The April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam, which tragically claimed 26 civilian lives, marked a return to cross-border hostilities, with India and Pakistan falling back into a familiar pattern of airstrikes, ceasefire violations, and international appeals for restraint. However, a more strategic split has emerged amid this crisis: the ongoing chasm in India-Turkiye ties.
On the night of May 6-7, Indian jets struck what New Delhi alleged to be terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Pakistan responded with cross-border stikes of its own – during which the Indian Air Force intercepted multiple retaliatory drones launched from across the Line of Control. According to press briefings by the Indian Armed Forces, among these were Turkiye-manufactured Asisguard Songar models – unmanned armed systems previously exported to Pakistan for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations.
This was the first instance where Turkish-origin defense platforms have been used in a live conflict directly involving Indian forces, escalating long-brewing apprehensions in New Delhi about Ankara’s regional posture. Intelligence reports have alleged the involvement of Turkish military personnel in the planning and execution of these drone operations. Suspicions of logistical coordination were heightened by additional sightings of a Turkish Air Force C-130 Hercules plane landing at Karachi airport and a Turkish Ada-class anti-submarine corvette docked at Karachi Port.
By reiterating his relationship with Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and referring to Turkiye-Pakistan ties as “one of the finest examples of true friendship,” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan demonstrated Ankara’s readiness to operationalize political support as well. This relationship has been shaped and bolstered by a long-standing strategic partnership between the two countries. Turkiye became Pakistan’s second-largest arms supplier after China between 2018 and 2022. Defense diplomacy and operational interoperability have been further solidified by their joint military exercises, such as the yearly “Atatürk” and more recent multinational exercises like Indus Shield.
For Indian officials, these developments have only confirmed what had been growing more evident in recent years: Turkiye’s strategic drift toward adversarial alignment. For much of the past decade, India has watched Turkiye’s overtures to Pakistan with increasing unease – from joint military exercises and arms deals to Ankara’s persistent commentary on Kashmir at international forums, including the United Nations General Assembly. But those ties, once viewed through a largely ideological lens, now appear to be crossing into tangible military support. For India, Turkiye has crossed a diplomatic Rubicon – it no longer merely cheers from the sidelines but now appears, unmistakably, as an operational actor in conflicts that hit close to home.
This shift is a result of Turkiye’s attempts to increase its geopolitical presence. As a NATO member with the second-largest military after the United States, Ankara has increasingly used its defense exports, especially combat-tested drones, to gain traction across Asia and Africa. It’s not just ambition – it’s a slow, deliberate, redrawing of Turkiye’s foreign policy blueprint.
Since launching the “Asia Anew” initiative in 2019, Turkiye has strengthened ties with countries in South and Southeast Asia, framing itself as a bridge between East and West. While some of this outreach has been economic so far, the growing defense and diplomatic footprint, especially in India’s immediate periphery, has raised red flags in New Delhi. Turkiye’s growing relations with Bangladesh, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are now being monitored closely for potential strategic implications.
Erdogan’s ideological outlook drives this geopolitical posturing. His revival of pan-Islamic and neo-Ottoman identity has placed Turkiye on a self-proclaimed pedestal of Muslim leadership. His rhetorical solidarity with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue – bolstered by Turkiye’s active role in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) – has steadily eroded the diplomatic space between Ankara and New Delhi.
Amid reports of Turkiye’s role in the India-Pakistan clashes, New Delhi’s policy response has been swift. The Indian government revoked the security clearance of Turkish ground-handling firm Celebi Aviation, citing national security concerns. Turkish news portals like TRT Global were also suspended temporarily. On top of that, public sentiment also hardened, with hashtags like #BoycottTurkiye trending on Indian social media. Indian travel agencies noted a surge in cancellations to Turkiye – an organic boycott born not from policy, but from public sentiment. Several Indian universities, like Jawaharlal Nehru University, Jamia Millia Islamia, and Chhatrapati Shahu Ji Maharaj University, suspended MoUs with some Turkish institutes.
India is also looking to hedge against Turkish assertiveness by strengthening ties with states and actors wary of Ankara’s ambitions. In April 2025, India signed a fresh defense export agreement with Armenia, adding to earlier deals involving radar and rocket systems. Maritime cooperation with Greece and Cyprus has also grown as part of a broader strategy to balance the Turkish influence in West Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, India is reinforcing partnerships with Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE – both of whom issued measured, neutral statements during Operation Sindoor. Their silence on Kashmir, in contrast to Turkiye’s vocal criticism, has been welcomed in New Delhi. Gulf capitals now serve as more pragmatic partners in India’s West Asia engagement, one less burdened by ideological posturing.
Can India afford to sit back while Ankara gains ground in its immediate periphery? Likely not. A practical blend of containment and competition is emerging as the only viable response as Turkiye pursues an activist foreign policy based on a blend of neo-Ottoman ambition and Islamic solidarity. This will entail increased investment for alternative alliances, more careful examination of Turkish-affiliated companies doing business in India, and more adroit diplomatic signaling when national security is involved.
However, Turkiye’s interventionist intent should not be overstated. Ankara’s support of Pakistan is likely to be more about political branding than strategic commitment. Other than increasing Turkiye’s visibility in Muslim majority forums, there will be few tangible returns if Turkiye decides to take significant risks on behalf of Pakistan instead of just conducting transactional defense deals.
Therefore, a complete rupture in India-Turkiye relations seems unlikely, despite the recent posturing of both countries. Bilateral trade stood at nearly $10.4 billion during 2023-24 and has historically endured moments of political strain. Turkish firms continue to participate in Indian infrastructure projects, while Indian multinationals maintain a presence in Turkiye. What lies ahead may well be a period of “managed hostility” – a diplomatic tightrope where handshakes continue but trust remains elusive.
The India-Turkiye relationship is thus now being reshaped not by a single event but by an accumulation of grievances and geopolitical drift. Operation Sindoor may have acted as a catalyst, but the fault lines had been widening long before. Whether Ankara and New Delhi can arrest this slide – or allow it to harden into estrangement – will depend on how each defines its strategic horizon in a changing global order.
