Is China intent on a D-Day style invasion of Taiwan?
Certainly that has been the tone of some of the reporting following the emergence of photos and videos depicting massive new Chinese barges designed for land-to-sea military operations. The fact that China launched a two-day military drill in the Taiwan Strait on April 1, 2025, has only intensified such fears.
To me, the curious thing regarding these musings about a potential war involving China, which has one of the world’s most advanced militaries, is that it is supported by reference to technology first used some 80 years ago – specifically, the Mulberry Harbours, floating piers that allowed Allies to deploy land vehicles onto the beaches at Normandy on June 6, 1944.
As an expert on the history and geopolitics of the Mulberry Harbours, I believe using the World War II example obscures far more than it clarifies with regard to the geopolitical situation today. Indeed, while the new Chinese ships may be operationally similar to their historical forebears, the strategic situation in China and Taiwan is far different.
Disquiet on the Pacific front?
The possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, an island the Chinese Communist Party sees as part of its territory, is perhaps the most pressing security issue for countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
Beijing has increasingly ratcheted up the aggressive rhetoric toward the government in Taipei during the premiership of President Xi Jinping. While one reading of Xi is that his rhetoric is in part a strategic move to burnish Chinese power globally, labeling Taiwan as a renegade or breakaway province is, for many, a clear indication of an intention to invade and bring the island within the geography of Chinese sovereignty.
From the US perspective, the Trump administration gave early signals that it saw China as the main threat to its national security, though Washington’s commitments to the defense of Taiwan remain uncertain, much like the president’s ultimate policy views toward Beijing.
Aside from the geopolitics, any Chinese decision to invade Taiwan would mean attempting an extremely challenging military operation that is, historically speaking, a risky proposition. Seaborne invasions have often led to high casualties or even outright failure.
The Gallipoli landings on the coast of Turkey during World War I, for example, led to the withdrawal of mainly Australian and New Zealand forces after high casualties and barely any territorial gains. In World War II, island-hopping by U.S. forces to push back Japan’s advance achieved strategic goals – but at a high human cost.
The difficulty posed by sea-to-land invasion is not just the battles on Day 1, it is the logistical challenge of continuing to funnel troops and materiel to sustain a push out from the beachhead. That’s where the barges come into play.
About those WWII barges …
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was skeptical of opening a front against Nazi Germany by a landing on the French coast – a position that frustrated the United States. The main concern of Churchill and his generals was the logistical puzzle.
They reasoned that Germany would either retain control of French ports or sabotage them, and that tanks, guns, food, soldiers and other necessities were not going to be brought up from reserve via ports.
The Mulberry Harbours fixed that problem by creating a set of floating piers that would rise up and down with the tide by being fixed to sophisticated anchors. Ships could moor to these piers and unload needed material.
The piers were protected by an inner ring of concrete caissons, dragged across the channel and sunk into position, and an outer breakwater of scuttled ships. The Mulberry Harbours were a combination of cutting-edge pier technology and improvisation.
The images of Chinese invasion barges today show that the technology has advanced, but the principle of an operational need for logistical support of a beachhead breakout is the same.
Yet the geography of any invasion is very different. In World War II, the Mulberry Harbours were part of an invasion from an island to conquer a continent. But a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be the inverse – from a continent to an island.
Great power politics, Chinese characteristics
The use of Mulberry Harbours, as innovative as it was, was only a moment in a longer geopolitical process.
The D-Day invasion was the culmination of the transfer of US military might across the Atlantic through Operation Bolero. Simply, the United Kingdom became a giant warehouse – mainly for US soldiers and equipment.
The Mulberry Harbours made the crossing of the English Channel possible for these men and weapons. It was the last step in the projection of US power across the Atlantic Ocean and on to the European continent. I describe this as a process of a seapower moving from its near or coastal waters to far waters in another part of the globe.
The calculation for China is very different. Certainly, barges would help an invasion across the Taiwan Strait. But China sees Taiwan as part of its near waters, and it wants to secure those waters from global competition.
Beijing views the US as having established a military presence just off its coastline from World War II to the present day, making the western Pacific another set of US far waters across the globe accompanying its European presence.
From its perspective, China is surrounded by a US military based in Okinawa, Guam and the Philippines. This chain of bases could restrict China’s ambition through blockade, and controlling Taiwan would help China create a gap in this chain.
Of course, China does not just have an eye on its near waters. It has also created a far water presence of its own in its building of an ocean-going military navy, established a military base in Djibouti, and through its Belt and Road Initiative become an economic and political presence across the Indian, Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic oceans.
Chinese invasion barges could be deployed quite early in China’s process of moving from near to far waters. The Mulberry Harbours, conversely, were deployed once the U.S. had already secured its Caribbean, Atlantic and Pacific near waters.
Part of a process
Technical matters and historical comparisons with the Mulberry Harbours are an interesting way to look at the new Chinese invasion barges and consider the operational scale of geopolitics.
But as with the World War II case, China-Taiwan tensions are simply a modern example of a local theater – this time, the Taiwanese Strait – being part of a greater global process of power projection. The comparisons to Mulberry Harbours, therefore, are not with the technology itself but its role in a mechanism of historical geopolitical change.
The reemergence of the technology of invasion barges may be a sign that a new conflict is on the horizon.
If that were the case, the irony is that China would be using Mulberry Harbour-type technology to secure its position in the western Pacific at the same time the Trump administration is questioning the strategic value of the US presence in Europe – a presence established through World War II and, at least in part, the use of the Mulberry Harbours.
Colin Flint is distinguished professor of political science, Utah State University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
