Playing down normalization prospects, analyst says Saudis feel Israel ‘looking backward’

Twice during his Senate confirmation hearing on Tuesday, US President Donald Trump’s nominee to serve as ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee told enthusiastic Republican lawmakers that brokering a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia is a top priority for the new administration and that a deal is within reach.

“The president is in an incredible position to build upon what he did in his first term, expanding the Abraham Accords to include not only the Saudis, but other Gulf state nations,” Huckabee said. “This president could achieve something in the Middle East… [of] biblical proportions.”

Israel’s new Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter has expressed similar optimism, saying in a recent interview that Jerusalem is “closer than ever” to a normalization deal with Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia has struck a completely different tone, asserting last month that it will not normalize ties with Israel before a Palestinian state has been established on the pre-1967 lines — a framework flatly rejected by the current government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu along with much of the broader Israeli society.

But Riyadh’s public statements on the issue have long been downplayed, given that its leaders have long presented a more flexible stance in private meetings with US officials.

Still, one well-connected Mideast analyst told The Times of Israel on Tuesday that the current Israeli government has all but foreclosed any chance for a normalization deal.

“It’s not even close to the realm of possibility when you look at the return to conflict in Gaza and the rumblings inside of the current Israeli government of looking toward possible annexation and other extreme moves in the West Bank,” said Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute (MEI) who regularly speaks to Saudi and other regional officials.

The return to conflict was a reference to Israel’s renewal of intensive military operations throughout the Gaza Strip on March 18, collapsing the ceasefire and hostage release deal with Hamas that Netanyahu authorized two months earlier.

That agreement envisioned a transition into a second phase on March 2, which would have seen the release of all remaining living hostages in exchange for a full withdrawal of Israeli forces and a permanent end to the war. Believing the latter two conditions would leave Hamas in power, Netanyahu sought to instead pursue the release of additional hostages through proposals to extend the temporary phase one ceasefire. Hamas refused, insisting on sticking to the terms of the original deal, creating the ongoing deadlock.

Along with resuming the war, the Netanyahu government is working to advance legislation that would radically curb the power of the country’s judiciary and grant widespread exemptions for ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students from military service.

“There’s a growing sense [in Riyadh] that Israel is looking backward and is going back deeper into a more conservative interpretation of religion, which is something that Saudi Arabia has moved away from,” he argued, seeking to differentiate between the Jewish state and the Islamist Gulf monarchy where “there’s the younger generation believes their country is moving forward into the 21st century.”

‘A different playing field’

Claiming that the potential for a normalization deal was “over-sold,” the Mideast analyst argued that Riyadh “sees itself on a higher playing field than the Israelis are right now” with its larger economy and population, along with its membership in the G20.

“Saudi Arabia has global — not just regional — aspirations, and they see Israel taking steps that isolate itself from the emerging regional consensus,” Katulis continued. “This is not the consensus that rejects Israel. It’s a consensus that actually wants to welcome in Israel — but an Israel that is willing and capable of living in security with its neighbors, including the Palestinians.”

“With all that Israel [brings to the table] in terms of its hi-tech prowess and its highly educated population, it also comes with it a lot of baggage that leans toward the past as opposed to the future,” he argued.

After committing a series of “unforced errors” — which the MEI fellow said included Riyadh’s handling of the war in Yemen and its murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi — the country’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is much more cautious and focused on preserving his 2030 vision for economic reform.

“Therefore, a leap toward normalization with the current Israeli government is extremely far-fetched because it’s seen as presenting more risk than any possible return,” argued Katulis, who held posts in the Defense Department, State Department and White House National Security Council during the Clinton administration.

The analyst added that a normalization deal will require more than just an end to the war and a new Israeli government.

“You’d need a serious commitment to a pathway to a two-state solution from whatever government replaces the current one. That seems pretty far away as well, given that the center of gravity inside of Israel is more toward separation from the Palestinians, as opposed to a pathway back to autonomy that leads to a Palestinian state,” Katulis said, referring to the Saudi demand for the creation of a credible, time-bound and irreversible political horizon for the Palestinians.

He explained that Riyadh was less familiar with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during Trump’s first term but has since concluded that resolving it is essential for regional stability.

