Andrew Marshall, the visionary founder of the now-disbanded Office of Net Assessment (ONA) in the Pentagon, once remarked, “The purpose of net assessment is to look at the big picture and to assess the long-term competition between states.” He believed that the essence of net assessment is to compare both sides’ strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and vulnerabilities to determine the most effective means of achieving national security objectives.
The recently released 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) provides an overview of global security, reflecting the collective insights of the 18 intelligence agencies under the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The section on China — occupying a quarter of the report — states, “The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) probably is making steady but uneven progress on capabilities it would use in an attempt to seize Taiwan and deter — and if necessary, defeat — U.S. military intervention.” The phrase “uneven progress” deserves deeper scrutiny, as it highlights China’s weaknesses and crucial opportunities for Taiwan to exploit.
For Taiwan, conducting a net assessment should inform its broader strategic planning and guide its procurement of military technologies, thereby enhancing the country’s ability to deter, disrupt, and defeat a Chinese invasion.
Understanding the PLA’s “Uneven Progress”
From the U.S. perspective, “uneven progress” reflects the fact that while the PLA has made notable strides in some areas of military modernization, it still faces significant challenges in others. In other words, China is advancing toward its goal of deterring U.S. intervention and achieving its objectives in Taiwan, but these advancements are not consistent across all domains. This imbalance creates strategic openings that both Taiwan and the U.S. can exploit, particularly in areas where the PLA’s capabilities remain underdeveloped or face significant challenges.
Although the classified version of the 2025 ATA is not publicly available, open-source information sheds light on specific weaknesses in the PLA’s military capabilities that Taiwan could strategically exploit. Key vulnerabilities include areas such as command and control (C2) systems, electronic warfare (EW), missile defense, and cyber warfare, among others. These areas are complex and interrelated, but even targeting one of them could undermine the PLA’s operational effectiveness. If any critical element remains unaddressed or weak, it could create exploitable gaps in China’s military capabilities. By making targeted investments in these areas, Taiwan can significantly enhance its deterrence and strengthen its defense posture.
Key Areas for Taiwan’s Strategic Focus
Command and Control (C2)
The PLA’s Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Operations Command Center, located in the Xishan Command Compound in Beijing, serves as the central nerve center for PLA operations. At the regional level, the Eastern Theater Command in Nanjing oversees military activities in the region that includes Taiwan. While specific details about the communication infrastructure used by these C2 centers remain classified, it’s known that the PLA has upgraded to fiber-optic and satellite communications for those centers in recent years. These systems, however, are not impervious to disruption by electronic warfare (EW) and cyberattacks.
Taiwan could exploit these vulnerabilities by targeting the PLA’s key C2 nodes with the assistance of U.S. technology, such as advanced EW tools and cyber capabilities. By focusing on critical communication infrastructure, such as fiber-optic cables and satellite ground stations, Taiwan could disrupt the flow of command and create confusion within the PLA’s decision-making processes. Additionally, exploiting weaknesses in the PLA’s C2 network security, which is susceptible to both signal jamming and cyberattacks, could severely degrade China’s ability to prosecute a military campaign. This disruption would delay or prevent the PLA from executing synchronized precision strikes, creating a critical window for Taiwan to mount a more effective defense.
Electronic Warfare (EW)
In April 2024, the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF) underwent a significant reorganization, breaking into independent units across the PLA branches. Previously centralized, China’s EW capabilities have now been distributed across its air force and navy, reflecting a broader trend in modern militaries. While this decentralization provides tactical flexibility, it also introduces coordination challenges and inconsistent expertise. In comparison, while the U.S. military also has decentralized EW capabilities, it has done so in a more structured and coordinated manner than the PLA’s recent reorganization.
Taiwan can capitalize on these vulnerabilities by enhancing its own EW capabilities to target PLA radar systems, communications networks, C2 centers, and missile defense systems. By investing in advanced signal interception and analysis, jamming technologies, and artificial intelligence-enabled EW operations, Taiwan could disrupt the PLA’s ability to effectively coordinate military operations. Consequently, Taiwan could create a technological advantage, degrading the PLA’s ability to establish air superiority and naval dominance, both essential elements for any successful military campaign against Taiwan.
Missile Defense
The PLA’s HQ-9B, HQ-19, and HQ-22 surface-to-air missile systems are touted as competitive with the U.S. Patriot or THAAD missile defense systems. Despite these claims, the PLA has also acquired S-400 Triumf missile defense systems from Russia to supplement its capabilities. In the ongoing war in Ukraine, the U.S. ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) has demonstrated remarkable effectiveness against S-400, destroying not only the missile batteries but also critical infrastructure such as airfields, command posts, and logistics hubs, forcing Russia to reposition its assets further from the front lines.
Taiwan has acquired fewer than 100 ATACMS missiles. Considering the PLA’s strike capabilities, Taiwan should consider purchasing a vast number of ATACMS, along with Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs) and land-based Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs). These long-range precision munitions could target critical PLA infrastructure — such as naval bases, air force bases, and ammunition and fuel facilities — disrupting the PLA’s operational tempo and capabilities. These offensive capabilities would also serve as a deterrent, signaling that Taiwan has the means to retaliate effectively should China initiate an invasion.
Cyber Warfare
Chinese hacker groups like Unit 61398 (APT1), Unit 61486 (APT3), and Unit 78020 reflect China’s sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities. However, China’s ability to defend its own networks from prolonged and complex cyberattacks is described as “weak to very weak” by analysts affiliated with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The 2024 Global Cybersecurity Index, published by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), similarly ranks China well behind Western powers. Moreover, China’s cyber defense mechanisms are still in the early stages of integration with traditional military operations, leaving potential openings for exploitation.
Fundamentally, China’s reliance on Western technologies for its cyber infrastructure creates inherent disadvantages in times of conflict. With technological support from the U.S., Taiwan could exploit these vulnerabilities with large-scale, AI-driven cyber operations aimed at decapitating China’s Eastern Command and Central Command, among others. By targeting key C2 systems and other critical cyberinfrastructure, Taiwan could disrupt China’s ability to coordinate and execute military operations, further enhancing its own deterrence strategy.
Strategic Opportunities for Taiwan
Over the past few decades, the world has seen the military balance shift in China’s favor. Yet, Taiwan is not without its opportunities. By employing a net assessment approach and sound strategic planning, Taiwan can focus on areas where the PLA remains vulnerable — such as command and control, electronic warfare, missile defense, and cyber warfare — and strategically enhance its own defense.
While the U.S. has been a key arms supplier to Taiwan, primarily focusing on defensive systems, it is now crucial for Taiwan to develop offensive capabilities. Washington’s reluctance to supply long-range precision strike systems, stealth fighter jets, and other weapons has left Taiwan at a disadvantage. Given the rapidly evolving threat against Taiwan, it is urgent for the U.S. to revise its overly cautious stance on arms sales to Taiwan, supporting the island’s ability to impose significant costs on China in the event of a conflict.
By strengthening Taiwan’s offensive capabilities, the U.S. can help ensure that Taiwan remains not only capable of defending itself but also able to deter Chinese aggression effectively. Ultimately, both Taiwan and the U.S. must collaborate on crafting a strategy that includes both defensive and offensive capabilities, allowing Taiwan to become a force to be reckoned with in the face of rising Chinese military pressure.
