This is the transcript of an interview conducted for the July episode of “Beyond the Indus,” The Diplomat’s South Asia-focused podcast.
Tushar (Interviewer): Today, we’re happy to be joined by Biswas Baral, the editor of the Kathmandu Post, Nepal’s most widely read English daily. With over two decades of experience in Nepali journalism, Biswas frequently writes articles on Nepali politics and foreign policy for several international outlets, including The Diplomat. He also has a fascinating YouTube series called “Idea of Nepal,” where he has wide-ranging discussions on Nepal’s history, politics, economy, and foreign policy. He’s perhaps the best person to talk to about the rise, or perhaps the revival, of Hindu politics in Nepal. Biswas, welcome to Beyond the Indus, and thank you so much for joining the podcast.
Biswas Baral: Thank you so much, Tushar. It’s lovely to be here.
Tushar: Nepal was once the world’s only official Hindu state, ruled over by a semi-divine monarch since, I suspect, the mid-18th century. That state of affairs lasted, not without change, but it did last until 2008 when a popular revolution ousted the last king, Gyanendra* Shah. Just to begin with, could you give our listeners a brief outline of the politics of Nepal under the monarchy and the transition and circumstances that led to its fall in 2008?
Biswas Baral: When we talk about monarchy, its history begins in the mid-18th century when Prithvi Narayan* Shah founded modern-day Nepal. The kings were the main rulers under the Shahs* for nearly 100 years, and then they were not ousted but made secondary rulers by the Ranas*, who were a family of courtiers who took over executive powers. This happened in the mid-19th century, and this rule of a single family lasted for 104 years until it was overthrown in 1951.
When the Rana rule ended in 1951, the king came back into the picture as the head of state and as a constitutional monarch. In 1951, when the king was restored and the Rana rule ended, he was restored with the promise that he would hold constituent assembly elections and hand over power to a democratic government. However, this could not happen for the next eight years until Nepal had its first parliamentary elections in 1959, whereupon a democratic government was brought in. But it lasted maybe a year and a half before the monarch took over again and started a one-party rule, which lasted until 1990.
In 1990, there was a popular protest, and again, the era of active kingship ended and constitutional monarchy was restored. After that, in 1996, the Maoist insurgency started. The Maoists aimed to overthrow the democratically elected government and wanted to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat.
Then you come to 2001, while the war against the Maoists was at its peak. The entire royal family was massacred. This is a very crucial point in the history of Nepali monarchy because when the royal family was massacred in 2001, the earlier king was much more popular and well-liked. The new king who came in his place, Gyanendra*, was always unpopular. He was known for his dubious ways. His son was involved in various crimes, including running over a popular Nepalese singer. They were extremely unpopular. When King Gyanendra* came to power in 2001, I think many people lost their faith in monarchy. That was the first big blow to the institution of monarchy in Nepal.
Tushar: I just wonder if you could go into the detail of what exactly happened there, because was it someone from the royal family who did the massacre?
Biswas Baral: Yes, the official version is that the Crown Prince gunned down his entire family. He was intoxicated and shot his entire family. Many Nepalis don’t believe that version. They somehow think that Gyanendra* had something to do with it. But the official version is that the Crown Prince shot the entire family when he was intoxicated, supposedly because his family would not let him marry the woman of his choice.
Tushar: I was wondering if you could give us an overview of the political transition from monarchy to secular democracy and the subsequent post-2008 politics of Nepal. Who are the major parties, which communities formed the base of support, and how has their performance been in terms of governance and stability? In your view, has the current political arrangement and the current parties lived up to their social contract that the Nepali people expected of them?
Biswas Baral: Before I go to post-2008 politics, it’s very important to cover the period between 2001 and 2008. Gyanendra* came to power and subsequently took over executive powers, dismissing the elected government. On one hand, the Maoist war was raging. On the other hand, he had alienated all the political parties. What happened is that the Maoists and these political parties came together and jointly launched a movement to remove the monarchy.
