Donald Trump’s return to the White House has led to a series of dramatic shifts in U.S. foreign policy, disorienting its allies, particularly the European Union (EU). Recent key developments, such as the United States’ full alignment with Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in Israel and, more notably, the bilateral negotiations with Russia regarding the war in Ukraine, have generated unprecedented tensions between the EU member states and the new U.S. administration. The resulting cooling of relations between the two sides of the Atlantic can produce far-reaching effects, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, where U.S. and European strategies may increasingly diverge. This misalignment can be driven by three main factors: political-ideological differences, shifting security and defense priorities, and diverging economic needs.
Less than two months after Trump’s inauguration, a partial ideological decoupling between the United States and the EU began to emerge, posing a direct threat to the future of joint transatlantic action on the world stage, including in the Indo-Pacific. Statements and positions taken by prominent figures in the new Republican administration – such as Elon Musk’s support for the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany or Vice President J.D. Vance’s disruptive speech at the Munich Security Conference – underscore the growing divide. These developments highlight the rise of two distinct conceptions of democracy between the U.S. and the EU, which influence their definition of long-term goals and identification of threats.
According to the strategy published in 2021, European external action in the Indo-Pacific should be guided by the principles of promoting democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, as well as the implementation of the United Nations Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. None of these principles, however, appear on the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities and, consequently, it is unlikely that Washington and Brussels will maintain a shared political narrative on key Indo-Pacific issues, such as the Taiwan and South China Sea disputes.
Additionally, without a mutual understanding of international law and the role of its key actors, including the U.N., it is improbable that the EU and the U.S. will continue to implement their respective strategies to support partners aligned with the Euro-Atlantic bloc in a coordinated manner. The absence of a common transatlantic vision for Europe’s future risks creating deep friction between the United States and key member states like France and Germany. This divergence could lead European actors to distance themselves, rather than align with U.S. foreign policy as has often been the case in the past. As a result, Europe’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region may become more autonomous, while individual member states are likely to focus more on bilateral relations.
In parallel, the lack of political alignment between the EU and the U.S. on the war in Ukraine is driving the member states to accelerate rearmament, as evidenced by the launch of the ReArm Europe plan by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, while also prompting them to reorganize institutionally to address growing threats in the European neighborhood. With an increasing focus on securing the eastern flank against Russian belligerence, and the prospect of a U.S. disengagement from Europe, the Indo-Pacific is likely to fall lower on Europe’s list of political and security priorities. This shift would reverse the trend of the growing EU presence and the increasing involvement of member states in the region.
Maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, in particular, could become one of the first casualties of these changes, with Europe potentially emphasizing the economic aspects of its regional engagement instead of a broader strategic approach. This would mark a return to the past, when the Indo-Pacific was seen primarily as an area of great economic opportunities rather than one of critical strategic importance. In this context, national strategies for the Indo-Pacific, often influenced by dialogue with Washington, could be sidelined or even revised in the long term, especially if Trump’s foreign policy proves to be more than just a passing phase.
To assess the implications of Trump’s foreign policy on the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it is essential to consider what is happening between the United States and the Baltic States. The latter, in tune with the U.S., have incorporated Indo-Pacific affairs into their national strategic discourse, which traditionally focused on the Russian threat. Prominent among them is Lithuania, a country that has developed a regional outlook centered on the increasing assertiveness of China and the dangerous “no limits” Sino-Russian partnership. The election of Estonia’s Kaja Kallas as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy seemed to signal a full alignment in foreign policy between the United States and the EU, both in Europe where they faced the common Russian adversary and in Asia where they sought to balance China’s assertiveness.
However, the Trump administration has revolutionized this dynamic and, at least for now, marginalized the Baltic states in the discourse on the future of the EU. Kallas, after being excluded from negotiations on Ukraine, was denied a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, officially due to scheduling issues. Against this background, it is difficult to imagine how the EU high representative, who had explicitly stated her intention to strengthen the EU-U.S. dialogue on the Indo-Pacific, will be able to establish a framework for transatlantic cooperation in the region. Even the Polish presidency of the Council of the EU, which has set as one of its objectives the deepening of the transatlantic dialogue on the Indo-Pacific, is now facing an unexpected scenario that forces it to rethink its regional approach at a time when the national strategic community’s focus on the Indo-Pacific was higher than ever.
The ideological and strategic rifts between Brussels and Washington could therefore encourage a return to a purely economic approach by Europeans toward the Indo-Pacific. The main consequence of this would be efforts by the EU and some member states to revive relations with China, after years of increasing tensions driven by the growing Sino-Russian political, economic, and trade partnership. Indeed, an EU grappling with the dual economic challenges of increasing defense spending and managing the threat of U.S. tariffs is likely to slow down the implementation of its de-risking strategy from China.
Ironically, this change in course may occur just when the EU appeared poised to redefine its regional strategy, particularly through the revival of its strategic partnership with India, aimed at addressing, at least in the medium to long term, the very issue of significant economic and trade dependence on China. Currently, despite relevant differences in perspective between Europeans and Americans on most international issues, there is notable consensus regarding the desire to build positive relations with New Delhi. However, the fate of open issues and critical projects, such as the EU-India Free Trade Agreement and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), will also be influenced by the trajectory of U.S. protectionist and neo-mercantilist policies.
In essence, the impact of Trump on European strategy in the Indo-Pacific may lead to a slowdown and a reshaping of the EU’s regional external action in the short term. In the medium to long term, particularly if transatlantic relations continue to deteriorate, the divergences in approach and vision between the U.S. and the EU regarding the Indo-Pacific could deepen significantly, with far-reaching implications for regional balances.
