The return of Donald Trump as U.S. president marks an important crossroads in the future of two emergent Indo-Pacific security frameworks: the Quad, comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States; and AUKUS, the trilateral partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Both institutions played a key role in the Biden administration’s regional strategy, which placed particular emphasis on building a network of cooperation across the Indo-Pacific.
While the initial signs from key Trump administration officials have been positive, long-standing concerns about the two institutions’ durability and effectiveness have been reignited by the actions directed against long-standing U.S. allies and partners.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has taken the lead in highlighting the profile of both institutions by convening a Quad foreign ministers’ meeting as his first official engagement. Both he and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth also spoke favorably of AUKUS during their confirmation hearings.
However, these events cannot be viewed in isolation.
Trump has laid out a disturbing expansionist territorial vision for the United States. And the new administration has already damaged its relationship with its immediate neighbors by threatening to use the weapon of punitive tariffs. Europe is divided over Trump’s demand that NATO allies spend more than twice as much on defense.
The Asian allies of the United States have undoubtedly received a more welcoming first month than their European and North American counterparts. However, they will be looking with alarm at the almost flippant manner in which the Trump administration has been willing to disregard history, friendship, and binding international treaties. If Trump can renege on agreements he personally established (the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, for example), why would he hold a Biden-era agreement like AUKUS in higher regard?
For now, even though Trump has never once spoken about AUKUS publicly, Rubio has been quite explicit in his endorsement of it. During his confirmation hearing, he described the agreement as “something that I think you’re going to find very strong support for in this administration…”
Rubio continued:
I think it’s almost a blueprint, in many ways, of how we can create consortium-like partnership[s] with nation-states that are allied to us to confront some of these global challenges, be it in the defense realm and the technology realm and the critical minerals realm, in the sensitive technologies and critical technologies on, for example, artificial intelligence and advances in even quantum computing… it’s one example of how we can leverage the power of these partnerships with allies. Two, three countries in some cases, broader in others, to reach outcomes and objectives, such as creating a geopolitical and strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.
Extrapolating from these sentiments, there is a clear connection to the Quad and its potential role in the second Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Although the grouping has, in recent years, emphasized its role as a diplomatic framework, in standard-setting, establishing and upholding norms, and in public goods provision, there is considerable latent potential in the Quad to address more traditional security challenges.
Noting the move to dismantle USAID, the emphasis on military spending, and concerns about a strategic balance with China in the Indo-Pacific, the key work of the Quad will need to evolve to maintain relevance in a Trump administration. That it was revitalized during his first term of office is unlikely to carry much weight, going by the example of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, so proactive change is required – not appeals to history.
Nevertheless, it is striking that the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting was the first official engagement conducted by Rubio as secretary of state. This sent a strong message of support for the grouping, even if the precise shape of future cooperation is likely to be held over for discussion at either a leaders’ meeting or a more extended foreign ministers’ meeting later in 2025.
Rubio followed up this quadrilateral meeting with his first three official bilateral engagements with the Quad foreign ministers – S. Jaishankar of India, Penny Wong of Australia, and Iwaya Takeshi of Japan. Similarly, Hegseth’s second bilateral call was with Australia’s Minister for Defense Richard Marles and his fifth with Japan’s Nakatani Gen.
Of course, such niceties are good, but if Trump is not invested in AUKUS or the Quad, the number or order of meetings and phone calls will count for naught. The challenge will be to make a compelling case for him to support and endorse these partnerships and to maintain that support over the next four years.
As the Lowy Institute’s Richard McGregor has observed, the pitch from Australian politicians and officials is that “the U.S. has the best submarines in the world – not only does Australia want to buy them but we are investing in U.S. industrial capacity to make them. These arguments, combined with Australia’s large trade deficit with the U.S., hit Trump’s political sweet spot in a way few countries can replicate.”
The challenge, however, is that “supporting the project and promoting its contribution to industry policy… will not be enough. Rubio will likely also expect Australia to publicly tie it to the U.S. strategy on China.”
This is where aspiration may run up against economic realities.
While the flow-on effects of the new tariff measures are yet to be seen, China is the largest trading partner of both Australia and Japan, making up 26 percent and 20 percent of their trade respectively, though both count the United States as their largest source of foreign direct investment. India’s largest source of imports is China – double the value of the nearest competitor.
As much as the Quad countries may share reservations about the regional aspirations and defense capabilities of China, a global trade war is likely to severely curtail their capacity to compete economically, and therefore militarily, with China. Publicly tying themselves to a position that is overtly “anti-China” (at least to the degree that Trump or his senior Cabinet officials might wish) may quickly become unpalatable, especially if there is a sufficient level of uncertainty or distrust vis-à-vis U.S. alliance commitments.
While the initial signals from the Trump administration on the Quad and AUKUS have been very positive, in considering their longer-term prospects, it is important to be mindful of the broad array of foreign policy messages that have been sent from Washington in recent weeks. Chief among these are Rubio’s three framing questions for the State Department: Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? Does it make America more prosperous?
If regional security institutions can’t – or won’t – make this case to the United States, then their days may be numbered, no matter how strong the signals are today.
Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info.
