Great power competition is no longer waged only on battlefields – it has transcended into the realm of microchips, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing.
In this emerging “technopolar” order, where control over advanced technology will determine the trajectory of global power, the US and China are engaged in a fierce struggle to define the architectural framework of the 21st century.
The digital realm has become the new geopolitical frontier, where those who control data, computing power and related supply chains will dictate the rules of the future world order. And small countries will increasingly be pressured to choose technological sides in this fast-bifurcating new world order.
AI, semiconductors and quantum computing are not simply tools of economic progress; rather, they are force multipliers that are shaping everything from military superiority to global governance structures.
AI is one of the foremost domains where global techno-politics is playing out. There is an American model, a Chinese one and also British and French ones, each varying on how strategic imperatives surrounding AI are being construed.
Crucially, a nation with AI dominance will outpace adversaries in decision-making, cybersecurity and autonomous defense systems.
At the same time, semiconductors are the lifeblood of the modern digital economy. It would not be wrong to call it the “new oil “ of the global economy, as chips power everything from smartphones to fighter jets.
The main question is: If the world is facing a new techno-global order, where technological “haves” and “have-nots” will be demarcated according to which bloc a state is aligned, where does that leave developing states that lack the domestic industrial base and know-how to guard against technological dependencies?
The US-China tech war is more than a struggle for economic primacy—it is a defining moment in history. The winner of this contest will shape the rules of the digital age, the architecture of global security and the ideological trajectory of the international system.
This is no longer an era where passive reliance on market forces is sufficient. Tech alliances are already being discussed in Western capitals due to anxiety about China’s industrial prowess that is rapidly advancing and leapfrogging to supplant US counterparts.
Unlike the Cold War, where US technological dominance was clear and largely self-sufficient, today’s semiconductor supply chains are highly fragmented across multiple nations.
For example, Japan and the Netherlands are the principal suppliers of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. South Korea and Taiwan (TSMC) dominate advanced chip production. India is emerging as a key player in AI development and critical technology manufacturing.
For its strategic imperatives, Washington is striving to forge a web of strategic partnerships, crafting a new tech alliance to contain Beijing’s rise.
This “alliance” is characterized by, but not limited to, the Dutch-Japanese agreement to restrict high-end semiconductor equipment exports to China, the Quad’s focus on critical and emerging technologies, and US-Taiwan and US-South Korea agreements to safeguard semiconductor supply chains.
But containing China is not that simple. In the 1990s, the US tried the same with Japan but there are contemporary divergences. The US managed to circumscribe Japan’s technological rise through trade diplomacy, market competition and selective interventions.
However, China is not Japan, and it does not play by the same rules. Unlike Japan, which operated within the overarching Bretton Woods system, China’s industrial policy is deeply intertwined with the state-security apparatus.
In this vein, China actively stockpiles semiconductor tools and AI hardware, reinforcing its self-sufficiency strategy. China’s state-driven model has fueled rapid industrial growth, allowing tech companies like SMIC and Huawei to win global markets and develop cutting-edge technologies.
The US and its allies have failed to coordinate industrial policies, enabling China to dominate key sectors like solar energy and lithium-ion batteries. China is also well on the way to dominate global electric vehicle (EV) markets.
It’s simply impossible to vitiate China’s advancing technology unless tech blocs condition exclusivity in their spheres of influence. For small countries like Pakistan, there will soon be the dilemma of a binary choice. Technology will no longer be the “global common” it was since the 90s globalization boom.
The intersection of technology and global politics will increasingly push countries to align themselves with a singular technological order. This will require them to forego the others’ technology in their respective economies and societies.
It is obvious that such a zero-sum approach will be a Catch-22 situation for many countries in Asia, the Middle East and Europe, which are all walking a tightrope of balancing ties between the US and China.
There are other players, too, like the EU, France and Britain, but it’s likely for them to bandwagon with the US-led tech order, not the Chinese one.
Pakistan’s technological outlook shows an increasingly greater reliance on advanced Chinese tech, ranging from defense equipment, space satellites, EVs, 4G and 5G networks and even daily-use electronics.
Yet aligning too firmly in the Chinese tech camp might limit or close access to emerging new Western technology. Even if it picks a side, Pakistan will need to contribute in terms of manpower, knowledge-innovation or open markets.
It’s one thing to balance security ties between great powers, but an entirely different one to balance technological reliance. It’s a new geopolitical reality that will force Pakistan and others like it to make fateful geopolitical choices.
Hammad Waleed is a research associate at the Islamabad-based Strategic Vision Institute. He graduated with distinction from the National Defence University, Islamabad, and writes on national security, conflict, emerging technologies and public policy. He may be reached at hammadwaleed@thesvi.org
