Unlock the White House Watch newsletter for free
Your guide to what the 2024 US election means for Washington and the world
The writer is the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Last week’s US-Russia talks on a Black Sea ceasefire with Ukraine confirmed Moscow’s interest in a reset with Washington. In a statement published afterwards, the Kremlin expressed satisfaction with the gradual improvement in relations with Washington, even as it raised doubts over the extent of their alignment on the details of the truce.
The last time Russia and the US tried a reset was in 2009, under presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama. But today Russia has no interest in dusting off its playbook from back then. It has more patience, less goodwill and an altogether different measure of success.
In 2009, the Kremlin’s wish list was ambitious. Badly hit by recession, Russia hoped for American investment in the country’s economic modernisation. Medvedev also wanted Washington’s support for Russia’s WTO accession, an agreement on European missile defence systems, and progress on arms control.
In return, the Kremlin was willing to engage with US priorities. It supported UN sanctions against Iran in 2010. It also banned the delivery of the S-300 missile defence system to Tehran, which at once dumbfounded and delighted White House officials. While Russia had its own concerns vis-à-vis Iran, it also calculated that there was merit in building up goodwill with the US. The dynamic at play was one of diffuse reciprocity, a process in which Russia was open to giving and fostering a genuinely more co-operative relationship that would pay off over time.
Vladimir Putin’s vision for today’s reset is different. In last week’s negotiations, Russian officials disguised demands as concessions. They injected calls for sanctions relief in return for agreeing to a Black Sea ceasefire — a truce Russia does not actually need since it already enjoys access to grain and fertiliser markets. While Russia has no interest in real reciprocity, its expectations for US gives may also be lower than in 2009. Putin and his acolytes understand that Trump is fickle and that deals with his administration could be fragile.
That said, Russia has much to gain from engaging the US in an open-ended reset. First, it is a tool for Moscow to buy time in Ukraine. By dangling the benefits that the US can expect from making up with Russia, and pandering to Trump’s ego, Putin can look like the reasonable party. That puts him in an advantageous position to blame Ukraine for any future lack of progress towards a ceasefire, let alone comprehensive settlement. Even if it yields no US concessions on specific dossiers, an endless reset thus brings Russia closer to defeating Ukraine — whether through war or diplomacy. As Putin told a group of Russian sailors in Murmansk last week, he is entirely prepared for both options.
Second, Trump’s enthusiastic embrace of Putin will allow Russia to fully shed its pariah status. Russia’s isolation was always more myth than reality. But by suggesting that it be readmitted to the G7, or blocking efforts to hold it accountable for war crimes in Ukraine, Washington will further normalise international engagement with Russia.
Lastly, a reset with Washington will give Moscow opportunities to alienate the US from its transatlantic allies, bringing Putin closer to his long-term goal of fragmenting European security. To be fair, the apparent hostility vis-à-vis Europe among members of the Trump administration seems entirely endemic, rather than somehow orchestrated by Moscow. Still, Russia has rapidly reversed course to benefit from America’s chill towards Europe. Its diplomats have muted their criticism of the US, instead zeroing in on Europe and Britain. If he plays his cards well, Putin can use the thaw in US-Russia relations as a vehicle for widening transatlantic fissures.
There is one risk, which is that Russia is overplaying its hand on Ukraine. Trump has recently started to notice that Putin is dragging his feet, threatening secondary tariffs on buyers of Russian oil if no truce is agreed. The chances of Trump recognising Russia’s reset ploy for what it is, and doing a U-turn, may be very small. But they are not nil.
A potential US détente with Moscow today will not be like that in 2009. Steeled by years of confrontation, and convinced that it enjoys geopolitical tailwinds, Russia will not give up just anything in hope of future reciprocity. Still, entertaining the US in a drawn-out reset promises great rewards. At a minimum, Russia buys time to win against Ukraine on the battlefield. At best, Trump ushers in a world order more amenable to Russia, while Putin cheers him on from the sidelines.
