Myanmar’s parallel National Unity Government (NUG) saw some surprising diplomatic victories in the months after the military seized power in February 2021. Established by elected lawmakers deposed in the coup, the NUG has long styled itself as the country’s legitimate government, in contrast to the unelected and widely despised military junta.
The parallel government helped deny the military representation at the United Nations, where Myanmar’s ambassador rejected the coup and later aligned with the NUG. It did the same at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, whose member states couldn’t reach a consensus on whether the NUG or the military represented Myanmar, and so rejected both.
Meanwhile, the NUG was greeted with enthusiasm by many in Myanmar. But political legitimacy only counts for so much in a civil war, which soon engulfed the country.
Four years after its creation, it’s clear the NUG has failed at its primary task: being a unity government.
While the parallel administration was originally conceived of as a body to bring together the various factions in Myanmar opposed to military rule, it has instead come to be seen as the successor to one faction: the National League for Democracy (NLD).
Aung San Suu Kyi’s political vehicle, the NLD won a sweeping re-election victory in 2020, the results of which the military refused to recognize, resorting to outlandish claims of massive voter fraud.
While the NLD was massively popular, it attracted fierce criticism from ethnic armed groups, who accused the Bamar-dominated party of siding with the military in its many conflicts with ethnic minorities. The NLD also resisted some federal reforms championed by ethnic minorities, striking down a constitutional amendment to allow states and regions to elect their own chief ministers, for example.
Against this backdrop, the NLD took pains to be more inclusive when creating the NUG, appointing representatives from ethnic armed groups, ethnic political parties, and various civil society groups. But this alone has failed to make the NUG a true unity government.
Malaysia’s current government, often referred to as a unity government, includes representatives from three political parties who together form a government and a coalition in parliament. While the NUG includes representatives with connections to various different political factions, it has not brought these organizations into a coalition under its banner.
For instance, Deputy Defense Minister Nai Kao Rot is a former colonel and central committee member of the New Mon State Party (NMSP), one of Myanmar’s oldest ethnic armed groups. But the NMSP as an organization is not a part of, or under the authority of, the NUG.
Since the coup, I’ve embedded with the NMSP and Karen National Union – both longstanding ethnic armed groups – and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), a post-coup group also largely made up of ethnic minorities. All three groups see themselves as being in a loose alliance with the NUG, rather than being under or part of the NUG. Other ethnic armed groups have distanced themselves from the NUG to an even greater extent.
The lack of a central resistance body to replace the junta means that as the military gets pushed out of territory, it’s being replaced piecemeal by different armed groups, leading to the fragmentation of the country under different rulers.
When forming the NUG, the NLD could have done more to win over ethnic minority groups. Nearly all of the minister positions went to NLD parliamentarians, particularly the more important posts, indicating a continued unwillingness to meaningfully share power.
For instance, the defense minister position would have been an obvious post to give to an ethnic armed group ally with decades of experience fighting the military. Instead, it went to an NLD parliamentarian with no military background. While his deputy was taken from the NMSP, a member of the group told me he has little actual power and that they view his appointment as tokenistic.
On the back of its sweeping electoral mandate, the NLD seemed to feel entitled to dominate the NUG cabinet, an understandable position in a stable democracy, but not a particularly strategic choice during a civil war, when the NLD as a political party was dependent on armed groups to support it.
What’s more, the 2020 election, through which the NUG claims its mandate, was deeply flawed. The military received an unelected 25 percent bloc in parliament, incentivizing voters to pick the only party that could defeat the military nationwide, rather than splitting the anti-military vote by voting for ethnic parties. While the NLD does enjoy widespread support among ethnic minorities, it’s likely its margin of victory would be narrower in a free election held under a genuinely democratic constitution.
However, ethnic armed groups have also not been entirely forthcoming. Many have refused to discuss details of how a federal arrangement with the NUG would work, continuously insisting that now is the time to focus on battlefield strategy rather than thorny political questions. It’s true that these conversations could contribute to divisions among allies, but it’s also true that it’s important to establish certain frameworks of political cooperation.
In a telling back-and-forth in February, the NUG and major ethnic armed groups released competing statements on federalism. Among ethnic armed groups, the NUG’s statement was only signed by the Chin Brotherhood, one of the two factions in Chin State.
Duwa Lashi La, the acting president of Myanmar’s opposition National Unity Government, inspects a People’s Defense Force emplacement at an undisclosed location in Myanmar, May 19, 2022. (Facebook/Acting President Duwa Lashi La)
The counter-statement, signed by four major anti-regime ethnic armed groups, warned that “successive centralized systems have not only failed to address Myanmar’s political crises for over seven decades but have also deepened them.”
“We, the undersigned, who have collaborated in the removal of military dictatorship, will not accept a holding together federal model that will renew centralization,” it added, in a seemingly pointed rejection of the NUG’s vision of federalism.
The reality is that despite making federal democracy into a rallying cry for the post-coup movement, most of the ethnic armed groups desire a level of autonomy that’s well beyond what a traditional federal arrangement would offer. The more cynical interpretation is that ethnic armed groups are intentionally kicking the can down the road, avoiding the issue while seizing territory they never intend to surrender to a future federal government.
While ethnic armed groups may say that discussions on federalism should wait until after the revolution, there is unlikely to be a singular, discrete moment when the military junta is defeated. Instead, it has been pushed out of different conflict theaters at different times, being usurped by the Arakan Army in Rakhine State, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in northern Shan State, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in parts of Kachin State, the Karen National Union in parts of Karen State, two different Chin armed movements in Chin State, and the KNDF in large swathes of Karenni State.
It’s not popular to say in anti-regime circles, but Myanmar is a country that is fragmenting. The authority of the central government is being eroded and replaced by many different local authorities, with no central body to bring them together. The NUG was once conceived of as this central body, but has instead become just another local authority – and one that controls significantly less territory than the other armed factions.
The lack of a central resistance coordination body also gives the military an opportunity to compartmentalize the conflict, as it always has, and strike separate ceasefires while making fewer concessions.
The MNDAA and TNLA buckled under immense pressure from China, signing a ceasefire with the military after Beijing closed border crossings, cut electricity and internet to their territories, and took other measures that made running their border statelets untenable. The KNDF and KNU are under similar pressure from Thailand in eastern Myanmar, and it’s not clear how long they can hold out.
If more groups enter into talks, the NUG will be even more disadvantaged, as the group that controls the least territory and commands the fewest troops, while also being the group the military is the least willing to compromise with.
While both ethnic armed groups and the NLD may share some blame for undermining the emergence of a true unity government, the NLD/NUG is undoubtedly worse off for it. The NLD/NUG’s political movement is dependent on the total overthrow of the junta, while ethnic armed groups need only expel the military from the borderlands, difficult to reclaim due to their rugged terrain.
Some of the ethnic armed groups are more genuine in their commitment to overthrow the regime, such as the KNU, but ultimately would accept settling for expanding their territory if they feel the movement has run out of road. The NUG has no such luxury.
