United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is heading to Japan. This visit needs to be more than cordial meetings reaffirming the US-Japan alliance as rock solid and discussing vague improvements with even vaguer timelines for completion. If that’s all it is, he might as well stay home and do it over Zoom.
Hegseth should return to the United States able to explain what he accomplished that improves US and Japanese warfighting power – both individually and collectively. He’ll do well to take a list of things the US military needs from the Japanese. US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) presumably has this list. Or at least it should.
Friends tell hard truths
Secretary Hegseth will also need to speak up, even if people tell him not to. Maybe keep in mind former Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s advice to the Americans who were dithering over asking to station an aircraft carrier in Yokosuka in 1970:
“Tell us what you need, and don’t back down.”
And more recently, a senior Japanese officer said:
“Tell us what we’re doing wrong. Only our friends will tell us that.”
So don’t just jigger around the edges, aiming for low-hanging fruit such as a few more, and more complex, exercises.
What both sides have been doing for the last 25 years has not deterred or even kept pace with a steady Chinese People’s Liberation Army build-up. The PLA went from a force people laughed at to one that operates aircraft carriers east of Taiwan and south of Japan.
It recently sailed a naval task force around Australia, stopping to conduct live-fire training in a show of intimidation and contempt. The China Coast Guard and Navy are leaning on the Japanese in more places, more often, and not just around the Senkaku Islands.
If Hegseth asks Japan for something, he just might get it. There are well-placed officials on the Japanese side who want to move things forward. But windows don’t stay open forever. And one Japanese person describes it as a “race against time.” One hopes that Hegseth’s staff will give him the aforementioned list. But here’s a couple of things I would include.
A real alliance, not just exercises
First, consider what the PRC would like the least. That’s a Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) that is equipped and ready for combat – and solidly linked and operating with American forces on a routine basis. So, create a permanent combined US-JSDF task force that is ready to fight. Despite 60+ years of the US-Japan military alliance, such a force has never existed.
One idea is to create a Joint Task Force – Nansei Shoto. Headquartered in Okinawa and with Japanese and American staff and naval, air, and ground forces allocated to the joint task force.
It would exercise and conduct patrols to defend Japan’s southern islands (the Nansei Shoto) that are under constant Chinese encroachment. It would cover Russian incursions, too. With a little effort, this could be moving within three months. Politically impossible? Only if you want it to be.
A permanent force with a real-world mission has a different dynamic than the “exercise mentality” that comes with conducting periodic, lovingly scripted exercises together. Moreover, a Japan Task Force – Nansei Shoto means more than declarations of “rock-solidness.” It might also be a stepping stone towards a US-Japan joint operational headquarters in Japan – covering the entire country.
Plus, it might sidestep (for now) the immediate challenge of turning US Forces Japan (USFJ) into a warfighting command. That seems to be causing undue difficulty for the US side and attracting attention from the Department of Government Efficiency.
Reexamine the defense policy review initiative
The second thing I’d add to the list is to take another look at the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) agreement, which will move US forces out of Japan just as the threats to Japan are increasing.
Reached in 2006 after many years of negotiation, the DPRI was premised on the doubtful belief that US forces in Japan – especially the US Marines on Okinawa – were such an irritant that they potentially threatened the entire US-Japan security relationship.
Thus, the thinking went, move a lot of them somewhere else – Guam, Hawaii and even back to the continental United States.
China wasn’t considered a problem back then. If anything, the idea was that with enough engagement and the “open hand of friendship,” the PRC would become a responsible stakeholder and liberalize. Even the Marines saw China as just a friend they hadn’t made.
The Japanese wanted the Americans gone – but, of course, on call to come back (and die for Japan) if things got dangerous. Indeed, it often seemed the Japanese considered the US military presence as more of a danger than the PRC. Some years later – after the China threat became apparent – one of the Japanese negotiators told me he wished they could re-do the deal.
Speak up or fall behind
Marines have recently started moving from Okinawa to Guam after many years of delay. Marine commanders are quietly saying they can’t perform required missions if DPRI is carried out. They need to make their case.
And DPRI needs prompt rethinking. You’ll hear, “It’s too hard.”
No. “Too hard” is being on the breaching party at Fallujah. Everything else is just an inconvenience.
But maybe the current US-Japan relationship is as good as it gets. And, anyway, Americans adapt, improvise, overcome. They’ve done it before. That may be true, but it can also mean some number of Americans will pay with their lives while we catch up. While we’ve prevailed in the past, there’s no reason to think we always will.
So Hegseth needs to get his list – and say what he needs. And don’t forget this works both ways.
The Japanese should tell the Americans what they need, too. And don’t hold back.
This all might cause some friction. But the US-Japan relationship doesn’t need another love-fest. It needs to be able to fight together.
Grant Newsham, a retired US Marine officer, is the author of When China Attacks: A Warning to America.
This article was originally published by Japan Forward. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.
