China’s tease of a graphite bomb signals a shift toward non-kinetic warfare aimed at crippling Taiwan’s power grid and eroding resistance from within.
Recently the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China in a state broadcaster video had teased a potential new graphite bomb, which appears designed to disable enemy power infrastructure through non-kinetic means.
The animation, shared via a CCTV-affiliated channel, shows a land-launched missile deploying 90 submunitions. These eject carbon filaments mid-air, short-circuiting electrical grids across an area exceeding 10,000 square meters.
While not officially named, the weapon mirrors characteristics of graphite munitions historically used by the US in Iraq and Kosovo. With a stated range of 290 kilometers and a 490-kilogram warhead, the weapon is allegedly suitable for precision strikes on substations, although its operational status remains undisclosed.
CCTV attributed the concept to China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation but withheld technical specifications. Analysts highlighted its alignment with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) priorities, enabling the paralyzing of command, control and surveillance systems without confrontation.
A 2017 commentary by Modern Ships editor Chen Chundi classified graphite bombs as “game-changing,” citing their potential to bypass conventional defenses and integrate BeiDou-guided tail kits for enhanced accuracy. Online speculation quickly linked the system’s deployment to a potential contingency in Taiwan.
While China offered no confirmation of deployment or mass production, the broadcast marks a rare public reference to a capability aimed at undermining adversarial command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) frameworks through electromagnetic disruption.
The implications of this weapon go beyond battlefield utility. Analyzing the tactical, operational, and strategic impact of China’s new graphite bomb in a Taiwan scenario necessitates contextualization within a broader framework.
Timothy Heath and other writers mention in a June 2023 RAND report that Taiwan’s durability against China’s reunification efforts hinges on three interconnected factors: its infrastructure, economy and public resilience.
Heath and others state that disruption to power production could exacerbate economic hardships and public suffering. They note that since Taiwan is heavily dependent on trade, it is vulnerable to disruption in the event of a blockade, and low public tolerance towards hardship could result in limited support for resistance.
Highlighting the vulnerability of Taiwan’s power grid, the Financial Times (FT) reported in March 2024 that Taiwan’s energy grid faces acute wartime vulnerabilities due to its centralization, outdated crisis protocols and heavy (82%) dependence on imported fossil fuels for electricity generation.
Citing a war game by the Taiwan Center for Security Studies, the FT states that Greater Taipei relies on just three transmission chokepoints, which link northern demand centers to power plants in the center and south, making the grid highly susceptible to kinetic, cyber or electromagnetic attacks.
According to a Chinese military journal cited by SCMP in May 2025, a simultaneous strike on three key substations would carry a 99.7% probability of triggering a total blackout in northern Taiwan. The report adds that if timed for peak disruption, such as during a typhoon or election, the collapse of other infrastructure systems could unfold 40% faster.
Such infrastructure fragility makes graphite bombs an ideal first-strike tool in a strategy designed to break Taiwan’s will to fight before a conventional war even starts, especially if paired with a blockade that controls the tempo of escalation.
The logic of this strategy goes beyond infrastructure; it aims to fracture morale and governance. In line with that, Franklin Kramer and others write in a July 2024 Atlantic Council report that a large-scale attack could trigger cascading failures across Taiwan’s emergency services, healthcare, water supply and transportation, plunging society into chaos.
Such disruptions, they argue, could shake public faith in the government’s response, potentially destabilizing its ability to maintain order. They point out that the PLA could exploit societal collapse to enable a decapitation strike aimed at Taiwan’s political and military leadership.
Kramer and others emphasize that blackouts would be not merely collateral damage but a deliberate tactic designed to paralyze governance, disrupt national defense coordination and accelerate Taiwan’s potential capitulation.
Targeting Taiwan’s critical power infrastructure with “soft weapons” such as graphite bombs shows China’s approach to urban warfare. In an October 2022 RAND report, Sale Lilly notes that the PLA has increasingly focused on the challenges of urban warfare in its preparations for a potential invasion of Taiwan. He cites the Chinese idiom “killing rats in a porcelain shop” to illustrate the PLA’s recognition of the fragility of urban environments like Taipei and the need for caution in such settings.
Lilly explains that the phrase, drawn from historical precedent, conveys the difficulty of conducting combat operations without causing widespread damage. While the report highlights the PLA’s efforts to prepare for operations in complex urban terrain, it also points out that Chinese military writings may underestimate the duration and intensity of such fighting.
A graphite bomb attack on Taiwan’s power grid would likely be done in concert with a blockade and intense information warfare, all to ensure that the self-governing island capitulates with little to no resistance.
Noting Taiwan’s economic vulnerability, Bonny Lin and other writers mention in an August 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that in 2022, Taiwan’s imports and exports accounted for 61% and 69% of its GDP, respectively. They also note that 97% of Taiwan’s energy and 70% of its food are imported.
The same report warns that a Chinese blockade resulting in a 50% trade disruption could spark widespread blackouts and cripple key economic sectors, including the semiconductor industry. It adds that even without total isolation, incremental disruptions to fuel and food shipments alone could induce widespread panic, weaken morale, and prompt Taiwan to negotiate.
In concert with a blockade, Vincent So mentions in a May 2025 article for The Interpreter that China’s information warfare strategy toward Taiwan aims to erode political cohesion and societal confidence without triggering kinetic retaliation. So says that rather than persuading Taiwan that reunification is desirable, China aims to convince it that reunification is unavoidable.
He explains that this is pursued through gradualist grey-zone tactics, including cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion and narrative saturation, designed to normalize pressure and fragment decision-making. He adds that Taiwan’s fragmented media landscape creates fertile ground for amplification and manipulation, while elite economic dependencies enable quietist accommodation.
China’s graphite bomb is not just a battlefield tool; it is part of a broader strategy of incapacitation through blackouts, blockade, and narrative warfare. If China views blackout warfare as a prelude to political collapse, graphite bombs may not just be an option. They could be the opening act of a war designed to end without invasion at all.
