As the United States officially launched a tariff war against China, China convened an unusual Central Conference on Work Relating to Neighboring Countries on April 8 and 9. All members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China’s top political body, attended. At the meeting, CCP General Secretary and China’s President Xi Jinping emphasized the need to focus on “building a community with a shared future for neighboring countries.” He also proposed for the first time an “Asian security model.”
China’s convening of such a conference at this time aims to strengthen economic ties with Central Asia, as well as Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, thereby consolidating its backyard. It’s an indication that Beijing will strengthen its relationship with neighboring countries to respond to the China-U.S. trade war.
On April 2, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the imposition of “reciprocal tariffs” on a large number of countries – including a 34 percent tariff hike on Chinese goods. Beijing retaliated with equivalent tariff measures. Following a series of escalations, the U.S. tariff rate on Chinese goods has reached 145 percent, even as Trump instituted a 90-day “pause” in the extra tariff hikes for all other countries (a 10 percent tariff remains in place). Meanwhile, China has raised its tariffs on imported goods originating from the U.S. to 125 percent.
According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s readout of the Central Conference, Xi “clarified the goals, tasks, ideas and measures for neighborhood work in the coming period” and “emphasized the need to focus on building a community with a shared future with neighboring countries, striving to break new ground in neighborhood work.”
Noting China’s long border – the country shares land borders with 14 countries, and that’s not counting its maritime neighbors – the conference highlighted the crucial importance of “neighborhood diplomacy” for reasons of both economic development and national security. The Foreign Ministry described China’s immediate periphery as “a vital foundation for achieving development and prosperity, a key front for safeguarding national security, a priority area in managing overall diplomacy, and a crucial link in promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.”
The ministry readout continued: “It is necessary to view neighboring regions through a global perspective and enhance the sense of responsibility and mission in effectively conducting work related to neighboring countries.”
The Foreign Ministry described China’s relations with its neighboring countries as being “at their best in modern times,” while noting that neighborhood diplomacy is “also entering a critical phase of deep linkage between the regional landscape and the world changes.” Under such conditions, the readout said, it is necessary to “take into account both domestic and international imperatives, and coordinate the two top priorities of development and security.”
This meeting emphasized three concepts: China’s periphery or neighborhood diplomacy, creating “a community with a shared future for mankind,” and Xi’s call for “an Asian security model.”
Much will depend on how China’s partners respond.
China’s New Focus on Its Neighborhood
First, China’s “periphery” is a geopolitical concept denoting the regions and countries in the geographical vicinity of China. In the traditional view, it encompasses areas and nations connected to China both by land and sea. The China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), a think tank affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, defines “China’s periphery” as consisting of 29 countries. This group includes not only the 20 countries that share land or sea borders with China, such as India, Mongolia, North Korea, the Philippines, and Japan, but also nine other countries. These nine countries – Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – are located in China’s near abroad, and are relatively reliant on China across various sectors. Their dependence on China in economic, trade, cultural, and other aspects makes them an integral part of the concept of China’s “periphery” or “neighborhood.”
Among China’s 29 “neighboring” countries, with the exception of Russia, all others are Asian nations. Excluding Bhutan, which does not have diplomatic relations with China, the remaining 28 countries have established various forms of partnerships with China, including comprehensive strategic partnerships, strategic cooperative partnerships, or mutually beneficial relationships.
According to official news reports, China has reached consensus with 17 neighboring countries on building a “community with a shared future,” signed Belt and Road cooperation agreements with 25 neighboring countries, and is the largest trading partner for 18 of them. Nine neighboring countries have signed treaties of good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation with China, and 12 of its 14 land neighbors (all but India and Bhutan) have resolved historical border issues with China through negotiations.
While the concept of “neighborhood diplomacy” is not new, it is rare to hold such a high-level conference on the topic. The last such event was the Symposium on Diplomatic Work With Neighboring Countries, held in October 2013, which also lasted for two days and was attended by all members of the Politburo Standing Committee. At that symposium, the strategic goals, basic principles, and overall layout of China’s diplomatic work with neighboring countries were proposed, and the working ideas and implementation plans for addressing major issues facing this diplomatic work were clarified. However, it was not formally named a “Central Conference” like the current one.