By this time, the king had become extremely unpopular because he had suspended democratic rights and had jailed leaders and civil society members. The earliest suspicions people had about him were heightened. By the time he was removed in 2008, a major section of Nepalese believed that he was unfit for the role and somehow supported his removal. Now, there can be an argument that many people supported the removal of just King Gyanendra*, not the monarchy, but that’s a debate which continues to this day.
In 2006, the seven main political parties at the time and the Maoists signed an agreement in New Delhi whereby they agreed to elect a Constituent Assembly and whereby the Maoists would come back into mainstream politics. Kingship and monarchy were kept in deep freeze in 2006. After the Constituent Assembly election in 2008, when the Maoists and all the anti-monarchy forces came to the Constituent Assembly, they formally removed monarchy. The institution of monarchy was formally abolished in 2008.
Since 2008, and actually since 1990 after the first political change, the two main political parties in Nepal are the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), or CPN-UML*. After 2008, the Maoists also entered the scene. So right now, there are three main parties: the Nepali Congress, the CPN-UML*, and the Maoist Unified Center*. These three are the main political actors.
Tushar: Where do they draw their basis of support? Is it similar to India, where you have certain castes and communities that tend to drift towards parties, or is there a different setup in Nepal?
Biswas Baral: Right now, if you look at the support base of Nepali Congress, it’s generally more liberal and believes in liberal values. The CPN-UML* is a Communist Party by name, but there’s nothing communist about it. They have absolutely diluted whatever programs they had adopted. Even in the case of Maoists, the agendas they waged war with, they have step-by-step abandoned all those agendas.
Initially, at least, the left parties like CPN-UML* and Maoists were the parties of the proletariat—the farmers, laborers, and low-wage earners—while Nepali Congress attracted those who didn’t believe in communist values and thought the country could only be run by modern liberal values. But right now, I would say it’s a mixed bag. I don’t think there’s a strict distinction, particularly between Nepali Congress and CPN-UML*. They have nationwide networks and do well throughout the country.
In terms of Maoists, during the civil war, their main support came from the marginalized Hill communities. But even now, since they came into mainstream politics—it’s been nearly two decades—they are indistinguishable from the other two political parties. People say there’s absolutely no difference between these parties. They look similar, they sound similar, their leaders sound similar, and the same three leaders of these parties take turns as government head. There’s no material or significant difference in their ideology or what they do. Maybe there’s a big difference in what they espouse, but in terms of their practice, there’s absolutely no difference between these three main political parties.
Tushar: How would you evaluate their performance since 2008 in terms of delivering what the Nepali people expected of them? When the Constitution was formed, there were three founding principles: federalism, republicanism, and secularism. Was there an economic promise, or a promise to deliver certain growth? To what extent are the Nepali people satisfied that these three parties, in their different alliances and times in power, have delivered on those promises?
Biswas Baral: I think Nepali people have been not at all satisfied. What we see post-2008 is that the monarchy was removed, but there’s a popular saying that we removed one monarchy and now we have produced ten monarchs. All the political parties and political leaders are acting as owners. What happened is that the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML*, and the Maoists have basically come to power, and their leaders have become prime ministers by turn. It’s purely person-centric politics.
The government doesn’t change because of ideology or because certain ideology wins in the elections. It’s purely person-centric politics: How do I get to power? How do I monopolize it? How do I get to power and make enough money, develop enough resources, so that I can do even better in the next election? How do I distribute important government portfolios so that I can form a base which supports me at all times?
Corruption is very high at all levels among the bureaucracy, in politics, and in political parties. When people see this, they question why they overthrew the monarchy because they thought the king was acting entitled and was jailing leaders. How are these leaders any different from him? Some are wondering if they made a mistake by throwing out the monarchy.
