As the war in Ukraine has ground into its third year, ceasefire negotiations have continued to falter. Despite mounting casualties and international fatigue, Russia shows little interest in halting its campaign. Ukraine, for its part, sees little to gain from any deal that would involve ceding territory.
To that end, recent American efforts to broker a truce have sparked significant debate. While some see these attempts as driven by a genuine desire for peace, others contend that Washington’s focus on quick resolution overlooks the stark realities on the ground.
In an interview for Asia Times, Atsuko Higashino, a professor of international studies at Tsukuba University, offered her insights on the issue. An expert in European security, she has been a prolific commentator on the Ukraine war since its outbreak.
How would you evaluate the ceasefire negotiations so far?
There have been numerous failed attempts at ceasefire negotiations, largely due to the Trump administration’s naive understanding of the situation in Ukraine and its misreading of both sides’ intentions. While Russia has faced setbacks in the southeast it continues to advance overall, albeit small and slow, having even regained territory in the Kursk region.
From Moscow’s perspective, now is hardly the time to stop. If the war drags on, Ukraine could be further weakened and Russia may stand to gain even more territory. Meanwhile, Ukraine has nothing to gain from a ceasefire that involves giving up its land.
The Trump administration seems to have overlooked this reality. Its approach to ceasefire talks is based on the mistaken belief that a deal heavily favoring Russia – with Ukraine making major concessions and Russia making few – could somehow succeed. This reflects a deeper misunderstanding of the conflict’s dynamics.
What do you think is Putin’s ultimate goal?
I believe it is the vassalization of Ukraine – what could also be described as the “Belarusianization” of the country. In other words, he aims to reduce Ukraine to a state that is entirely dependent on Russia for its national defense and key political decisions, rendering it incapable of functioning independently. The objective is to ensure that Ukraine will never again pursue closer ties with the West or seek membership in NATO or the European Union.
To that end, Russia is not fixated right now on achieving de jure recognition of Crimea as Russian territory or de facto acceptance of its control over the four southeastern provinces. From Moscow’s perspective, those regions are already part of Russia under domestic law. Constitutional amendments have formalized this claim, and Russia has demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from those areas as a precondition for further talks.
Do you think Russia has ambitions beyond the four occupied oblasts?
Yes, I believe that remains entirely conceivable. There still appears to be strong interest in additional southern regions, such as Mykolaiv and Odesa. I also don’t think Moscow has given up on expanding farther into the central and northeast – including Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city; Sumy, which was recently hit by a major attack; and Kryvyi Rih, President Zelensky’s hometown and a predominantly Russian-speaking area.
Frequently mentioned objectives at the outset of the war were to landlock Ukraine. This would mean seizing all coastal regions along the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, effectively cutting Ukraine off from maritime access. The broader strategic goal seems to be the creation of a Russkiy Mir – a “Russian World” – across these territories.
There have been reports suggesting that Russia may be open to freezing the current front lines. What’s your take?
This is a relatively new development. Until recently, Russia had maintained that negotiations could only begin once Ukrainian forces withdrew entirely from the four southeastern provinces – territories that, under Russian domestic law, have already been annexed and formally incorporated into the Russian Federation. The idea of fixing the front lines as they stand now only emerged in May, and even then, it does not reflect a unified or officially established Russian negotiating position.
How do you assess Obama and Biden’s Ukraine policies?
When the Obama administration came into office following the 2008 Russo-Georgia war, it was still finding its footing. Michael McFaul, then the US ambassador to Russia, wrote in his memoir that the invasion of Georgia was a turning point that forced him to think seriously about how Washington should deal with Moscow.
Yet, due to the timing of the transition, the administration did not deeply engage with the implications of that war. Instead, it focused on improving relations with Russia, pursuing the so-called “reset.” As a result, there was little strategic planning for how to respond if Russia continued changing the status quo by force.
Although the Obama administration was involved in the Minsk agreements, its broader posture was shaped by an overriding concern not to provoke Russia. That reluctance undermined the credibility of US deterrence and contributed to the perception that Washington would tolerate further aggression.
As for the Biden administration, history will ultimately render its verdict, but it’s fair to say it didn’t do everything it could have. Through its repeated, hesitant signaling, the Biden administration made Russia’s strategic calculations easier. It failed to act decisively – when it mattered most – particularly by delaying the provision of critical military support when Ukrainian forces needed it. This hesitation was a key reason the counteroffensive failed to gain real momentum.
How should Japan respond to Trump’s hardline rhetoric?
There is growing concern among security experts, including myself. The second Trump administration has even characterized the Japan-US Security Treaty as fundamentally unbalanced, with Japan shouldering little to no obligations.
For Japan, I believe it’s time to engage in a more open and realistic dialogue about what the US expects from its allies. Rather than reacting passively, Japan should proactively consider those expectations and formulate a concrete, strategic response.
