China has unveiled its stealth carrier jet program, revealing not only cutting-edge warplanes but a bold bid to redefine naval power in the Indo-Pacific.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China publicly revealed the production facilities of its fifth-generation stealth fighter jets for the first time, signaling progress toward deploying these aircraft on its third aircraft carrier.
During a broadcast by state-run CCTV, at least two J-35 jets were observed at Shenyang Aircraft Corporation’s (SAC) hangar, even though the report focused on the J-15T, an upgraded 4.5-generation carrier-capable fighter. Military analyst Song Zhongping said the J-35s were likely corrosion-resistant, carrier-based variants, marking the first public indication of their mass production. Both aircraft are expected to operate from the Type 003 aircraft carrier Fujian, currently undergoing sea trials and set for commissioning by year-end. Sun Cong, chief J-15 designer, highlighted software-defined functionality as key to faster aircraft development.
Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, a subsidiary of AVIC, is expanding its facilities, with provincial governor Wang Xinwei inspecting new construction sites this month. The company had earlier announced an 8.6 billion yuan (US$1.2 billion) investment in a 4.2 square kilometer production site over five years. The move underscores China’s accelerating naval aviation modernization and ambition to become a “deep blue-water” navy.
China’s J-35A and J-15T carrier-based fighters mark a significant step in the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) ability to project power across the Indo-Pacific. However, persistent technological, operational and strategic constraints continue to limit the effectiveness of China’s carrier aviation in high-end maritime conflict scenarios.
Kevin Kusumoto states in a February 2025 article for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) that China’s J-35A fifth-generation stealth fighter represents a leap in stealth, electronic warfare, and multi-domain capabilities. He explains that the J-35A, designed for all-domain operations, employs advanced stealth and networked systems to strike enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, and air defenses while maintaining “one-way transparency” against prior-generation threats.
He adds that its modular design supports carrier-based variants intended for deployment aboard the Type 003 Fujian. Although some observers compare it to the F-35, Kusumoto argues that the J-35A reflects China’s tactical priorities, citing its unique aerodynamic structure, bomb bay configuration and engine layout.
Writing in November 2024 for The War Zone (TWZ), Thomas Newdick describes the J-15T as a substantial upgrade to the PLAN’s carrier aviation. He reports that the aircraft incorporates domestically produced WS-10 engines and is a catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR)-compatible for operations aboard Chinese carriers, including the Fujian.
He notes that its reinforced landing gear and integration with the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) allow for heavier payloads and higher sortie rates. Newdick also highlights a revised radome housing an active electronically scanned array radar compatible with PL-10 and PL-15 missiles, along with cockpit enhancements that improve pilot situational awareness. He states that these upgrades, combined with domestic engine production and broad compatibility, establish the J-15T as a multirole naval fighter.
Jack Burnham adds in a November 2024 article for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) that, alongside the J-20, the J-35A enables China to field two stealth fighter types – a capability previously exclusive to the US. He further notes that an upgraded carrier-based J-15, likely featuring extended range and improved armaments, demonstrates China’s ability to refine existing platforms to enhance force projection.
At the operational level, Daniel Rice explains in a July 2024 report for the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) that Chinese state media emphasizes “split wave” and “continuous” air operation patterns, allowing sustained presence or saturation attacks to support amphibious assaults and control contested airspace.
He says China could employ its carrier battle groups (CVBGs) to project power well beyond its coastline by organizing layered maritime defense zones. These CVBGs, he notes, are structured into inner, middle, and outer defense layers extending up to 400 kilometers from the carrier and integrate submarines, surface combatants, and carrier-based aircraft to defend the formation and strike targets.
Keitaro Ushirogata, in his book Global Maritime Strategy 1980-2023, frames China’s aircraft carriers as strategic tools in the PLAN’s transition from coastal defense to blue-water operations. He notes that China’s carriers are designed to support operations in the Western Pacific and beyond, enabling extended-range air operations, sea control, and deterrence missions far from the Chinese mainland.
Ushirogata underscores that these vessels are intended not merely as status symbols but as instruments to enhance China’s regional influence, protect overseas interests, and potentially challenge US naval dominance in Asia.
Yet this ambition is undercut by enduring constraints. Jonathan Caverley, writing in a 2025 article for the Texas National Review (TNR), observes that the PLAN’s carriers lack nuclear propulsion and overseas basing, which limits their endurance and reach. He notes that PLAN vessels remain vulnerable to long-range precision strikes from the US and its allies, supported by satellite-based targeting and resilient kill chains.
Caverley also warns that China’s reliance on contested space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) networks makes its carriers susceptible to disruptions, further reducing their combat effectiveness. Moreover, he states that deficiencies in integrated air defense and anti-submarine warfare capabilities could undermine PLAN carrier survivability in high-intensity engagements.
Aina Turillazzi builds on this analysis in a 2024 article for the SAIS Europe Journal of Global Affairs, noting that Fujian’s reliance on conventional propulsion demands support vessels for sustained operations and that the carrier has underperformed in EMALS trials compared to US counterparts. She further cites a shortage of carrier-qualified pilots as a critical bottleneck.
While she acknowledges progress in underway replenishment and satellite communications, Turillazzi argues that China’s power projection remains limited by logistical depth and lack of combat experience. Rather than matching US global reach, she concludes, China’s carriers are better suited to influence operations against weaker regional adversaries.
China is pairing stealth aircraft with expanding shipbuilding to reshape its naval presence. But despite rapid gains, persistent logistical and operational constraints continue to tether its ambitions to regional waters.
