Since the infamous shouting match between the US President Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president has been scrambling to try and repair what looked initially like a near-total breakdown in the relationship between the US and Ukraine.
Zelensky, urged by European leaders, including the British prime minister, Keir Starmer, and the NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte, has tried to mend his ties with Trump.
The US president acknowledged as much in his first post-inauguration speech to Congress on March 5, saying that he appreciated Zelensky’s readiness to work for peace under US leadership.
But that happened just 24 hours after he decided to halt all military aid to Ukraine. And since then, the new director of the CIA, John Ratcliffe, and national security adviser, Mike Waltz, have confirmed that intelligence sharing with Kyiv, which was critical to Ukraine’s ability to hit strategic targets inside Russia, has also been suspended.
Neither of these two moves will have an immediate game-changing effect on the war, but they certainly increase pressure on Ukraine to accept whatever deal Trump will ultimately make with Putin.
So far, so bad for Zelensky. Yet Trump’s maneuvering does not only affect Ukraine. It has also had a profound impact on the relationship between the US and Europe.
On March 2, in the aftermath of the White House debacle, Starmer convened an emergency meeting in London with a select number of European leaders, as well as the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau.
This “coalition of the willing” has been in the making for some time now. Its members straddle the boundaries of the EU and NATO, including – apart from the UK – non-EU members Norway and Turkey.
Since the relatively disappointing first-ever EU meeting solely focused on defense on February 3 – which was more notable for the absence of a European vision for the continent’s role and place in the Trumpian world order – Europe has embarked on a course of more than just rhetorical change.
The UK was first out of the blocks. Ahead of Starmer’s visit to Washington, the UK government announced on February 25 an increase of defense spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027. This was then followed on March 2 with a pledge of additional air defence missiles for Ukraine worth £1.6 billion (US$2.1 billion).
Europe responds
In a crucial boost to defence spending at the EU level, the president of the European commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the “Rearm Europe” plan on March 4. It is projected to mobilize around 800 billion euros ($867.8 billion) for European defense.
This includes a “national escape clause” for EU members, exempting national defence expenditures from the EU’s deficit rules. It also offers a new loan instrument worth up to 150 billion euros, allows for the use of already allocated funds in the EU budget for defense projects, and proposes partnerships with the private sector through the Savings and Investment Union and the European Investment Bank.
Perhaps most significantly, in Germany, the two main parties likely to form the next coalition government announced a major shift in the country’s fiscal policy on March 5, which will allow any defense spending above 1% of GDP to be financed outside the country’s strict borrowing rules.
This marks an important point of departure for Germany. Apart from what it means in fiscal terms, it also sends an important political signal that Germany – the continent’s largest economy – will use its financial and political muscle to strengthen the emerging coalition of the willing.
These are all important steps. Taken together, and provided that the current momentum is maintained, they are likely to accelerate Europe’s awakening to a world in which US security guarantees as no longer absolute.
The challenges that Europe faces on the way to becoming strategically independent from the US are enormous. But they are not insurmountable.
The conventional military threat posed by an aggressive and revanchist Russia is more easily manageable with the planned boost to conventional forces and air and cyber defences. Close cooperation with Ukraine will also add critical war-fighting experience, which can boost the deterrent effect.
Europe for now, however, remains vulnerable in terms of its nuclear capabilities, especially if deprived of the US nuclear umbrella and faced with Russia’s regular threats to use its nuclear arsenal – the world’s largest nuclear power by warhead stockpiles.
But here, too, new strategic thinking is emerging. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, has indicated his willingness to discuss a more integrated European nuclear capability.
And in Germany, a country with an otherwise very complex relationship with nuclear weapons, such a European approach has been debated, increasingly positively, for some time, starting during Trump’s first term in office between 2017 and 2021.
Tectonic shift
A stronger, and strategically more independent Europe, even if it will take time to emerge, is also crucial for the war in Ukraine. Increased European defense spending, including aid for Ukraine, will help Kyiv in the short term to make up for at least some of the gaps left by the suspension – and possible complete cessation – of US military support.
In the long term, however, EU accession would possibly open up the route to a security guarantee for Ukraine under article 47.2 of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union.
This so-called mutual defense clause has been derided in the past for lacking any meaningful European defence capabilities. But if the current European momentum towards beefing up the continent’s defenses is sustained, it would acquire more teeth than it currently has.
With the benefit of hindsight, Zelensky may have walked away less empty handed from his clash with Trump last week than it seemed initially. If nothing else, Europeans have since then demonstrated not just in words but also in deeds that they are no longer in denial about just how dangerous Trump is and how much they are now on their own.
Threatened by both Moscow and Washington, Europe is now on the cusp of a second zeitenwende, the “epochal tectonic shift” that the then German chancellor Olaf Scholz acknowledged after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
They may finally even have found an answer to the question he posed at the time: “How can we, as Europeans and as the European Union, remain independent actors in an increasingly multi-polar world?”
Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko is professor of international relations and Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
