After more than two hours on the phone on Tuesday, March 17, the US president, Donald Trump, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, agreed only to confidence-building measures, not to a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia.
The two leaders came away from the call having agreed on carrying out a limited prisoner exchange, suspending attacks on energy infrastructure and creating working groups to explore further steps towards a ceasefire and ultimately a peace agreement.
A less charitable way of looking at the outcome of the second call between the two presidents since Trump returned to the White House would be that the ball is now back in America’s court. Putin made it crystal clear to Trump that he is not (yet) in the mood for any compromise.
This is hardly surprising given recent events.
The US has pressured Ukraine mercilessly into accepting a proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, which Trump hoped Russia would also agree to. But apart from a vague statement by Trump that he might consider sanctions against Russia, he has so far seemed unwilling to contemplate putting any meaningful equivalent pressure on Putin.
On the ground, Russia has gained the upper hand in the Kursk region where Ukrainian troops have ceded most of the territory they captured after a surprise offensive last summer. Once Putin’s forces, assisted by thousands of North Korean soldiers, have succeeded in driving the Ukrainians out of Russia, Kyiv will have lost its most valuable bargaining chip in negotiations with Moscow.
Meanwhile, Russia has also made further gains on the frontlines inside Ukraine especially in parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. These are two of the four regions (the other two are Donetsk and Luhansk) that Putin has claimed for Russia in their entirety since sham referendums in September 2022, despite not yet having full control of them.
If Russia were to capture yet more Ukrainian territory, Putin would probably find it even easier to convince Trump that his demands are reasonable. The fact that Trump already hinted at a “dividing of assets,” including the nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia – Europe’s largest before its forced shutdown in September 2022 – is a worrying indication of how far the Russian president has already pushed the envelope.
But a deal solely between Russia and the US is not going to work. In that sense, time is not only on Putin’s side but also on Zelensky’s.
The Russian readout of the call between the two presidents claimed that they had discussed “the complete cessation of foreign military assistance and the provision of intelligence information to Kyiv” as a key condition for moving forward – something that Trump subsequently denied in an interview with Fox. This means that, for now, Kyiv is likely to continue to receive US aid.
Europe at the ready
Perhaps more importantly in the long term, Europe is also doubling down on support for Ukraine. While Trump and Putin were discussing a carve-up of Ukraine over the phone, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, left no doubt on where the EU stands.
In a speech at the Royal Danish Military Academy foreshadowing the publication of the commission’s Readiness 2030 white paper on bolstering European defences, she recommitted to developing European “capabilities to have credible deterrence” against a hostile Russia.
A few hours later, the German parliament passed a multi-billion Euro package that loosens the country’s tight borrowing rules to enable massive investments in defense. This follows announcements of increased defense elsewhere on the continent, including in the UK and Poland and by the EU itself.
Meanwhile, the UK and France are leading efforts to assemble a coalition of the willing to help Ukraine. Representatives of the 30-member group gathered in London on March 15 for further talks.
Afterwards, the UK prime minister, Keir Starmer, released a statement saying that Ukraine’s western partners “will keep increasing the pressure on Russia, keep the military aid flowing to Ukraine and keep tightening the restrictions on Russia’s economy”.
Undoubtedly, these measures would be more effective if they had Washington’s full buy-in – but they send a strong signal to both the Kremlin and the White House that Ukraine is not alone in its fight against Russia’s continuing aggression.
Putin’s options
Putin, meanwhile, may have time on his side in the short term – but he should take note of this: Russian manpower and firepower may dwarf that of Ukraine, but it would be no match for a Ukraine backed by such a coalition of the willing.
Putin’s apparent plan to drag Trump into the minutiae of negotiating a comprehensive deal may eventually backfire in more ways than one. For a start, really detailed discussions will test the US president’s notoriously short attention span.
But this will also buy time for Ukraine and its supporters to strengthen Kyiv’s position in future negotiations. And it will continue to strain – but not immediately break – Russia’s economy.
For now, Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine have stalled. He is attempting to broker a complex ceasefire deal that involves separate agreements with Kyiv and Moscow, pressure on NATO allies, and an attempt to drive a wedge between Russia and China. It’s not clear how this will succeed – or, indeed, where it will end.
The only certainty is that they are not bringing a just and stable peace for Ukraine any closer.
Stefan Wolff is a professor of international security at the University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko is a professor of international security and Jean Monnet professor of European security at the National University Odesa Law Academy.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
