China is racing to shatter US air dominance in the Pacific—one stealth jet, long-range missile and cratered runway at a time.
This month, a top US official stated that China is rapidly building its capacity to challenge US air superiority in the Pacific, particularly within the strategically vital First Island Chain.
Testifying before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), warned that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), with an order of battle of 2,100 fighters and over 200 H-6 bombers, is outproducing the US in fighter aircraft at a ratio of 1.2 to 1.
Paparo credited China with “high marks” for its ability to deny US air superiority along the First Island Chain, citing its fast-growing fighter fleet, advanced long-range air-to-air missiles and sweeping modernization across all warfighting domains.
Holding air superiority along the First Island Chain, which stretches from Japan to the Philippines, is essential for the US to operate and support allies like Taiwan.
Paparo stressed that air supremacy—total control of the air—will not be enjoyed by either side, but warned that without credible investment in long-range fires, integrated air and missile defenses, and advanced command and control systems, the US risks falling behind. “Ceding air superiority is not an option,” he cautioned.
Seth Jones and Alexander Palmer mention in a March 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that while China’s fighter production capacity is impressive, it is still behind the US in aircraft numbers, with the US maintaining an advantage in fifth-generation aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35 in particular.
However, Jones and Palmer point out that China is closing the production gap with the US. They note China is reportedly producing 100 fifth-generation J-20 fighters annually and tripling the production of other aircraft types, such as the J-10C and J-16, suggesting a high production rate. Jones and Palmer attribute China’s high fighter output to its centralized, whole-of-government approach to defense production.
In terms of long-range air-to-air missiles, Tyler Rogoway mentions in a December 2023 article for The War Zone (TWZ) that China’s new PL-17 is most likely a very long-range air-to-air missile with an estimated 300-kilometer range.
Rogoway notes that the PL-17 may be intended against airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, other aircraft close to the target, ground-based radar or satellites. He mentions that the size of the PL-17 may restrict it to being carried externally by China’s J-16 or J-20 fighters.
As for China’s rapid airpower growth, the US Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) states that the PLAAF and PLA Naval Aviation comprise the Indo-Pacific’s largest air force, with 3,150 aircraft—1,900 of them fighters—an increase of 400 in the last three years, per Aquilino.
Aquilino warns that if trends persist, China could soon overtake the US in total airpower, complementing its dominance on land and sea.
Given China’s looming quantitative fighter advantage, Matthew Revels mentions in an April 2023 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article that in an invasion of Taiwan, the PLA would likely mass air assets over the self-governing island to achieve localized, tactical air superiority instead of fighting to achieve strategic air dominance.
Beyond sheer fighter numbers, China’s missile capabilities pose an even greater threat to US air operations in the region.
Eamon Passey mentions in a December 2024 article for the American Foreign Policy Council that when it comes to conventional missiles, the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has a significant hardware advantage over the US.
Passey notes China has developed an extensive array of ballistic and cruise missiles that are oftentimes more numerous and sophisticated than their US counterparts. He says that while the US invests in hypersonic weapons technology, it lags behind China in development and deployment due to high costs and the complexity of integrating those weapons into its military framework.
Passey observes that China can make substantial investments in its missile capabilities mainly due to the absence of constraining arms control treaties. He also points out that the PLARF manages an autonomous, intensely focused and extensive missile program that has quickly developed to unite nuclear and conventional capabilities under a single command structure.
The PLARF is critical in China’s counter-intervention strategy in regional conflicts. Christopher Mihal mentions in a 2021 Military Review article that China, as of that year, has 2,200 conventional ballistic missiles and enough anti-ship missiles to attack every US surface combatant in the South China Sea, with sufficient firepower to overcome each ship’s missile defenses.
Further, Kelly Grieco and other writers mention in a December 2024 Stimson Center report that the PLARF is expected to play a leading role in neutralizing US airbases in Japan, Guam, and other Pacific locations, launching coordinated missile attacks to destroy US aircraft on the ground and cratering runways to make them unusable.
These missile capabilities threaten the US’s forward-deployed airpower, which remains highly vulnerable due to inadequate base fortifications, Greico writes.
Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton mention in a January 2025 Hudson Institute report that in a worst-case scenario, most US aircraft losses will occur on the ground, as its Pacific airbases lack hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) and individual aircraft shelters (IAS).
They mention that US operational concepts have assumed mainly that its aircraft would operate from forward airfields uncontested and that minor threats to those facilities would abate with the cessation of hostilities.
They say that thinking disregards China’s growing ability to strike those vulnerable facilities with missiles, aircraft and special forces. Shugart and Walton say China has enough firepower to make dispersal alone an ineffective countermeasure.
These shortcomings could prove catastrophic in the event of a Chinese assault on Taiwan, where a rapid US response would be critical to deterrence and defense.
Timothy Heath and other writers mention in a June 2023 RAND report that Taiwan is vulnerable to defeat in the first 90 days after an invasion, with that time being the minimum required for the US to marshal enough forces for military intervention.
In contrast, Bonny Lin and other writers mention in an August 2024 CSIS report that China can sustain major combat operations against Taiwan for six months as part of a larger blockade, with PLAAF and PLARF strikes aiming to neutralize the latter’s naval bases, coastal and air defense batteries and command and control with the option of unleashing more missile and air attacks should Taiwan continue to resist.
Lin and others say those intensified attacks also aim to prevent Taiwan from reconstituting damaged equipment and deploying additional weapons systems. If the US doesn’t act fast, the next battle for air superiority could be over before its aircraft even get off the ground.
