As Emmanuel Macron wrapped up his visits to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore – where he delivered the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue at the end of May – the French president reaffirmed the Indo-Pacific’s strategic importance for both France and Europe. In a context of growing geopolitical uncertainty and renewed unilateralism, Macron emphasized France’s commitment to a stable, multipolar order grounded in international law, freedom of navigation, and inclusive multilateralism – an international posture shared with key partners such as India, Japan, and ASEAN.
Building on this common strategic vision, and as the only remaining European Union (EU) member state with sovereign territories in the Indo-Pacific, France seeks to position its diplomacy not only as a national actor but also as a standard-bearer for European engagement in the region.
The exercise of sovereignty is precisely what underpins France’s specificity and credibility as a resident power. The French Indo-Pacific overseas collectivities (FIPOCs) – La Réunion, Mayotte, les TAAF (or South Antarctic Lands), New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton – which together have a population of 1.65 million inhabitants, play a central role in the construction and elaboration of a credible strategy.
Notably, 93 percent of France’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) lies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, making it the second largest EEZ in the world after that of the United States. There are also around 200,000 French expats residing in countries of the region, more than 7,000 French subsidiary companies operating in the region, and 8,000 military personnel stationed permanently.
The assimilation of the FIPOCs into a single geostrategic Indo-Pacific framework is a logical step for a state seeking to assert itself as a legitimate actor in the region. However, despite some common geographical, economic, and political characteristics, grouping the FIPOCs into a single macro-region does not fully reflect the diversity of contexts and geopolitical challenges specific to each territory.
A comprehensive and nuanced understanding of local contexts is thus essential to fully comprehend the complexity of France’s Indo-Pacific engagement. This series will explore each of the FIPOCs separately to understand their characteristics, role in France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, and potential friction points between national and local drivers. You can view the full series here; today, we focus on New Caledonia.
A map highlighting the French Indo-Pacific overseas collectivities (FIPOCs). Map by Paco Milhiet.
New Caledonia is a French overseas archipelago located in the Melanesian subregion of the Southwest Pacific. With over 160,000 square kilometers, its main island, Grande Terre, stands as both the widest geographic FIPOC and the largest French Island. Home to the world’s fifth-largest nickel reserve, the archipelago occupies a position of significant economic and geopolitical relevance.
However, the archipelago’s strategic economic potential contrasts sharply with a fragile and eruptive political landscape, shaped by longstanding independence movements, a renewed outbreak of civil unrest, and institutional uncertainty.
New Caledonia. Map created by Paco Milhiet using D-map.com
The Rise of Independence Claims
The islands have been inhabited by the Indigenous Kanak people – of Melanesian origin – for over 3,000 years. From a European perspective, the archipelago was first sighted by British navigator James Cook in 1774 and formally annexed by France in 1853. Initially used as a penitentiary settlement, New Caledonia later experienced successive waves of immigration from Europe and Asia. These demographic transformations, combined with the devastating effects of disease and violence contributed to the progressive marginalization of the Kanak people in their own land.
Following decades of discrimination and land dispossession under colonial rule, the Kanak population began to acquire civil rights in the post-World War II era. The broader decolonization movement sweeping across the Pacific further fueled cultural and nationalist aspirations among Kanak communities.
Between 1984 and 1988, escalating political tensions culminated in a near-civil war. The conflict reached a dramatic peak in 1988 with the killing of four French gendarmes and the hostage-taking of 26 others by pro-independence militants on the island of Ouvéa. A French military intervention resulted in the deaths of 19 Kanak activists and two French soldiers. In the aftermath, political negotiations led to the signing of the Matignon Agreements (1988), which established a ten-year transitional period.
This process was extended by the Nouméa Accord (1998), which provided for the gradual transfer of competencies to local authorities, the creation of a restricted electoral roll for local elections, and the organization of a self-determination referendum by 2018. Up to three referendums could be held in the event of a rejection of independence.
In parallel, the General Assembly of United Nations added New Caledonia to the list of non-self-governing territories, thereby acknowledging the territory’s ongoing decolonization process.
The Resurgence of Violence
Three self-determination referendums were held between 2018 and 2021, with voters asked the question: “Do you want New Caledonia to attain full sovereignty and become independent?” The referendums failed to produce a conclusive outcome. Although a majority of voters rejected independence on all three occasions, the process was undermined by the boycott of the third referendum, held in December 2021, by major pro-independence parties. They argued that the COVID-19 pandemic had disproportionately affected Kanak communities and rendered a fair campaign impossible.
These electoral results highlighted a crude reality: ethnicity decides the vote in New Caledonia. The Kanak population voted almost exclusively for independence, while other communities – comprising Europeans, Asians and Polynesians – mostly voted to remain in the French Republic.
What had initially been designed as a consensual and democratic pathway toward a final status for New Caledonia has devolved into renewed confrontation. A key issue remains the restricted electoral roll for local elections – a long-standing demand of independent parties, which fear being electorally marginalized by newcomers from mainland France. This provision excluded around 42,000 individuals in 2023 – approximately 17 percent of the electorate. Now that the transitional provisions of the Nouméa Accord have expired, the French government has deemed this restriction no longer justified and has sought to lift the restrictions on the electoral roll.
On May 13, 2024, as the French National Assembly adopted legislation to enlarge the electoral roll, violent riots erupted in Nouméa and surrounding areas. The unrest left 14 people dead – including two gendarmes – and hundreds injured, and caused extensive damage to infrastructure and businesses. One year later, the economic consequences are significant: over 500 enterprises were destroyed or seriously damaged, leading to an estimated economic contraction of 10 to 15 percent of the territory’s GDP.
Political Deadlock
The political process remains stalled, hindering any economic recovery. Efforts by current Minister for Overseas France Manuel Valls to relaunch dialogue have so far produced limited results and no consensus on a new statue has been reached. Provincial elections are expected before the end of 2025, raising fears of further unrest.
The ongoing crisis threatens to unravel more than three decades of French diplomatic engagement and negotiated transition in New Caledonia. Several leaders from the Pacific islands have expressed official support for Kanak independence claims, thereby undermining France’s broader strategy in the region.
A new summit began on July 2 in Paris, bringing together all political stakeholders in the hope of resolving the political and economic crisis in the Pacific territory, one year after unprecedented unrest. The negotiations are expected to last for quite a while – “as long as necessary,” according to President Emmanual Macron – with no clear agenda yet and no guarantee that any consensus will be reached.
With political tensions still running high and both communities entrenched in opposing visions for the future, the territory stands at a critical crossroads – between the risk of renewed conflict and the fragile hope for reconciliation.