Gaza as a case study

Katulis maintained that the phased Gaza ceasefire framework put together by the Biden administration offered a path to the regional vision that Riyadh could get behind, with a reformed Palestinian Authority gradually returning to Gaza, supported by Arab partners who would help manage and secure the Strip in the interim.

But those potential components of the second and third phases of the ceasefire were largely dismissed by Israel, as they would grant a foothold in Gaza to the PA, which Netanyahu has likened to Hamas.

Those details regarding subsequent phases of the deal and the so-called “day after” in Gaza have been shelved, as Netanyahu has sought to instead rework the terms of the deal and return to fighting amid Hamas intransigence.

“If that simple test case of the first 40 to 50 days of the ceasefire did not stand the test of time with the current Israeli government, why would anyone buy into a bigger normalization deal,” Katulis posited. “You’re looking at this from Riyadh, and you say, ‘We’re going to continue to build ties with China and India instead. Why would they get involved with something like this that just seems so convoluted and unpredictable.”

The MEI fellow said Saudi Arabia also rejects Trump administration and Israeli efforts to relocate Palestinians out of Gaza, which “they see as undercutting the dignity and security of Palestinian people.”

Riyadh also took particular issue with Netanyahu’s suggestion that Saudi Arabia could use its own territory for the creation of a Palestinian state.

Katulis clarified that the Saudis are aware that they are expected to play a key role in the post-war reconstruction of Gaza. US special envoy to the Mideast Steve Witkoff said Riyadh is putting together its own plan for the enclave.

This will follow a similar plan introduced by Egypt at a summit in Cairo at the beginning of the month. That plan had the backing of the entire Arab League, though, bin Salman and UAE President Mohamed bin Zayedh did not attend the confab, indicating that they do not fully approve the proposal, which does not specify how Hamas will be removed from power.

Regardless, “none of these Arab plans align with where the current Israeli government is. It’s not even in the same zip code,” Katulis said.

The Israeli strategy of encouraging the emigration of Gazans is largely in line with what Trump has discussed, but he argued that Arab leaders are not particularly phased by the US president’s public comments.

“None of these countries take Trump all that seriously because they’ve heard it all before,” said the analyst, pointing to Trump’s 2018 declaration that Saudi Arabia would pay for the reconstruction of northeast Syria, which never actualized.

‘Completely different approach’ to Iran

Proponents of an Israel-Saudi normalization deal within the Trump administration have framed it as a tool for the region to better combat the joint threat of Iran.

But Katulis pointed out that Riyadh’s approach to Tehran has shifted in recent years away from the hawkish stance adopted by Israel.

“When [bin Salman] first came to power, he spoke about Iran as [if it was] Nazi Germany — as a threat that needed to be eliminated. While he still doesn’t trust its leadership, [the Saudi crown prince] has a completely different approach,” the MEI fellow said.

In 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran restored ties, as Riyadh and other Gulf states have sought to minimize confrontation through dialogue with the Islamic Republic.

The Saudis view a potential war between Israel and Iran as a threat to that fragile dynamic they are trying to uphold and fear that a regional war will lead the Tehran-backed “Axis of Resistance again turning and training their fire on them,” Katulis said, just hours after an errant Houthi missile landed in Saudi Arabia.

Those fears sky-rocketed last year after Tehran fired hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones at Israel in two separate attacks.

Israel managed to thwart them with the help of a US-led coalition that included Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UK and other allies. It then staged a counterstrike last October that US officials say took out Iran’s air defenses almost entirely.

While backing the defense of Israel and appreciating the IDF’s response against Iran, Saudi Arabia believes they were a result of close regional coordination facilitated by the Biden administration, which took Arab concerns into account, Katulis explained.

“If [the Saudis] now see Israel as an actor that still is not finished with its combat operations — whether in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria or elsewhere… [then] there isn’t a lot of confidence” in the threat perception, he argued.

“There’s no love lost for Hamas [or any of Iran’s proxies] by Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and others in the Gulf; but they simply don’t want the potential of a wider regional conflagration hitting their shores,” Katulis said, suggesting that Jerusalem does not sufficiently appreciate this concern.

