Ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Brazil in November, China reportedly pushed to have Brazil formally join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Ultimately, Brazil’s government declined to sign an official document, but instead offered to “establish synergies” with the BRI.
Brazil’s cautious approach to joining the BRI reflects the nuanced balance between strategic pragmatism and economic gains that defines its foreign policy. In Latin America, intergovernmental rhetoric about a rising Global South often meets the hard realities of economic bargaining. Brazil exemplifies this careful calculation of maximizing economic gains while maintaining autonomy. The stance is influenced by factors like its relationship with China, its trade balance with China, its regional role alongside India, and the potential trade conflict between the United States and China.
Brazil’s agreement on project-based collaboration under the BRI, without formal membership, demonstrates its pursuit of strategic autonomy in a multipolar world. Instead of committing to the BRI as other Latin American nations have, Brazil will align Chinese investments with domestic priorities, especially those enhancing Brazil’s agricultural and industrial competitiveness. By leveraging this cautious engagement, Brazil retains control over the terms of its partnership with China, seeking not only economic benefits but also a greater balance of power in its international relations.
From China’s perspective, Brazil’s selective engagement reflects a broader trend of adaptability in its Latin American strategy. Although a full endorsement of the BRI would further Beijing’s strategic goals in the region, Brazil’s reserved approach has led China to showcase greater flexibility, adapting BRI principles to meet Brazil’s specific economic and political needs. Through targeted investments that respect Brazil’s strategic autonomy, China can continue to make substantial progress in Latin America’s largest economy, expanding infrastructure, connectivity, and trade. Xi’s state visit to Brasilia in November endorsed this adaptive approach, and his statements that the China-Brazil relationship is at its “best period in history” and “the most wonderful chapter” of China-Brazil relations is yet to come adds goodwill to their dynamic.
Since its inception in 2013, the BRI has driven global connectivity and economic integration, especially through transportation, energy, and telecommunications investments. Across Latin America, 22 countries have formally joined the BRI – 13 in Central America and the Caribbean and nine in South America – yet Brazil remains an outlier alongside Mexico, Colombia, and the Bahamas. President Lula da Silva’s administration has signaled that while Brazil remains open to collaboration, formal BRI membership would require substantial trade and investment access from China. This stance aligns with Brazil’s broader foreign policy, emphasizing strategic autonomy and balanced partnerships.
Despite China’s continuous interest in a formal endorsement, Brazil’s government has shown restraint, prioritizing more predictable access to Chinese markets, particularly for high-value agricultural exports like animal proteins. China’s recent goodwill gesture of ending its anti-dumping measure on Brazilian chicken was well received in Brazil and may open further discussions on technical trade barriers in areas such as sanitary standards.
This can be seen as a long-term strategy to maximize Brasilia’s negotiating power. Endorsing the BRI without securing concessions would weaken Brazil’s leverage. Instead, a reserved stance allows Brazil to press for terms that strengthen its economic standing and trade independence without creating unsustainable dependencies.
The strategic relevance of Brazil to China cannot be overstated. As China’s largest trade partner in Latin America, Brazil exported nearly $90 billion in goods to China in 2022, primarily petroleum, iron ore, and soybeans – commodities that make up around 75 percent of Brazil’s exports to China. Yet despite this volume, Brazil remains frustrated with its meager 5 percent market share in China and its ranking as the seventh-largest importer. Brazil wants greater market diversification for high-value exports like beef, poultry, and pork.
During his 2023 visit to Beijing, Lula fortified diplomatic ties, signing multiple bilateral agreements to enhance trade facilitation and research cooperation. However, in 2023 and again this year, Brazil’s president withheld a formal endorsement of the Belt and Road Initiative, instead framing the BRI as a flexible framework capable of adapting to the varied needs of partner countries.
China’s response to Brazil’s selective engagement has highlighted the BRI’s adaptability as a flexible, project-based platform rather than a rigid membership structure. China’s willingness to accommodate Brazil’s demands illustrates a strategic approach that prioritizes substance over formality, emphasizing flexibility in project choice, investment goals, and market access. By prioritizing Brazilian interests – such as infrastructure development, animal protein exports, and technology cooperation – China acknowledges that emerging markets seek tailored partnerships that reflect their economic and national agendas.
This adaptive stance reflects a significant evolution in China’s foreign policy approach, one that seeks to nurture sustainable relationships by meeting countries where they are. China’s continued interest in Brazil’s renewable energy, telecommunications, and agricultural sectors, even without requiring BRI membership, demonstrates a responsive strategy that emphasizes mutual benefit over strict alliance. This flexibility serves China’s interests as well, as Brazil approaches potential reevaluation of its stance ahead of Xi Jinping’s return visit in 2025 for the BRICS summit. Respecting Brazil’s selective engagement reinforces China’s image as a cooperative power valuing sovereignty – a necessary stance, given Latin America’s political dynamics.
Brazil’s careful strategy underscores its ambition to leverage any potential BRI endorsement for greater market access, especially in high-value sectors where it competes with the European Union and the United States. The possibility of China enhancing access to high-growth markets for Brazilian animal proteins, leather, cellulose, and fruit would diversify Brazil’s trade relations and reduce its reliance on raw commodities. Brazil will likely require assurances on reducing technical trade barriers in exchange for any symbolic endorsement of the BRI, helping Brazilian firms expand beyond primary exports into high-potential Chinese market segments.
For Lula, expanded market access for Brazilian products and a reduction in trade barriers would represent a major political win as he approaches his re-election campaign in 2026. Securing favorable trade terms with China could enhance Lula’s domestic standing, showing that his administration has engaged with China on its own terms, without compromising Brazil’s autonomy.
Moreover, the incentive of BRI recognition could bolster China’s support for Brazil’s longstanding campaign for a permanent seat on a reformed United Nations Security Council, a goal Lula has pursued since his first term. A formal endorsement could become a significant bargaining tool in U.N. reform discussions, allowing Brazil to achieve one of its key foreign policy ambitions while further solidifying its partnership with China.
For China, securing a formal endorsement from Brazil would symbolize a critical win in the face of geopolitical resistance to the BRI from the United States and Europe. Failing that, however, Brazil’s example could signal to other developing nations that BRI membership is not a precondition for substantial cooperation with China, reinforcing Beijing’s narrative of the BRI as a flexible and globally inclusive initiative.
