the EU, the US, and others.
“In Iran, support for resistance movements isn’t just policy; it’s written into law,” Ghodsi explained.
Iran maintains that this legal provision demonstrates transparency and frames its support as backing “anti-oppression and anti-imperialist” allies.
Inside Iran’s leadership, however, views are divided.
Moderates and reformists have pushed for concessions that could help reconnect the country to the West, including potential revisions to its support for regional militias.
What could have offered a pathway to normalization was the 2015 landmark nuclear agreement with world powers, including the United States, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which saw Iran agree to limit its nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief.
However, US President Donald Trump’s first administration unilaterally withdrew from the agreement in 2018, reimposing sanctions and crippling Iran’s economy.
Although European nations tried to salvage the deal, their efforts fell short of mitigating the damage.
Can there be any changes?
Some experts believe that the situation could still be reversed — but doing so will be difficult.
“It’s a political conundrum, and it requires a political solution,” Mazarei said, yet he remained skeptical that the necessary changes would occur under Iran’s current leadership.
Beyond the apparent lack of political will in Tehran, it is not clear whether the ongoing Iran-US nuclear talks will offer a breakthrough.
“Neither side is fully credible,” he said, noting that the United States has repeatedly shifted its stance, making it difficult to predict whether sanctions might actually be lifted.
Brussels technically has the option to chart its own course if US-Iran negotiations collapse, he pointed out — but whether it would do so is another matter.
Europe remains deeply tied to the trans-Atlantic alliance. Since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine, it has become increasingly dependent on LNG, which now accounts for more than a third of its gas imports. In 2024, about 45% of Europe’s LNG came from the US.
“I don’t think Europe would go against the United States,” said Ghodsi. “They didn’t even do so in response to the tariff war, when it would have been in Europe’s interest to expand trade with China.”
Ghodsi added that the trans-Atlantic relationship has effectively tied Europe’s hands to pursue what could be in its own interest.
Edited by: Keith Walker