This has given rise to some new political parties, for instance, the Rastriya Swatantra Party*, which emerged in the 2022 election with around 21-22 seats. Largely, the votes they got were a reflection of the unpopularity of the three main political parties. That said, the vast majority of parliament, both national and federal, are occupied by members from the two largest parties, with some filled by the Maoists. Other parties are still distant to these three parties, including the new ones.
Tushar: I asked this question to establish context for our next question about the rise of Hindu politics, because I wonder to what extent this dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs is leading to this revival of Hindu politics. To what extent does the former king continue to have political support and influence in Nepal – are there sections of the population that want the monarchy restored? Is the rise of Hindu politics solely linked to the idea of restoration of the monarchy, or are there other factors behind this phenomenon?
Biswas Baral: Like I said, people do not want the same three leaders. It’s not even the three parties, but the three leaders who take turns to become Prime Minister. They are sick and tired of seeing the same faces come to power again and again, and they want change. Some opted for the new political party, the Rastriya Swatantra Party*. Some opted for independent candidates.
But it’s very curious and interesting because if you look at the two most recent general elections, first in 2017 and then in 2022, nearly 95% of the seats in the most recent election went to pro-republican forces or those who don’t support monarchy. In the election, just 5% of the votes went to avowedly pro-monarchy parties. If that is the barometer, then monarchy still has very little support.
Another thing is that even if you look at the most recent pro-monarchy protests, there are not that many people—2,000, 3,000, maximum 5,000. Whereas at the height of the anti-monarchy protests in 2006, which removed monarchy, there were easily up to a million people coming out in the streets. You don’t see that level of support. It seems that monarchy has a lot of support on social media or online to international observers, but when it comes to people coming out on the ground, you don’t see that kind of support.
There’s a mismatch between what we’re seeing. This year, there were student elections, and the pro-monarchy parties were absolutely nowhere in the scene. So where is the support for monarchy? How do we calculate the support? Is it the number of people coming out in the streets? Not many people are coming out. Is it the votes they’re getting? They’re just getting 5% of the votes.
It seems that people are dissatisfied with the current political setup and current political parties, but they don’t trust the monarchy as yet. They don’t think the future of the country lies with monarchy. There is some nostalgia about monarchy among youngsters, particularly those who came of age after it was removed, but this nostalgia is not translated into support in terms of protesting or voting in favor of monarchy. To international observers, it looks like monarchy is on the brink of coming back, but that’s not happening.
Tushar: I’m reminded of the rise of the BJP in the 1980s in India and how they piggybacked on an issue—the Ram Janmabhoomi* issue and eventually the Babri Masjid* destruction—that catapulted them to power in the 1990s. What issues do Hindu political parties in Nepal campaign on – are there specific social or economic issues? Is the king involved in this at all – has he become a rallying figure of sorts?
Biswas Baral: The king’s involvement could clearly be seen in the most recent pro-monarchy protests, which unfortunately turned violent. In one protest, two people were killed. The problem was that if the king has new supporters and his support base is growing, then he should have relied on new faces to lead the movement. But who’s leading the pro-monarchy movement this time? It’s all old faces. The commander of the movement was about 80 years old. These are all old faces at the forefront of recent pro-monarchy protests.
When you talk about the factors fuelling the rise of pro-monarchy parties, there’s just one pro-monarchy party that has any kind of presence in Nepal. It’s the fifth-largest force in parliament, but even that is small—like I said, 5% of the total votes. When you’re saying “rise of pro-monarchy parties,” what does that actually mean? You don’t see that in the elections. I don’t know what will happen in the next election, but even in by-elections after 2022, no pro-monarchy party is anywhere in the scene.
Again, my question is: How do you judge the popularity of monarchy? How do you say that monarchy is gaining more and more support? Yes, you see that on social media, but is that translated on the street? No. Is that translated in the ballot box? No, at least not until now. Right now, this campaign for the restoration of monarchy, even in the last month, is dying down. It’s not picking up steam at all.