Deciphering Saudi messaging

But it was not just US and Israeli officials who have said that a normalization deal between Jerusalem and Riyadh is within reach.

Bin Salman himself told Fox News in September 2023 — just over two weeks before Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terror onslaught that started the Gaza war — “every day we get closer” to such an agreement.

Katulis explained that the Saudi leader made the comments as his government was in the midst of extensive talks for a set of bilateral defense deals between Washington and Riyadh. However, two major hurdles still remained then — getting those deals approved by a somewhat reluctant Congress and coaxing Israel to agree to a pathway to a future Palestinian state — without which the normalization deal would not be possible.

“It was not conceivable that the complexion of the Israeli government at the time would have ushered in that deal,” the Mideast analyst argued.

Katulis acknowledged that the deal is deeply desired by the new Trump administration, which Riyadh is eager to please.

“The Saudis care what the Trump administration wants, and they’ll be polite and nice; but they’ll probably go for something much less,” he said, speculating that Riyadh will seek defense agreements with Washington that fall below the treaty-type deal that was initially pursued.

While this might disappoint the Trump administration, Katulis said Washington has “accepted polite ‘Nos’ from Jordan, Egypt,” who have refused Trump’s demands that they take in Palestinians from Gaza.

‘Saudi-splaining’

Many in Washington and in the region were similarly pessimistic about the prospect of Israel normalizing ties with additional Arab countries, even in the days before the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020.

“I admit that I didn’t expect it at the time, and I’d love to be proven wrong, but you can’t just say, ‘All Arab and Gulf countries are the same,’ said Israel Policy Forum (IPF) research director Shira Efron, who rejected efforts to liken the normalization deals Israel signed with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco to a potential deal with Saudi Arabia.

“Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not the same country. The Saudis are not the Emirates 2.0 who were just late to the party. The Abraham Accords were open to Saudi Arabia five years ago and they decided against joining them for a variety of reasons,” she explained.

Saudi Arabia views itself as a leader of the Arab and Muslim world that must be more in tune with the concerns of its people.

Bin Salman has told visiting US lawmakers that the younger generation in his country might not have been as familiar with the Palestinian cause before October 7 but has become much more invested in it since, further complicating efforts to normalize ties with Israel.

Unlike in the UAE, where economic and security relations with Israel had grown quite extensive in the lead-up to the Abraham Accords, ties with Israel are much more nascent in Saudi Arabia.

Still, Efron was more willing to entertain the possibility of a normalization deal, if Israel takes a different approach to Gaza moving forward.

“But the more Israel or the US dismisses Saudi public concerns about the Palestinians, the more the Saudis raise the threshold,” she said. “Those saying Saudi Arabia will normalize ties with Israel and that Saudi Arabia doesn’t care about the Palestinians are simply engaged in ‘Saudi-splaining’ and it’s not helpful.”

For his part, Netanyahu has argued that Israel’s resumption of the war is essential for dismantling the terror group’s governing and military capabilities — something that is in the interest of Israel and US-aligned Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Efron acknowledged the accomplishments Israel has lodged on the battlefield over the last year and a half but argued that without a realistic diplomatic initiative, they are at risk of being rolled back.

Alternatively, she warned that the renewed IDF military operations in Gaza raise the chances that Israel will get bogged down in the Strip indefinitely and end up re-occupying the enclave.

“Israel has a lot of experience with occupation. We know how it starts. We don’t know how it ends,” Efron warned.

The IPF research director argued that Arab plans for the post-war management of Gaza are capable of translating Israel’s tactical victories into strategic ones.

She recognized that the Egyptian plan’s lack of explicit mention of Hamas falls short of what the US and Israel are demanding. However, she explained that Cairo was seeking the initial support of the entire Arab League and therefore “had to cater to the lowest common denominator.”

However, if they receive a formal invitation from the PA, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are willing to contribute troops to a post-war Gaza security force that would assist in efforts to disarm Hamas, said Efron, citing conversations with unnamed Arab officials.

“This would be a very lengthy process, and it might not be successful; but the alternative is the current Israeli approach, which I don’t think is going to create the next generation of Zionists in Gaza,” Efron said.