As China readies its first catapult carrier and the US scrambles to revive its sixth-generation carrier-based fighter program, the battle for air dominance at sea is entering a crucial new phase.
This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is nearing a pivotal milestone with its first catapult-equipped aircraft carrier, known as Fujian, as newly released state media imagery suggests imminent or ongoing fixed-wing flight operations.
The undated visuals—timed with the PLA’s 98th anniversary—show Shenyang J-15T fighters positioned for catapult launches, afterburners ignited and shadows of jets flying low over the deck, though no confirmed launch or recovery footage has surfaced.
Since May 2024, Fujian has undergone intensive sea trials, including an eighth round completed in May 2025. The carrier employs an Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), bypassing steam catapults entirely, bringing China in line with US, French and Indian naval advancements.
Operational readiness is underscored by support assets such as Harbin Z-9 helicopters and crew performing Foreign Object Debris (FOD) walks.
The PLAN’s modernization, driven by ambitions for Taiwan contingencies and blue-water power projection, includes stealthy J-35s, KJ-600 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft and a new JL-10-based carrier trainer.
Beyond Fujian, China is developing a nuclear-powered Type 004 CATOBAR carrier, which could enable sustained operations farther afield. The broader naval buildup also features amphibious platforms like the EMALS-equipped Type 076 Sichuan, highlighting China’s growing capacity to integrate sea-based airpower across multiple hull types.
This acceleration reflects more than technical upgrades—it signals doctrinal transformation. Asia Times has previously reported that Fujian is on track to conduct “Alpha strike” tactics—mass saturation air assaults designed to overwhelm adversary defenses and seize early initiative.
Once the exclusive domain of the US Navy, these tactics are now within China’s grasp thanks to EMALS-enabled sortie rates that eclipse those of its older ski-jump carriers, Liaoning and Shandong. Such capability enhances China’s ability to support amphibious operations and conduct standoff strikes beyond the First Island Chain.
Yet significant structural constraints remain. Fujian’s conventional propulsion system limits its operational endurance compared to nuclear-powered US carriers. It also lacks overseas basing infrastructure, reducing its forward persistence.
Its EMALS has not yet matched US performance benchmarks, and China still faces a shortfall of carrier-qualified pilots. The PLAN’s capital ships also remain highly vulnerable to long-range precision strikes, while China’s space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) architecture—essential for targeting and coordination—remains fragile.
While China surges ahead in carrier aviation and doctrine, the US is working to preserve its edge by rebooting long-delayed initiatives. Last month, TWZ reported that the US Senate Appropriations Committee approved $1.4 billion in its draft FY2026 defense spending bill to revive the Navy’s F/A-XX sixth-generation carrier-based fighter program.
This move defies the Department of Defense’s (DoD) previous decision to halt the program and echoes the Navy’s Unfunded Priority List, revealing an internal split between naval leadership and defense officials.
TWZ also notes that Admiral Daryl Caudle, Chief of Naval Operations, has warned that without the F/A-XX, the Navy risks ceding air superiority and depending on aging fourth-generation platforms.
According to TWZ, Boeing and Northrop Grumman remain contenders for the contract, while Lockheed Martin has reportedly been eliminated. The House has proposed $972 million, with final funding dependent on reconciliation and presidential approval.
In a July 2025 article for The National Security Journal, Brent Sadler underscores the urgency. He argues that the US Navy’s current air wing—dominated by the F/A-18 and stealth-optimized F-35C—is increasingly mismatched to the realities of a Pacific conflict.
Sadler writes that the F/A-18, first deployed in 1983, is outdated and vulnerable to long-range threats, while the F-35C’s limited internal weapons bays constrain its capacity to carry extended-range ordnance.
He notes that China’s PL-17 air-to-air missile and DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile can reach 400 and 1,600 kilometers, respectively—distances that far outstrip the range envelopes of US carrier aircraft.
Without a fast, long-range and heavily armed platform like the F/A-XX, Sadler warns, American carriers may be forced to operate within lethal threat rings, jeopardizing both survivability and mission effectiveness.
The proposed F/A-XX aims to restore that edge. In a July 2025 article for Proceedings, Josh Hano writes that the aircraft would prioritize long-range strike and heavy payloads, allowing it to complement F-35s assigned to fleet air defense.
He adds that the envisioned F/A-XX—also referred to as the A-XX—would trade traditional fighter agility for the ability to deliver antiship missiles, smart bombs and naval mines, while also serving as a platform for electronic warfare, ISR and aerial refueling.
Though the F-35’s range limitations are well-known, TWZ mentions in a June 2025 article that the upcoming Block 4 upgrade package may evaluate integration of drop tanks or conformal fuel tanks, though technical details remain sparse.
Hano notes that this new strike aircraft would recall Cold War-era platforms designed to deliver specialized ordnance at long range, thereby restoring the carrier’s ability to project power from outside contested zones—a capability that is becoming vital as adversary missile systems improve.
Framing these developments in broader strategic terms, Thomas Mahnken writes in a February 2022 Proceedings article that the US Navy’s evolving maritime posture against China revolves around a dual-force concept: “inside forces” that operate within China’s missile envelope, and “outside forces” that remain beyond it.
Mahnken explains that inside forces—submarines and land-based units stationed in allied territory—would impose costs and deny adversary objectives through presence and rapid reaction.
Outside forces, like carrier strike groups, would operate from standoff distances, leveraging long-range strike capabilities to hold targets at risk and reinforce deterrence.
But the US may not have enough carriers to make this strategy work. Asia Times reported in July 2025 that delays in the delivery of USS John F Kennedy (CVN-79) will soon reduce the US Navy’s operational carrier fleet below the congressionally mandated 11-ship minimum, exposing a readiness shortfall at a time of global tension.
Delays in the Ford-class carrier program—exacerbated by technical faults, industrial bottlenecks and persistent cost overruns—are undermining the Navy’s ability to maintain forward-deployed strike groups in multiple theaters.
As China intensifies naval activity near Taiwan and the Luzon Strait, while crises simmer in the Middle East and Europe, the US risks strategic overextension. Building carrier power is one challenge.
But sustaining it across contested maritime space is the actual test—one both nations are now racing to master in a contest that could redefine naval dominance in the Indo-Pacific.
