In an era marked by open confrontation between NATO and Russia, Germany finds itself at the epicenter of both the military and economic implications of the Ukraine war. While the government of Chancellor Friedrich Merz continues to expand its support for Kiev — including through direct financing of arms production on Ukrainian territory — the largest opposition and second-largest party in the Bundestag (federal parliament) is highly critical of escalating talk of war with Russia.
Stefan Keuter, a Bundestag member of the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and Deputy Chairman of the AfD parliamentary group, spoke with Asia Times about the need for a fundamental realignment of German security policy — away from confrontation and toward a strategic détente with Russia. He is a member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and advocates the development of new security structures for Europe to include Russia rather than isolating the largest European nation and defining it as a forever enemy.
Uwe von Parpart, publisher of Asia Times, and Germany correspondent Diego Faßnacht conducted the interview with Stefan Keuter.
Diego Faßnacht: Mr. Keuter, many voices – including international observers – are saying that Germany has effectively become a party to the war in Ukraine. Do you agree?
Stefan Keuter: Look, I’m not a legal scholar, so I won’t pretend to judge the precise legal threshold. But from a political and strategic standpoint, I think there are clear indications that we’ve crossed a line. And more importantly, the question isn’t even whether we think we’ve become a party to the war — it’s how others, especially Russia, see us. And if Moscow sees Germany as acting like an enemy, then for all practical purposes, that’s what we are. That perception alone puts us in danger. We can argue all day about legal definitions, but if the other side treats us as a combatant, then we have a serious problem. And I don’t think the German government fully understands the risks it’s creating with its current course of action.
Diego Faßnacht: The German government is now actively supporting weapons production inside Ukraine. Can this still be described as indirect involvement?
Stefan Keuter: Honestly, no. It’s a workaround, plain and simple. Because Germany can’t – or won’t – deliver certain weapons directly, especially those like the Taurus missiles, there’s now this new idea of funding the production of such weapons directly on Ukrainian soil. So, in effect, we’re outsourcing the manufacturing while still being financially and technically involved. It’s a strategic sleight of hand. NATO expertise is likely involved as well, even if that isn’t being said openly. The difference is purely bureaucratic. From a Russian point of view, and frankly from a sober assessment, we are helping Ukraine build the capacity to strike deeper and more effectively — and that, in my view, is not neutrality.
Uwe Parpart: Some argue that the Ukraine war is being used — perhaps deliberately — to wear down Russia, so the West can shift its strategic focus toward China later. Do you see merit in that perspective?
Stefan Keuter: I think it’s not only plausible — I think there’s a good chance that’s exactly what the idea was from the beginning. The United States clearly sees China as its primary competitor in the long term. If you want to prepare for a confrontation with China — whether it’s over Taiwan or in the Indo-Pacific more generally — then weakening Russia through a war of attrition first could well have been a strategic thought.
Uwe Parpart: Let’s move to the broader Russia question. What is your position – and that of your party – on how Germany should handle its relationship with Moscow going forward?
Stefan Keuter: For us, it’s very clear: this is not Germany’s war, and we should stop acting like it is. Our job as elected representatives is to serve German interests – not American interests, not Ukrainian interests, and certainly not the interests of some ideological project. For decades, Germany benefitted from stable and productive relations with Russia. We imported affordable energy, built up our industry, and maintained peace through mutual respect and trade. All of that has been thrown away in the name of sanctions and military escalation. And who has paid the price? Not Russia. It’s German industry, German taxpayers, German families. We’ve lost far more than we’ve gained.
Diego Faßnacht: You’ve repeatedly said that Russia must be part of any future European security architecture. Could you explain why that is so essential from your point of view?
Stefan Keuter: Because you can’t build a lasting peace in Europe against Russia — only with Russia. That’s a fundamental truth. After the end of the Cold War, the West made verbal promises — especially to Gorbachev and later to Yeltsin — that NATO would not expand eastward. And those promises were broken. We now say, “Well, it wasn’t in writing.” But in diplomacy, a given word used to count for something. The Russians remember very well. And from their perspective, NATO expansion to their doorstep is a betrayal. If we had taken their security concerns seriously, maybe we wouldn’t be in this mess. Ukraine could have been a neutral buffer state — but instead, we encouraged it to move into Western military structures. That was a provocation, and we’re now living with the consequences.
Uwe Parpart: Could the OSCE, originally intended to balance East and West, be revived as a platform for dialogue?
Stefan Keuter: In principle, yes — but not in its current form. The OSCE was founded to bring all parties to the table, including Russia. But what we’ve seen in recent years is a complete distortion of that idea. Russian delegates are denied visas. Resolutions are passed without giving them a chance to speak. The whole thing has been turned into a stage for political messaging. That’s not diplomacy — that’s theatre. If we want serious dialogue, the OSCE would have to return to its original mission: dialogue without preconditions, with all sides heard equally. Until that happens, I don’t think Moscow will take it seriously — and frankly, I wouldn’t blame them.
Diego Faßnacht: Chancellor Friedrich Merz recently said that the Nord Stream pipelines should never be reopened. What’s your reaction?
Stefan Keuter: That’s incomprehensible. We still don’t know who actually attacked the pipelines. The federal government shows no interest in investigating the matter seriously. The account by Seymour Hersh is at least plausible — but Merz rules out restarting Nord Stream regardless of what the investigation might reveal. If that’s the case, he’s clearly not acting in Germany’s interest.
Diego Faßnacht: Friedrich Merz further claimed that Germany must become capable of defending itself — even without the United States. What’s your response to that?