In 2013, the then-Obama administration in the United States had already proposed the “Pivot to Asia” strategy, and China-U.S. relations were facing adjustments. The current situation is even more severe, hence the elevated level of the meeting.
Still, the lack of high-level political meetings devoted to the topic doesn’t mean that neighborhood diplomacy was not a focus for China between 2013 and 2025. In 2017 and 2022, the 19th and 20th National Congress Reports of the CCP respectively further proposed to “deepen friendly mutual trust and the integration of interests with neighboring countries.” On October 24, 2023, Xi delivered a written message to an international symposium on diplomacy with neighboring countries, emphasizing that in the new era, “we will endow the concept of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness with new connotations, promote the Asian values centered on peace, cooperation, inclusiveness, and integration, and provide new impetus for regional unity, openness, and progress.”
Beyond holding the Central Conference, China’s diplomatic activities abroad also reflect a focus on China’s neighborhood. This week, Xi Jinping is visiting Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia. In early May and June, he is also expected to attend the Moscow’s events commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory in World War II and the China-Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan, respectively. Ulaanbaatar has also repeatedly expressed its invitation for Xi to visit Mongolia in the near future. According to Korean media reports, China has indicated to South Korea that Xi will attend the APEC summit in South Korea in late October or early November. Tokyo is actively promoting a visit to Japan by Xi. It is reported that Japan plans to hold the 10th trilateral summit between South Korea, China, and Japan in the first half of 2025.
With these efforts, China seeks to strengthen its diplomatic united front, rallying countries similarly pressured by the United States to counter the comprehensive China-U.S. trade war. Southeast Asian nations are a particular focus for Beijing, as evidenced by Xi’s first trip of 2025 highlighting the region.
China’s Vision for a “Community With a Shared Future for Mankind”
The concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind” is a significant initiative put forward by Xi Jinping to address global challenges and promote world peace and development. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it, the concept “is China’s answer to the question of ‘what kind of world to build and how to build it.’” China actively promotes the implementation of this concept by signing cooperation documents with various countries – not only those in its immediate periphery.
According to the White Paper “Building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind: China’s Proposals and Actions,” released by the State Council Information Office, as of July 2023, more than three-quarters of the world’s countries and more than 30 international organizations had signed cooperation documents.
On January 2, 2025, the Research Center for a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind was officially inaugurated at China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing. The center aims to provide theoretical, policy, discourse, and talent support for building a community with a shared future for mankind, serving China’s diplomatic goals.
An Asian Security Model
Finally, the Central Conference particularly emphasized Asian values and an “Asian security model” to highlight the contrast with the United States. Xi has been pushing for a new and exclusively Asian security framework since 2014, when China hosted the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). The idea is to reshape the current security order, which is based on the “hubs and spokes” system of U.S. alliances. However, China has faced challenges in operationalizing its vision for a new Asian security model.
Amid the China-U.S. bilateral deadlock and increasingly skepticism of U.S. reliability, however, interest may be growing.
In January 2025, after a six-year hiatus in the exchange mechanism, a delegation from Japan’s ruling coalition – led by Liberal Democratic Party Secretary-General Moriyama Hiroshi and Komeito Party Secretary-General Nishida Makoto – visited China. While there, the Japanese side formally raised Komeito’s suggestion of establishing an “Asian version of the OSCE” (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe).
This initiative seeks to create a non-binding multilateral security dialogue mechanism focused on conflict prevention and crisis management in the Asian region. This proposal aims to establish a regional security consultation platform covering Asia, modeled after the dialogue mechanism in Europe during the Cold War. It intends to create a nonbinding multilateral dialogue mechanism, similar to the OSCE model, focusing on addressing issues such as conflict prevention and crisis management in the Asian region.
The initial concept, as outlined by Komeito, calls for “the establishment of a permanent institution” – headquarters in Tokyo, if possible – “with participation from Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, the United States, Russia and other countries.” Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru has been receptive to the idea, even announcing at a March 2025 Senate Budget Committee meeting that his government would focus on setting up an Asian equivalent to the OSCE.