Tushar: Maybe we can broaden from the pro-monarchy specifically to Hindu politics generally. To what extent is a rise in Hindu politics influenced or linked to the rise in Hindutva* ideas and the BJP that we’re seeing on the other side of the border in India?
Biswas Baral: When we talk about Hindu politics, it’s very interesting because two of our three big parties are communist parties. Their leaders are supposedly atheists who don’t believe in any religion. But what has happened is that since the rise of the BJP in India, when the political parties and political leaders here saw the allure of Hinduism and a Hindu agenda in India, they suddenly started visiting temples—even communist parties, even the leader of the Maoist party who went to war to establish a secular republic. Nearly 17,000 people died in the process to establish a secular republic, and now they want to be seen as not atheist. They want to be seen by India, particularly, that they believe in Hindu religion.
This happens because it’s very difficult, given our geopolitics and our precarious situation whereby we are surrounded on three sides by India, and given our large dependence on India trade-wise, for a Nepali Prime Minister to operate and continue in office for any length of time without some support from New Delhi. New Delhi has a lot of leverage in Kathmandu*.
Even for that purpose, even the supposedly atheist leaders show off by going to Pashupatinath* or even Indian temples. Even Prachanda*, the leader of the Maoists, when he goes to India, visits temples there. In a way, they have all adopted this approach. The Nepali Congress, the biggest political party, has always had a very ambivalent stand on Hinduism. There’s a strong pro-Hindu voice inside the party, and there’s a strong Hindu voice in all the major political parties.
The support for the restoration of a Hindu state is much bigger than the support for the restoration of monarchy. Those two are not synonymous because support for one is clearly more than support for the other.
Coming back to the BJP, I don’t think the BJP is directly involved in what’s happening. It’s more the RSS itself, which has branches in Nepal and supports various pro-monarchy activities in Nepal. That is much more active. Another thing is that we have an open border, so whatever politics is happening in Bihar* or Uttar Pradesh* easily spills over into Nepal. What we see, at least in the Tarai* Belt adjoining India, which is nearly a third of Nepal’s territory, is that there has been a shift in terms of visibility of religion.
The Hindus suddenly feel they need to show off their religion. They need to go out on streets and organize big rallies. Earlier, you didn’t see that. Earlier, the kind of Hinduism practiced in Nepal was done inside the puja ghar*, the small room in your house. They didn’t feel the need to go out and assert themselves. That is a very troubling sign because, for the first time in our history, there have been reports of Hindu-Muslim clashes from some of the areas bordering India. We find this extremely troubling.
Our political leaders especially make a show of being religious, being Hindu, to please certain constituencies in India. There is a level of support for a Hindu state because many people believe that Nepal was declared a secular republic at the behest of Westerners because they wanted to spread Christianity. Christianity has spread very rapidly in the past, and that only adds to the argument.
There is some influence from what’s happening in India, and I also see the possibility of this Hindu state agenda gaining ground among the mainstream political parties. They somehow feel that the pro-monarchy party, like the Rastriya Prajatantra Party*, is bidding for public support through their pro-Hindu agenda—not just pro-monarchy, but also pro-Hindu state. Many in the mainstream political parties are thinking they need to attract this sizable conservative constituency, or if it gets out of hand, they’ll suffer electorally. So there’s a debate in all the political parties about whether they should embrace a Hindu state.
One very curious thing I must add is that Nepal is a secular republic right now, but we have a very curious definition of secularism. Even our constitution states that Nepal is a secular republic, but all the ancient cultures and all the religions that have been practiced from ancient times, Sanatan Dharma*, will be preserved. Many people say we are already a de facto Hindu state because conversion is prohibited. Our constitution prohibits conversion, so it’s a criminal offense. Many people are saying we are already a de facto Hindu state, so what’s the harm in now officially adopting a Hindu state? On the other hand, critics say we are already giving priority to our traditions and cultures, we are protecting Sanatan Dharma*, so what’s the need to now declare a Hindu state? Many people are not aware that our definition of secularism is very qualified.
