Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s visit to China on January 26-27 is the latest in a series of high-level bilateral engagements that began in October last year, when a thawing of relations that have been acrimonious since May-June 2020, began.
In Beijing, Misri, who was India’s ambassador to China from 2019-2021 — arguably the lowest period in bilateral ties in recent history owing to the violent clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers in Galwan Valley in Ladakh — met with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
The two sides had “frank, in-depth talks on issues of concern,” a Chinese readout of the talks said. In addition to resuming the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, they agreed in principle to resume direct air services and visa issuance for journalists and think tanks. They also agreed to promote and facilitate people-to-people exchanges and redouble public diplomacy to “restore mutual trust and confidence among the public.”
The need to “restore mutual trust” rhetoric has been reiterated at other recent high-level bilateral interactions as well. Indeed, strategic trust is a prerequisite to confidence building and in turn improving bilateral relations. Past experience shows that merely increasing political and commercial exchanges between New Delhi and Beijing is not by itself enough to build confidence. The focus on the cultural route to confidence building by fostering people-to-people exchanges, as reflected in the recent agreements, is therefore a welcome development.
However, rebuilding strategic trust is not going to be easy. The subtle divergences in the statements released by China and India respectively, especially in terms of how both sides characterized the talks, do not inspire much confidence. While New Delhi described meeting by saying both sides “reviewed the state of India-China bilateral relations comprehensively and agreed to take certain people-centric steps to stabilize and rebuild ties,” Beijing’s description was more optimistic and focused on both sides “discussing measures to improve and develop China-India relations.”
Notably, the Chinese readout begins with India being “willing to fully support China’s work as the rotating chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” The Indian statement makes no mention of this, although Misri had mentioned India’s support to China’s SCO presidency following the Modi-Xi talks in Kazan.
This is not the first time that questions have been raised about differing interpretations post bilateral exchanges. In 2023, following the talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at the sidelines of the Johannesburg BRICS summit, Chinese and Indian briefings offered clearly divergent views, which was even raised by the Indian opposition leaders.
While New Delhi claimed that during the meeting Modi insisted that “maintenance of peace and tranquility in the border areas and observing and respecting the LAC [Line of Actual Control] are essential for the normalization of the India-China relationship,” Beijing stated that Xi reiterated how “two sides should bear in mind the overall interests of their bilateral relations and handle properly the border issue so as to jointly safeguard peace and tranquility in the border region,” indicating a fundamental difference on how border issues impact the overall trajectory of ties. Beijing’s claims that the talks were held at New Delhi’s request were also refuted by Indian government sources, who claimed it was a “pending request” from the Chinese side.
More recently, following the meeting between India’s Minister for External Affairs S. Jaishankar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit at Rio de Janeiro in November 2024, The Hindu’s correspondent in China, Ananth Krishnan, noted key differences when it came to the description of the state of bilateral ties, the global situation, and multipolarity. Repeated instances of such divergences do not bode well when both sides are trying to address the mutual trust deficit issue.
Before substantial confidence can be built between the two countries, several lingering problems that cast a shadow over bilateral ties need to be addressed.
Foremost among them are economic issues. While Chinese export restrictions pose serious challenges for Indian manufacturers, especially in the electronics, solar, and electric vehicles industries, New Delhi’s blanket ban on Chinese investments through the automatic route introduced in 2020 remains in place, as does the permanent ban on 59 Chinese apps introduced due to national security concerns.
While it is true that despite such market access issues and a restrictive regulatory environment, bilateral trade has soared, the trade deficit correspondingly increased to an unsustainable $85.1 billion in 2024, in favor of China. The rising trade deficit has deepened insecurity in New Delhi owing to concerns about Beijing weaponizing India’s dependence on China.
It is unclear if these trade issues were discussed at the recent meeting. While the Indian readout mentions that “specific concerns in the economic and trade areas were discussed with a view to resolving these issues and promoting long-term policy transparency and predictability,” the Chinese statement is silent on the matter.
It must be noted that the Strategic Economic Dialogue, which was established in 2010 to discuss macroeconomic cooperation, was last held in September 2019.
Then there is the problem of China’s plans for dam construction on shared cross-border rivers that have long been a source of tension in Sino-Indian ties. With the Chinese government approving the construction of a mega-hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo River, near the contested border with India, environmental and security concerns have intensified in New Delhi. Although the India-China Expert Level Mechanism to discuss transboundary water issues has met regularly, and is scheduled to meet again soon, it has seemingly reached an impasse, unable to resolve any of the major disputes between the two countries.
Compounding the problem of trust deficit is public opinion. Amid mounting tensions and violent clashes in recent years, the perception of Indians and Chinese has grown increasingly negative. Domestic political consideration and media pressure have adversely impacted the pursuit of pragmatic diplomacy.
To rebuild strategic trust, both sides need to navigate domestic pressures and regional power dynamics. While mistrust or suspicions of their emerging neighbors is inevitable between countries, especially those that are neighbors and competitors, the “thaw-provoke-repeat” cycle characteristic of China-India relations will not bring bilateral relations on the track of stable development.
There are difficult hurdles in the way of India and China normalizing their relations. These need to be overcome through gradual, reciprocal, and compromise-minded cooperation measures. Rhetorical statements are not enough.
