Afghan-Uzbek relations are expected to reach to a new high in 2025. Last year, the two countries stated aims to increase bilateral trade turnover to $3 billion. The planned construction of an Uzbek trade center, covering an area of 220 square meters, in Mazar-i-Sharif along with an effort for intensifying the implementation of the Trans-Afghan transport corridor might further solidify bilateral pragmatic cooperation between the two neighbors.
Over the last three years, Uzbekistan has pursued a proactive foreign policy toward Taliban-led Afghanistan based on its own strategic interests. Tashkent’s long-lasting obsession with a security-oriented approach has been traded for a pragmatic, economy-first foreign policy in relation to Kabul. Adopting a flexible and multivector approach to its Afghan policy might incur potential reputational risks for Uzbekistan’s international image. However, the current geopolitical reality and the historical links between Afghanistan and Central Asia underscore the significance of the country for Uzbekistan’s foreign policy priorities.
Historical Context
Tashkent’s foreign policy orientation toward Afghanistan is largely focused on the northern provinces. Historically, the two sides of the Oxus (the modern Amu Darya) were deeply connected through ethnic, historical, and cultural ties. The Afghan provinces of Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab, Sar-e Pol, Takhar, and Kunduz, where a significant Uzbek community resides, have long been closely connected to the civilizational space of Mavarannahr (also called Transoxiana), the legacy of which modern Uzbekistan upholds.
Some northern Afghan territories maintained administrative and political ties with the Emirate of Bukhara until the late 19th century, highlighting the longevity and depth of shared historical heritage.
This factor plays a crucial role in shaping contemporary Afghan-Uzbek relations, providing a foundation for sustainable partnership. Even during the tenure of Uzbekistan’s first president, when Tashkent officially exercised caution regarding Afghanistan, engagement with northern Afghanistan – particularly with the leader of the Uzbek community, Abdul Rashid Dostum – remained stable.
Over time, historical-cultural ties led to practical steps. A key contribution by Uzbekistan to the region’s infrastructure development was the construction of the 75-km Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif railway, completed in 2011 using its own funds. However, during that period, Tashkent’s priorities were primarily focused on security issues, and northern Afghanistan was regarded as a buffer zone ensuring strategic stability along Uzbekistan’s southern borders from the early 1990s to 2021.
Economic Context
Economic factors are playing a significant role in contemporary Afghan-Uzbek relations, shifting the focus away from security concerns. In recent years, Uzbekistan has actively expanded trade and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, establishing an International Trade Center in Termez, at the border, which has significantly boosted bilateral trade turnover. As part of furthering economic engagement, plans are under consideration to open a similar center in Mazar-i-Sharif, creating additional conditions for expanding trade and investment cooperation between the two countries.
Afghanistan, with its population of 41 million, represents a promising market for Uzbek goods. Currently, multiple countries – including China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Qatar, and the UAE – are showing interest in the Afghan market. Given the increasing competition, Tashkent faces the challenge of maintaining and strengthening its economic position in Afghanistan at a time when others are eyeing much the same.
While Afghanistan’s southern provinces are traditionally oriented toward Pakistan and its western regions toward Iran, Uzbekistan has the opportunity to sustain and expand its economic influence in the north. In this context, cultural and historical ties play a crucial role, fostering local preference for Uzbek goods and services in northern Afghanistan. This factor provides Tashkent with a strategic advantage in the competition for the Afghan market.
Qosh-Tepa Factor
The transformation of Uzbek foreign policy toward Afghanistan has manifested in its approach to the Qosh-Tepa Canal project. The Uzbek government has notably refrained from emphasizing the potential water-related tensions that may arise from the initiative. This careful approach can be attributed to the recognition that, for the sake of its own security, Tashkent has come to understanding the importance of fostering economic development in northern Afghanistan as a means of ensuring regional stability. Consequently, the prevailing consensus in Tashkent underscores the prioritization of security through economic cooperation and socio-economic development strategies. Uzbekistan’s approach to the canal project arguably demonstrates the evolving trajectory of Uzbek foreign policy toward Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, the development of agriculture and irrigation infrastructure in Afghanistan’s northern provinces contributes to improving living standards of local communities, and thereby strengthens bilateral relations between Tashkent and Kabul. In this context, Uzbekistan supports the implementation of the Qosh-Tepa project, provided it adheres to international norms and standards, ensuring the minimization of potential environmental risks and long-term benefits for all stakeholders.
Soft Power
Uzbekistan has placed a significant emphasis on educational initiatives in northern Afghanistan, viewing them as key factors in mutual understanding and eventually fostering the regional stability. In this regard, Tashkent has sponsored the construction of the “Khair al-Mudaris Imam Bukhari” madrassa in Mazar-i-Sharif. The institution is reportedly planned to be built with Uzbek-backed financial support amounting to $6 million and accommodating 1,000 students.
Tashkent believes that establishing such a joint educational institution might facilitate the development of a unified approach to religious education, which will eventually minimize the risk of radical ideologies spreading and strengthen the region’s spiritual security. Additionally, such a madrassa’s activities appear to foster a positive perception of Uzbekistan among Afghanistan’s religious community, which plays a crucial role in socio-political processes and governance. Thus, Uzbekistan’s involvement in preparing Afghanistan’s intellectual elite could become a vital instrument of its soft power strategy, contributing to the country’s long-term influence in the region.
Challenges
Although the Taliban appear to view Uzbekistan’s growing interest in northern Afghanistan as a positive development and recognize Tashkent as a key economic partner, several existing challenges could impact the development of bilateral relations.
First, the Taliban’s conscious and subtle push toward changing the ethnic landscape of the northern regions of Afghanistan could shift the balance in these provinces. Pashtuns, with their distinct cultural and historical background, may be less receptive to Tashkent’s initiatives in the area. In the long run, these developments might influence Uzbekistan’s strategic approach toward northern Afghanistan and could necessitate adjustments to it.
Second, Chinese influence in the northern regions of Afghanistan is growing. Chinese investments in extracting oil from the Amu Darya delta and the development of the Wakhan Corridor project could potentially shift local economic preferences in China’s favor, which might affect conditions for Uzbek investments in the region. Nevertheless, this process might present opportunities for Chinese-Uzbek cooperation aimed at transforming northern Afghanistan into a key transit hub for international projects, thereby enhancing Tashkent’s regional influence and advancing its economic interests.
Third, the implementation of international energy projects such as TAPI and CASA-1000 could lead to the Afghan energy market’s reorientation toward Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. This, in turn, may reduce Uzbekistan’s humanitarian assistance to northern Afghanistan while simultaneously diminishing Afghanistan’s reliance on energy cooperation with Uzbekistan. A weakening of energy diplomacy could impact the overall nature of bilateral relations.
Conclusion
Uzbekistan has recognized Afghanistan as a part of the broader Central Asian region, at least in discourse. The primary projects being implemented and planned by Uzbekistan are concentrated in the northern parts of Afghanistan, underscoring its strategic importance within Uzbekistan’s foreign policy framework.
Notably, Uzbekistan’s approach to the Qosh-Tepa Canal project as a development issue and a potential point for bilateral collaboration overweigh, at least for now, concerns about water security. In this context, Tashkent’s policy extends beyond its traditional national security concerns to encompass broader objectives – enhancing regional stability and socio-economic development – which, in turn, contribute to the long-term strengthening of Afghan-Uzbek relations. In the end, the water from the canal feeds Uzbeks inhabiting both sides of the border.