Tushar: It’s interesting how secularism as it manifests in South Asia differs from the traditional Western conception, or the French conception of laïcité*, where the state separates itself completely from all religions.
I do want to ask about the foreign policy implications of this, starting from Nepal’s largest trading partner and big neighbour, India. India and Nepal have had a mixed relationship at best. In 2015, we saw the devastating blockade that happened in the Tarai* region of Nepal, and I think India cooperated in blockading Nepal, which strained relations considerably. I wonder how this rise of Hindu politics interacts with nationalistic sentiments within Nepal that perhaps may be directed against India. Are we seeing a more positive relationship or feeling towards India because of this rise of Hindu politics?
Biswas Baral: I would say the general perception of Nepalese towards India is not influenced by Hinduism or any other religion. Historically, Nepalese think of themselves as the only state in South Asia that has never been colonized, unlike India. So we are a very proud people. Another thing is that, being surrounded by India on three sides and being so dependent on India for everything, we feel this need to assert ourselves, otherwise we’ll be lost.
A sense of this Nepaliness, at least among the people of the Hills especially, comes from being not Indian. Even our founder, Prithvi Narayan Shah*, defined Nepal as the Asli Hindustan*—the real home of Hindus—by which he meant that India is not the real Hindustan*. Even in religious matters and cultural matters, the Nepali psyche and mentality is to differentiate ourselves from India.
For instance, the current Prime Minister claims that Lord Ram* was not born in India but was born in Nepal. They are looking to appropriate Indian religion because they want to show that we are the true cradle of Hinduism, not India.
Another thing is that in 2015, one big reason for the blockade was that India did not want Nepal to become a secular state, which has been borne out by later books and scholarly works of various organizations and individuals who were active at the time. After Nepal became a secular state, I don’t think the BJP as a political party itself is so interested in turning Nepal back into a Hindu state. It’s much more organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS), which is very active here.
This rise of Hindu politics would not have much effect on our relations with India and similarly would not have much effect on our relations with China. Many Nepalese, practicing Hindus and devout Hindus, are perfectly happy with the idea of cultivating the Chinese as a counterweight to India. Even if we have similar religion, similar traditions and cultures, there’s this need to assert the Nepali identity—a very strong need to assert the Nepali identity.
Historical factors and cultural factors that go much beyond religion are responsible for Nepal-India ties. For instance, we have an open border, people marry across the border. It’s a very multifaceted relationship, and I don’t think Hindu politics will have very limited impact, even when it comes to pro-monarchy politics.
No political party in Nepal can come to power and be anti-Indian. That’s just not possible because India will find a way to punish it. We have seen that historically too. A government that is overtly anti-India—for instance, the first government of Prachanda* when he came above ground and his political party emerged the biggest in the 2008 election—he had formed the government, but he took such a strong anti-India line that India played an instrumental role in removing him from power. There were other secondary issues, but without India’s backing, he would not have been removed.
Even the current political leader, for instance, K.P. Sharma Oli*, is known as China’s man in New Delhi, but even he has been trying very hard in the last few years to reach out to India. He has been trying very hard to get an official invite to India, which has not been possible to date, but I hear that he could be visiting India soon.
Tushar: That’s fascinating, and I was particularly interested in the part where the RSS is influencing cultural activities. Could you maybe just explain very briefly how the RSS is doing this?
Biswas Baral: The RSS has branches in Nepal, especially in the Tarai*. It supports religious activities here and has also played some role in making Hinduism, the brand of Hinduism, more like what Hindutva* is doing in India. Given our cultural similarities, the RSS finds it very easy to operate in Nepal, especially in the Tarai* Belt, which adjoins India. It continues to play a very subtle, very behind-the-scenes, but very important role in the so-called preservation of Hindu culture and tradition and in opposing proselytization and Christianization in Nepal.
Tushar: Biswas, thank you so much. That was a very interesting interview.
Biswas Baral: Amazing talking to you. Thank you for having me.