Stefan Keuter: Honestly? That’s complete fantasy. He’s a loudmouth. It sounds good on a talk show, but it has nothing to do with reality. Germany is deeply embedded in NATO — not just politically, but logistically, technologically, and above all, in terms of intelligence. If you take the United States out of the equation, the entire defense posture of Germany collapses. Just look at the Taurus missile debate. The moment Washington indicated disapproval, everything stopped. That tells you everything you need to know. We don’t have strategic autonomy — and we haven’t even tried to build it. So when Merz talks about going it alone, I have to ask: with what? With whom? And at what cost?
Uwe Parpart: Bruno Kahl, the former head of the German foreign intelligence agency (BND), recently warned that Russia could push further west after Ukraine. Do you take that threat seriously?
Stefan Keuter: I think we have to be very careful with such statements. I’ve spoken to American sources, including within the intelligence community, and their reaction to Kahl’s remarks was clear: they called it nonsense. Now, what does that tell us? These kinds of warnings aren’t based on facts — they’re politically driven. They serve to justify further escalation and more military spending. But if a Russian invasion of NATO territory were truly imminent, wouldn’t our government be moving heaven and earth to prepare? Instead, we get symbolic announcements and half-hearted measures. It doesn’t add up. So I see this more as a propaganda tool than a genuine threat assessment.
Uwe Parpart: Let’s turn to Germany’s actual military capacity. What, in your view, are the core problems facing the Bundeswehr today?
Stefan Keuter: Where should I begin? The Bundeswehr is, in many respects, a hollow force. Structurally, it’s broken. It’s not an attractive employer — we have tens of thousands of vacancies, even in well-paid and specialized positions. And among those who do serve, morale is low. Equipment is outdated or missing altogether. I’m not just talking about high-tech systems — I mean basic things, like warm clothing, functioning radios, or even enough training ammunition. There are exercises where soldiers literally have to simulate shooting by shouting “bang.” That’s not a modern army — that’s a joke. And on top of that, the procurement system is so tangled up in bureaucracy and external consultancy contracts that it takes years to get even basic gear delivered.
Diego Faßnacht: Defense Minister Pistorius has announced plans to add 60,000 troops. Is that a step in the right direction?
Stefan Keuter: Well, intentions are one thing — implementation is another. Of course, we need more personnel, but you can’t just decree an increase in troop numbers without fixing the foundation. Right now, we have too many generals and not enough soldiers to lead. The hierarchy is top-heavy. And even if you recruited 60,000 tomorrow — where would you house them? Who would train them? What gear would they use? These questions remain unanswered. If you want a real turnaround, you have to start by making the Bundeswehr functional, respected, and mission-ready again. That’s a long-term project, not a press release.
Uwe Parpart: What about conscription? Some politicians are floating the idea of reintroducing it. Do you see that as a viable solution?
Stefan Keuter: To be honest, no — not in the current environment. A lot of the infrastructure that would be required for conscription has been dismantled. We don’t have the recruitment offices anymore. We don’t have enough barracks. And many former military sites have been sold off or repurposed. It would take a decade or more to rebuild the basic structure needed to support mandatory service. I also think the political will isn’t there — and the public wouldn’t support it unless the country were under direct threat. What we should focus on instead is building a well-equipped, well-paid, and professional military — one that people actually want to join.
Diego Faßnacht: Over 80% of Germany’s defense procurement reportedly comes from outside the EU — much of it from the United States. To change this would require massive development of production capacities. In what timeframe would you consider it possible to achieve progress in this area?
Stefan Keuter: No, it’s not sustainable — and it’s not strategic. What we’ve seen in the last few years is a total neglect of European and especially German defense manufacturing capabilities. Instead of investing in our own industry, the so-called “Bundeswehr special fund” — 100 billion euros agreed on in 2022 — was poured into American systems: the F-35 fighter jet, missile systems, helicopters, all produced overseas. Some of these purchases are directly tied to nuclear sharing arrangements with the U.S. That money could have been used to modernize German production, create skilled jobs, and build up a more autonomous European capacity. But that would have required political courage — and long-term thinking. Sadly, both are lacking.
Where there’s a will, there’s a way. I would also argue that, if the German Armed Forces agree to procure and put out to tender, the private economy is generally more flexible than the state. If production capacities are built up here, I have more confidence in the German or European private economy than in the state getting involved in this area.
Uwe Parpart: What’s your view on how that affects Germany’s role in the broader geopolitical landscape — not just militarily, but also industrially?
Stefan Keuter: We’re becoming dependent — not only in security terms but also economically. Once you lose industrial sovereignty in a sector like defense, you lose leverage in diplomacy, in alliances, in trade. It’s not just about whether we can build our own tanks or planes. It’s about whether we can shape our own future. And the current path leads us deeper into dependency — on suppliers, on foreign technologies, and ultimately on the political will of allies who may not always prioritize German interests. After all, those who are not independent are vulnerable to extortion.
Diego Faßnacht: There have been repeated calls — from both media and politicians — to ban the AfD. How do you respond to that?
Stefan Keuter: That’s an attack on democracy. You can’t just ban the second strongest party in the country. The legal foundation for such a move is nonexistent. It wouldn’t hold up in court. It’s a sign of desperation from a weak government that is losing support.
Uwe Parpart: Looking ahead to upcoming regional elections in 2026 — particularly in Saxony-Anhalt — what are your expectations?
Stefan Keuter: We have a real opportunity there. The CDU is weak, and we’re already the leading political force in parts of eastern Germany. I believe we can govern — possibly even without a coalition partner.