“We must establish a multilateral security mechanism in Asia,” Ishiba reportedly said. “We can’t set up an Asian version of NATO all at once, so I think we should focus on disaster prevention and public security and set up an Asian version of the OSCE.”
Just before his election as the head of the LDP – and thereby Japan’s prime minister – Ishiba had proposed the idea an “Asian version of NATO,” but the plan was opposed by China, South Korea, and other countries. The new idea to establish an “Asian version of the OSCE” to address regional security issues can be seen as a strategic adjustment and seems more practically feasible, as Ishiba himself acknowledged.
Tokyo’s surface promotion of regional peace may, in fact, be aimed at expanding its influence through this mechanism to balance the China-U.S. rivalry, particularly focusing on the management of hot issues such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea. However, the Japan-U.S. alliance may constrain the organization’s independence.
Why, then, did Japan choose to propose this suggestion to China? It is very likely that Japanese policymakers have sensed China’s interest in such cooperative security mechanisms. At around the same time, for example, China and Japan agreed on a visit by a delegation from the People’s Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command to Japan. Sino-Japanese defense exchanges are aimed at discussing the regional security situation, which seems to coincide with Japan’s proposal to establish an Asian version of the OSCE.
The Case of Mongolia
As China’s immediate northern neighbor, Mongolia holds a pivotal role in Beijing’s peripheral diplomacy, with bilateral trade and investment ties deepening significantly in recent years. While Ulaanbaatar has not yet formally joined China’s “community with a shared future for mankind” initiative, Mongolia is likely to actively study the relevant cooperation framework documents to maintain strategic mutual trust and prevent unnecessary misunderstandings arising from differences in strategic perceptions.
The Mongolian People’s Party and Democratic Party – Mongolia’s two main political parties, currently ruling in a coalition arrangement – both maintain close institutional exchanges with the Chinese Communist Party. Against this backdrop, drawing on the experience of Beijing’s exchange mechanisms with political parties in Japan, Russia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, ASEAN countries and other nations, China and Mongolia are likely to explore the establishment of a dedicated ruling party exchange and cooperation mechanism based on their existing inter-party cooperation foundation. This aligns with the need to upgrade the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries.
Should Japan, China, and other Asian countries establish an OSCE-style Asian regional security framework, Ulaanbaatar would likely weigh its participation cautiously. Like many other countries in Asia, Mongolia worries about pressure to take sides in the China-U.S. confrontation.
Revisiting the past, in November 2012, Mongolia formally joined the OSCE as its 57th member state. As one of only nine non-European members within the OSCE, it shares this distinction with Central Asian nations Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Mongolia jointed the OSCE in the same year it established a NATO “global partnership,” demonstrating Ulaanbaatar’s strategy to counterbalance Chinese and Russian influence. Both accessions aligned with Mongolia’s “Third Neighbor Policy.”
While OSCE membership grants Ulaanbaatar participation in conflict prevention and arms control discussions, Mongolia’s non-European status inherently limits its decision-making weight. The practical benefits of this affiliation are in question amid growing scrutiny amid shifting regional dynamics.
Notably, despite pursuing Western partnerships, Mongolia’s economy remains critically dependent on mineral exports to China (constituting over 80 percent of its total exports), as evidenced by Ulaanbaatar’s keen interested in the China-Mongolia cross-border railway project. Russia and other OSCE members remain skeptical of Mongolia’s asserted “European identity,” while the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – which originally focused on Central Asia, although it has since expanded – has pressed Ulaanbaatar for clearer geopolitical alignment. This tension underscores Mongolia’s delicate balancing act between multilateral aspirations and inescapable economic dependencies.
Beijing is actively adjusting its diplomatic strategy, placing greater emphasis on its relationships with neighboring countries, and attempting to establish a China-led security framework in the Asian region. This strategic adjustment reflects China’s deep understanding of the current international situation and its firm commitment to safeguarding its national interests. Countries neighboring China, such as Mongolia and Vietnam, are closely watching these reactions and adjustments and waiting to see how the situation evolves.
